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ABSTRACT 
Iran supports insurgent and counterinsurgent groups across the Middle East in 
opposition to the United States’ interests. Therefore, it is important to understand the 
strategy and approach of Iranian insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN). Iran's 
expertise in insurgency and counterinsurgency comes from its experience battling 
opposition groups inside its borders. Since 1979, Iran has frequently combatted 
insurgencies in peripheral territories. One of Iran’s most problematic regions has been the 
south-eastern province of Sistan-Baluchistan, where for almost 20 years Iranian security 
apparatuses have struggled against violent ethno-sectarian insurgency from Baluch rebel 
groups like Jundallah. This thesis examines Iran’s COIN strategy in Sistan-Baluchistan 
from 2003 to 2020, and the degree to which that strategy has been successful. Initially, 
Iran’s COIN was ineffective. However, Iran has revised its approach to the Baluch 
insurgency, tailoring its strategy to meet the circumstances, with better results. There are 
two factors that have driven the improved Iranian COIN performance against Baluch 
insurgents. First, the insurgency has fragmented since Jundallah’s demise. Second, and 
more significantly, the improved COIN performance in Sistan-Baluchistan is a result 
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ increasingly active and 
authoritative involvement in controlling the COIN campaign.
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1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since 2001, the United States and its allies in the Middle East have once again 
found their military and security forces heavily engaged in missions of counterinsurgency 
(COIN). In particular, with the American invasions and nation-building operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has become involved in 
COIN operations to a degree and depth not seen since the Vietnam war. Across the Middle 
East, insurgency and COIN continue to seemingly expand in relevance with regards to have 
also conflicts which the United States is now involved in, to include ongoing conflicts in 
Syria and Yemen.  
Concerns of insurgency and COIN not only shape U.S. considerations, but that of 
its potential adversaries in the region. In particular, the Islamic Republic of Iran has in the 
last two decades combatted significant opposition movements inside of its own borders. In 
addition to nonviolent movement, such as the 2009 Green Revolution, Iran has been nearly 
constantly engaged with significant, violent groups on its peripheries. In Iran’s Northwest, 
Iranian security forces combat insurgency from ethnic Kurdish groups seeking their own 
independent state. In the Southwest, Iran has been struggling against an insurgency from 
ethnically Arab separatists in Khuzestan. Finally, and most famously, in Iran’s 
Southeastern provinces, for 20 years the Islamic Republic has combatted an ethno-sectarian 
insurgency among Iran’s Baluch populations. Thus far, despite multiple violent 
insurgencies in its borderlands, the Iranian state appears to be enduring, if not defeating the 
insurgent threat. Given U.S. involvements in COIN in a number of conflicts throughout the 
Middle East, the United States ownership of a mixed record in COIN, and the impact that 
Iran has on the entire Middle Eastern environment, Iran’s COIN deserves further academic 
attention and analysis. 
This thesis seeks to contribute such analysis and information to the subject of 
Iranian Counterinsurgency through examination of Iran’s response to modern Baluch 
insurgency. More specifically, this thesis aims to determine what Iran’s COIN approach 
has been to Baluch insurgency in the past two decades, and to determine the degree to 
which that approach has been successful. 
2 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE IRAN-INSURGENT DYNAMICS 
As the topic of this thesis’ inquiry concerns an area of the world, as well as a 
specific ethnic identity which is not commonly recognizable to the average person, it is 
therefore necessary to provide some brief background on the Baluch, Sistan-Baluchistan, 
and Baluch insurgent groups prior to articulation of the research question and its 
significance. As such, this section will first overview the identity of the Baluch, then 
provide overview of Sistan-Baluchistan province, and then finally articulate some specifics 
on Baluch insurgents active in Sistan-Baluchistan province. 
1. Who Are the Baluch1 
The Iranian Baluch are considered a distinct ethnicity, religion, and culture, from 
the ethnic Persian majority of Iran. These differences cause significant tensions between 
the Iranian government and the Iranian Baluch, which lies at the heart of the insurgencies 
in Sistan-Baluchistan. Iran’s government and society is dominated by the Persian ethnicity, 
and a majority of the country is also Shia.2 By contrast, the Baluch identify themselves, 
and are also discriminated against by the Iranian government, as a separate and distinct 
cultural and religious identity.3 Though the Baluch did not have any written history until 
the 1800s, the Baluch, as well as many Western scholars assert that the Baluch had already 
established themselves as a distinct community before the estimated birth of Jesus Christ.4 
The Baluch speak their own language, called Baluchi, which is separate and distinct from 
 
1 There are multiple spellings of Baluch. Most commonly, referencing the Baluch populations of Iran, 
especially in Western academic circles, spell it “Baluch.” Conversely, when referencing Pakistani 
populations, it is more common to see their noun spelled “Baloch.” in this pattern, this thesis uses the same 
differentiation; “Baluch,” “Baluchistan,” etc., are used to refer to the Iranian side of the border, whereas 
“Baloch” and “Balochistan” are used in reference to Pakistani affairs. There are two exceptions to this 
usage, first in terms of direct quotation, if the source used an alternative spelling, it remains as the source 
spelled it. Second, if the reference is prior to the establishment of the Iranian and Pakistani territories, this 
thesis defaults to the “Baluch” spelling for consistency. 
2 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, Member Profile: West Balochistan, Balochistan 
People’s Party (Brussels: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, August 2017), 2, 
https://unpo.org/downloads/2341.pdf. 
3 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 9. 
4 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (New 
York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), 11. 
3 
the Iranian state language of Persian.5 Further separating themselves from the Persian-Shia 
ethno-religious majority, the Baluch have a distinctly tribal culture. There are at least 
seventeen Baluch tribes,6 each made up of several clans, with a designated leader, called a 
sardar.7 The tribal social culture social is almost entirely dominated by conditions of 
marriage, descent, familial, tribe, and clan relations.8 Some Baluch tribes are historically 
nomadic, but in more recent centuries these clans and tribes have increasingly become 
semi-settled agricultural communities.9 A very large part of the Baluch identity is 
intertwined with the harsh geography of the region, which mostly oscillates between 
rugged mountains and “semidesert wasteland.”10 Historically, this terrain has physically 
separated the Baluch from surrounding cultures and societies.  
2. What Is Sistan-Baluchistan? 
Sistan-Baluchistan is the South-Eastern Province of Iran where nearly all the 
Iranian Baluch reside. Sistan-Baluchistan borders both Pakistan and Afghanistan.11 
Geographically, the terrain of Sistan-Baluchistan is harsh, with significant portions of 
rugged mountain as well as barren desert.12 The dearth of arable, or hospitable terrain in 
the province led an American geological team in 1979 to characterize Sistan-Baluchistan 
as “the closest thing to Mars on Earth.”13 Additionally, Sistan-Baluchistan is one of the 
least densely populated provinces of Iran—just as the Baluch dominated province in 
 
5 Carina Jahani, “The Balochi Language and Languages in Iranian Balochistan,” Journal of the Middle 
East and Africa 4, no. 2 (May 2013): 165, https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2013.831333. 
6 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, 10. 
7 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, Member Profile, 9. 
8 Brian Spooner, “The Baloch in Islamic Civilization, Western Ethnography, and World History,” 
Journal of the Middle East and Africa 4, no. 2 (October 2013): 136, https://doi.org/10.1080/
21520844.2013.831021. 
9 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, Member Profile, 9. 
10 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, 7. 
11 “In Depth: Sistan-Baluchestan,” Al Jazeera, October 19, 2009, https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/
2009/10/20091018135453355456.html. 
12 “Inside Iran’s Most Secretive Region,” The Diplomat, May 16, 2011, https://thediplomat.com/2011/
05/inside-irans-most-secretive-region/.  
13 The Diplomat.  
4 
Pakistan—with an average of 14 people per square kilometer.14 Sistan-Baluchistan is also 
without question Iran’s poorest region, with Iran’s lowest per-capita income, near the 
lowest for life expectancy, and the highest infant mortality.15 
Sistan-Baluchistan is notorious for the rampant criminality which reportedly 
pervades the province. Sistan-Baluchistan is frequently described as Iran’s most “lawless 
region.”16 There is a wide-spread cross-border smuggling industry inside of Sistan-
Baluchistan, with Iranian fuel being smuggled into Pakistan, and narcotics flowing from 
Pakistan and Afghanistan into Iran.17 These criminal enterprises are also violent, and 
hostile to Iranian authorities. It is estimated that since the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in 1979, at least 4,000 police and military personnel have been killed in 
Sistan-Baluchistan in relation to smuggling, the drug trade, and other criminal 
enterprises.18 
3. Who Are the Modern Baluch Insurgents? 
The Baluch insurgency inside Sistan-Baluchistan consists of multiple, sometimes 
overlapping organizations. Some organizations are small, with less than a dozen fighters.19 
Others, such as Jundullah, may have been as large as 1,000 strong at their zenith.20 Some 
organizations communicate and cooperate with one another, while others view other 
 
14 “Population Statistics of Iran,” Knoema, January 24, 2018, https://knoema.com/IRPS2014/
population-statistics-of-iran?region=1000160-sistan-and-baluchestan. 
15 The Diplomat, “Inside Iran’s Most Secretive Region.” 
16 Al Jazeera, “In Depth: Sistan-Baluchestan”; Robert Tait, “Iran Suicide Bombing Kills 
Revolutionary Guards Commanders,” Guardian, October 18, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2009/oct/18/iran-revolutionary-guard-suicide-bomb; “Senior Police Officers among Seven Dead in Iran 
Plane Crash: IRNA,” Reuters, October 12, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-airplane-crash/
senior-police-officers-among-seven-dead-in-iran-plane-crash-irna-idUSKCN0I107S20141012. 
17 Sadegh Souri, “The Iranian Smugglers Trafficking Fuel into Pakistan,” Wired, November 9, 2017, 
https://www.wired.com/story/fuel-smugglers-photos/; Al Jazeera, “In Depth: Sistan-Baluchestan.” 
18 “Iran Hangs 16 Rebels in Reprisal for Border Deaths,” BBC, October 26, 2013, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24682729. 
19 Sajid Hussain Baloch, “The Other Jihadis,” Sajid H. Baloch Blog, November 28, 2013, 
https://sajidhbaloch.wordpress.com/2013/11/28/the-other-jihadis/. 
20 “Iran: An Examination of Jundallah,” Stratfor, July 28, 2010, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/
iran-examination-jundallah#/home/error. 
5 
insurgent organizations with suspicion and hostility. The particular dynamics of these 
organizations, and their relations to one another, are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 
IV and V. Currently, this subsection will discuss the archetypal structure of Baluch 
insurgent organizations, as well as what this thesis will and will not classify as a Baluch 
insurgent organization. 
Jundallah serves as the archetype for modern Baluch insurgency inside of Iran. At 
its inception, Jundallah was concentrated around an ethnic Baluch named Abdolmalek 
Rigi, and Abdolmalek Rigi remained the central figure of Jundallah until he was killed. 
According to Rigi, he started an anti-Iranian state militant group because the state killed 
his relatives and friends.21 Jundallah claimed to fight for the rights of the Baluch, whom 
the organization claimed had for decades been marginalized and oppressed as a people 
because of sectarian, ethnic, and linguistic differences compared to the Iranian Persian 
majority.22 Jundallah remained operative from 2003 to 2012. Its first attack was reportedly 
in 2005, when the organization assaulted a presidential security detail when President 
Ahmadinejad visited Sistan-Baluchistan Province.23 In 2010, Iran reportedly captured, and 
then subsequently executed Abdolmalek Rigi.24 Before he died, Abdolmalek Rigi went on 
Iranian television, and claimed that Jundallah was receiving support from the United States 
and NATO allies.25 Currently, there remains no consensus on which countries, if any, 
actually supported Jundallah. It is also uncertain if Rigi’s statement was made under 
coercion or threat from the Iranian government.26 That said, according to documents 
obtained by Foreign Policy, it appears that if Rigi did indeed have foreign support, it likely 
 
21 Stéphane A. Dudoignon, The Baluch, Sunnism and the State in Iran (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 227. 
22 Dudoignon, 227. 
23 Stratfor, “Examination of Jundallah.” 
24 “Iran Commander Says People ‘Celebrate’ Execution of Rebel Leader,” IRNA, June 20, 2010, 
NewsBank; “‘West Facing Constant Defeat in Iran’,” PressTV, July 13, 2010, https://web.archive.org/web/
20100716221828/http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=134627§ionid=351020101. 
25 Mark Perry, “False Flag,” Foreign Policy, January 13, 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/13/
false-flag/. 
26 Perry.  
6 
came from Israeli operative who were impersonating U.S. officials.27 Following Rigi’s 
demise, Jundallah eventually disbanded in 2012. 
As discussed in the previous subsection, crime and criminal violence against 
Iranian authorities is common in Sistan-Baluchistan. There are also direct relations 
between the criminal enterprises run and operated by ethnic Baluch and the Baluch 
insurgency. Abdolmalek Rigi’s family, for example, was known for smuggling and 
criminal enterprise prior to Jundallah’s establishment.28 Nevertheless, it is important for 
the purposes of this thesis to separate simple criminal activity from insurgent operations; 
analyzing both, as well as the Iranian response to these two related, but vastly different 
issues is simply beyond the scope of this thesis. Consequently, this thesis will only consider 
those organizations whose express purpose is to fight against the Iranian government on 
behalf of the Baluch people, and who conduct this fight in a violent manner, Baluch 
insurgent groups. This thesis will consider Iranian efforts and responses to these 
organizations COIN, where actions against other organizations and individuals will be 
considered law enforcement, and thus outside the scope of this thesis. 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis aims to answer two primary questions: First, what has been Iran’s 
approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) with respect to the Sistan-Baluchistan insurgency? 
Second, how successful and effective have Iranian counterinsurgency efforts been in 
Sistan-Baluchistan, and what tactics, techniques, procedures, and initiatives have proven 
effective in Iran’s defense against the Sistan-Baluchistan Insurgency? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH QUESTION 
Scholarship on counterinsurgency (COIN) is centered on the Western experience. 
More specifically, the current body of literature on COIN mostly concentrates on the 
military experiences which pertain to colonial and post-colonial Western powers. The 
 
27 Perry.  
28 Chris Zambelis, “The Evolution of the Ethnic Baluch Insurgency in Iran,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 3 
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pedigrees of the most prominent COIN theorists to illustrate this point. For Example, David 
Galula and Roger Trinquier were French officers in the Algerian war, David Kilcullen was 
a U.S. COIN advisor in Iraq and Afghanistan, and John Mackinlay served in the British 
Ghurka Regiments.29 However, there is an entire body of insurgencies and 
counterinsurgencies which do not bear heavy Western fingerprints. These include the 
Tamil Tiger insurgency in Sri Lanka, Algeria’s counterinsurgency against Islamic 
networks in the 1990s, Chechnyan Insurgencies against Russia, and attempted Tibetan and 
Uyghur insurgencies in China. Iranian counterinsurgency efforts in Baluchistan are also 
nearly devoid of Western influence, and by studying this topic, a valuable contribution of 
validation, juxtaposition, and reassessment of COIN concepts might be offered to the 
growing body of literature on global counterinsurgencies. 
Concerning U.S. regional security, Iran has consistently functioned as an 
adversarial regional power to the United States since the 1979 Revolution and subsequent 
establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.30 Recently, U.S.–Iranian tensions have 
escalated. The Trump administration has accused Iranian agencies of backing groups in the 
Middle East that both threaten and attack U.S. forces in the region and has expanded 
sanctions on Iran.31 Iran has increased its aggressive rhetoric and threatened to expand 
nuclear enrichment.32 Former members of the Trump Administration, such as National 
Security Advisor John Bolton, have advocated for regime change in Iran.33 Finally, the 
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United States and Iran conducted military strikes against one another in January 2020.34 
Given the United States’ current commitments in the Middle East, as well as the historic 
and contemporary adversarial relationship between the United States and Iran, seeking to 
understand the insurgency and counterinsurgency interaction inside of Iran’s borders can 
help provide a more complete analysis of Iran which may prove useful in future 
negotiations and interactions.. 
Through evaluation of Iranian COIN approaches in Baluchistan, insight can be 
garnered as to how Iran conducts COIN operations. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
Corps (IRGC) is the primary, dominant Iranian security force in both Sistan-Baluchistan 
and Iran as a whole.35 The IRGC is also designated by the United States as a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization.36 Internally, Iran has frequently had to contend with insurgencies 
from within the Iranian Turkmen population, and from Ahwazi Arab groups in 
Khuzestan.37 Externally, the IRGC has provided COIN support to Bashar Al-Assad in 
Syria,38 and the IRGC’s Qods force has supported insurgent movements in Iraq, Lebanon, 
Palestine, Afghanistan, and other Middle Eastern territories. Analysis and insight garnered 
by exploring this thesis topic could prove valuable in determining, and possibly 
neutralizing Iranian insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts in the Middle East. Through 
a better understanding of the Iranian COIN paradigm, it could be possible to develop 
approaches better aimed at deterring or diminishing the support Iran provides to violent 
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insurgent groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah,39 Hamas,40 and the Houthi coalition in 
Yemen,41 which could effectively reduce their overall capabilities and threats. Such 
reduction could thereby effectively reduce the severity of ongoing violent clashes such as 
the war in Yemen, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and might bring them closer to solution. 
Though fragmented, Baluch politics, of which the insurgency in Iran is a part of, 
are a limited transnational issue pertinent to several Middle Eastern and South Asian 
nations. Pakistan has faced violent Baluch insurgencies in its South Western province of 
Balochistan for decades, including a current insurgency by the Baluchistan Liberation 
Army.42 Baluch politics also spill into Afghanistan. Baluch insurgent training camps have 
reportedly been held inside of Afghan national territory.43 Terrorist attacks related to 
Baluch nationalism have also occurred in Southern Afghan territory.44 There are 
significant Baluch populations in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Turkmenistan, as 
well.45 Despite the presence of Baluch in different countries, there does not appear to be a 
unified, strong transnational Baluch independence movement. Nevertheless, study of the 
Baluch insurgency in Iran, and understanding of its underlying causes might also yield new 
or modified understandings with implication for Baluch politics elsewhere in the Middle 
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East, and could help potentially avoid the future possibility of violent insurgency between 
Baluch ethnicities and state governments. 
D. DEFINITIONS 
As this thesis focuses on insurgency and counterinsurgency, it is important to 
establish the specific definition of these terms. Related, terrorism and counterterrorism 
must also be defined because Baluch insurgent groups are commonly associated with 
terrorism. Finally, the relationships between terrorism and insurgency and counterterrorism 
and COIN must also be established. 
1. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 
Definitions for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency will be based off the consensus 
American doctrine. Other, divergent definitions also exist. However, since this proposed 
thesis is aimed at a U.S. defense audience, it will employ official U.S. definitions of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency as adopted in the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24. Per FM 
3-24, insurgency is defined as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed 
to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or 
other political authority while increasing insurgent control,” and counterinsurgency, drawn 
from this same document will be defined in this thesis as “military, paramilitary, political, 
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”46 
2. Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism 
It is also important to define terrorism and counterterrorism for the purposes of this 
thesis. Baluch groups such as Jundallah and Jaish ul-Adl have been dually identified as 
terrorist and insurgent organizations by the Iranian government.47 Furthermore, the U.S. 
government continues to identify both Jundallah and Jaish ul-Adl as Foreign Terrorist 
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Organizations.48 Because the Iranian government, which is the government executing 
COIN, and the U.S. government, which the author of this thesis serves as a uniformed 
service member, both consider Baluch militant insurgents terrorist groups, it is therefore 
also important to clarify the definitions of terrorism and counterterrorism. As with 
definitions of insurgency and COIN, this thesis will define terrorism and counterterrorism 
along U.S. DoD consensus definitions. From the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, 
revised 2020, this thesis shall therefore consider “terrorism” as “the unlawful use of 
violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological 
beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually 
political.”49 Conversely, utilizing the same document as basis, this thesis considers 
“counterterrorism” as “Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their 
organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill 
fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.”50  
For the purposes of this thesis, terrorism shall be considered a tool and method by 
which organizations can conduct insurgency, particularly due to fact that the groups which 
the Iranian State is conducts COIN against are at once considered both insurgent and 
terrorist groups. According to the objectives used for this thesis, described above 
insurgency and terrorism share in common that both phenomena have political objectives; 
they aim to change either the behavior of a government, if not the entire government itself. 
In addition, both insurgency and terrorism, according to their definitions, use either 
violence, or the threat of violence in order to compel the change they aim to enact. As the 
definitions above indicate, terrorism and insurgency, and by extension, therefore, COIN 
and counterterrorism are two, separate, distinct concepts, and cannot accurately be used 
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interchangeably. However, terrorism is also a means by which insurgents aim to achieve 
their objective. In this sense, as Ariel Merari notes, terrorism in certain, specific cases, can 
be considered a “form of insurgency.”51 For the terms of this thesis, because the Baluch 
groups which the Iranian state fights against in Sistan-Baluchistan are simultaneously 
insurgent and terrorist organizations, this thesis considers terrorism a method by which 
insurgents attempt to wage war and conflict against an established state.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW—COIN 
There are several, inter-related social science disciplines which comprise the 
necessary materials required to evaluate Iranian COIN against Baluch insurgent groups. 
For the purposes of this thesis, proponents of COIN theory can be divided into two general 
schools of thought. First, there is a group of theorists who emphasize the efficacy of 
coercion, punishment and repression in defeating insurgents. Second, there is a group of 
theorists who emphasize population-centric tactics as the most effective COIN approach, 
designed to influence popular support toward the counterinsurgent as a means of defeating 
insurgency. The relevant elements and themes from each group are detailed in the 
following subsections. In terms of practical reality, forming approaches to COIN are not a 
binary choice between two theoretical camps, but instead consists of the selective fusions 
between different theoretical and practical considerations, and the aggregate of these 
choices is ultimately what creates a COIN approach. Therefore, considerations of how 
fusions of these theories apply to reality immediately follows the sections which discuss 
COIN theory. 
1. Coercion, Punishment, and Repression 
Coercion, punishment, and reprisal counterinsurgency strategy seeks to separate an 
insurgent from his support structure by offensively targeting either the population or the 
insurgent himself. This line of strategy emphasizes the elimination or neutralization of 
insurgents by directly targeting them, as well as coercive and punitive tactics designed to 
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discourage the population from supporting insurgents. This paradigm views insurgency 
and COIN, s David Kilcullen described in 2007, as “a variant of conventional warfare,” 
and tend to rely heavily on conventional military and police forces to execute COIN 
operations.52 
One faction of coercive-repressive COIN tactics advocates indiscriminate mass 
repression. In indiscriminate targeting, the object is eradication of insurgents, their 
supporters, sympathizers, and enablers among a population. The prime directive 
underpinning this approach is that “the enemy is to be rooted out and killed,” and since 
insurgents “fight among the people then those who shelter the enemy are also enemies who 
are to be killed or terrorized” until the insurgency has been eliminated.53 Edward Luttvak 
argues that the Roman and Ottoman empires successfully, consistently employed this 
approach.54 Luttvak’s assessment of the Roman-Ottoman COIN approaches is as follows: 
whenever the general location of insurgents is known, “local notables can be compelled to 
surrender them to the authorities, under the threat of escalating punishments, all the way to 
mass executions.”55 Per Luttvak, the insurgents will eventually be eliminated, either as a 
by-product of reprisals on the population, or because that population turns over the 
insurgent to COIN forces for fear of future punishment. Luttvak argues this approach as 
dually effective, capable of achieving both insurgency elimination, and future insurgency 
prevention, as the memory of “terrible reprisals” serve to “deter any form of resistance” 
among would-be insurgents.56 Proponents of this approach tend to argue its efficiency, 
since it neither requires a specially trained COIN force, nor a large, constant military 
presence.57  
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Coercive-repressive COIN proponents acknowledge that political and institutional 
climates make some nations better suited than others to conduct COIN operations which 
they consider essential to success. Luttvak acknowledges the reality that the United States 
and most other liberal-democratic governments, accountable to public opinion, cannot 
sustain COIN approaches which heavily use reprisal and coercion.58 However, these 
methods have been echoed, endorsed and employed throughout the historical annals of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency. During the Indonesian National Revolution, Raymond 
Westerling employed massive reprisal COIN on the local population, attempting to quell 
insurgencies by surrounding suspected insurgent sympathetic villages and territories, 
detaining the men, and summarily executing any suspected insurgents through “very public 
acts of violence.”59 French Marshall Thomas Robert Bugeaud executed mass reprisal 
COIN against Algerian insurgents during the 1840s, targeting entire villages where 
insurgents drew support, and using “indiscriminate slaughter,” mass imprisonment, and 
enslavement to “crush” The insurgency.60 Importantly, both Bugeaud61 and Westerling62 
have been accused of war crimes by contemporary literature, but their contemporary 
political climates not only tolerated, but in some cases endorsed the effectiveness of their 
methods. Moreover, as the COIN scholar Daniel Byman notes, there is an entire body of 
modern, authoritarian regimes which have heavily relied on coercive-repressive COIN, and 
emerged victorious against the insurgencies which they were combatting.63 This body 
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includes post-World War II Soviet Union COIN in the Baltics, the recurrent Chinese COIN 
approach in Tibet , as well as modern examples such as the Syrian Civil War and Egypt.64 
A second subdivision of the coercive-repressive COIN approach is discriminant 
elimination. Proponents of this approach rely on sound intelligence to systematically 
eliminate, coerce, or otherwise neutralize insurgents. Israeli historian Martin Van Creveld 
argues that the preferable COIN methodology uses discriminant elimination tactics, reliant 
on two critical elements: first, peerless, actionable intelligence, and second, a peerless, 
highly disciplined counterinsurgent force.65 Through actionable intelligence, a disciplined 
COIN force can find, fix, pursue, and eventually remove insurgents from the fight, by  
force or attrition.66 Bernard Finel’s variant of this approach offers two specific courses of 
action to eliminate key insurgents. First, a COIN force can restrict population movements 
in order to root out and eliminate insurgents.67 Second, a COIN force can systematically 
assault insurgent strongholds with overwhelming power to erode insurgent combat 
effectiveness, forcing insurgents to choose between compromise, capitulation, or capture/
death by COIN forces.68 
Overall, tactics of coercion, punishment, and reprisal, are not popular COIN 
stratagem among modern academics and military doctrine. More often, a tendency towards 
these methods is pointed to as a significant point of failure in unsuccessful COIN 
operations. However, Iran does not publicize its COIN doctrine. Further, some have argued 
that Iran has used methods of coercion, reprisal, and repression in combatting the Baluch 
insurgency. Human rights groups have accused Iran of committing war crimes through 
mass execution and incarceration.69 Iran’s narrative of the capture and eventual execution 
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of the leaders of Jundallah further indicates the possibility of this approach as relevant to 
the Iranian COIN approach.70 For these reasons, methods of coercion, punishment, and 
reprisal must be considered in literature review.  
2. Population Support-Centric COIN 
Support-Centric COIN had enjoyed the most widespread acceptance throughout the 
20th century, and is the approach that most scholars, and governments currently endorse. 
Unlike coercive-repressive COIN, popular support COIN emphasizes that the center of 
gravity to any insurgent-counterinsurgent struggle is preponderance of popular support. 
Instead of using elimination, intimidation, and deterrence, popular support COIN 
proponents argue that victory against insurgents is only attainable when an insurgency is 
made irrelevant through the creation of popular support paradigms which favor the 
counterinsurgency over the insurgency. 
David Galula, often considered one of the most influential popular support COIN 
theorists, argued that the battlefield of an insurgency extends far beyond the boundaries of 
military and police matters. Sometimes characterized as the “Clausewitz” equivalent to the 
study of COIN, Galula argued that insurgencies, political in nature, are fundamentally 
determined not by military prowess but instead are won by whichever side better controls 
population support.71 Per Galula, population is the critical survival resource critical for 
both the insurgent and counterinsurgent: COIN forces need either the agreement, tacit non-
opposition, or submission of a population to continue exercising political power, where the 
insurgent needs to isolate the population from the counterinsurgency, or win their support 
to grow insurgent political capital.72 As John Nagl describes in his Foreword, Galula’s 
theory evaluates the conventional military mindset, focused exclusively on capturing and 
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killing the enemy to achieve victory, as folly when combating insurgency.73 At best, such 
an approach will yield only temporary victory, because “for every insurgent captured or 
killed, another one (or often several) will appear.”74 Instead, successful COIN achieves 
“the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population ... not enforced upon the 
population but obtained by and with” them.75 Thus, a successful counterinsurgent at once 
needs to be a “a propogandist, a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a 
boy scout” in addition to being militarily superior to the insurgent.76  
Within the popular support-emphasis camp of COIN, one important sub-approach 
involves the emphasis of public affairs and narratives. Sir Robert Thompson, for example, 
argues that any successful COIN effort should consider a vision or narrative which 
overrides, negates or at the very least competes with the narrative which insurgent present 
to the population.77 Thomas Johnson places even greater importance and emphasis on a 
superior counterinsurgency narrative. In Taliban Narratives, Johnson argues that in 
Afghanistan, coalition counterinsurgent forces’ failure to produce a coherent narrative 
competitive with that of the Taliban’s is the most significant cause of coalition failure to 
neutralize the insurgency.78 
Some contemporary popular-support COIN theorists stress the criticality of the 
constant, rapid evolution and variation of insurgency. John Mackinlay, in The Insurgent 
Archipelago, states that insurgency will “evolve at the same speed as the society from 
which it arises.”79 However, societies also “evolve at very different speeds,” which means 
that each insurgency is starkly unique from all insurgencies which have occurred prior to 
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as well as concurrent to it.80 As a result, any COIN doctrine which relies exclusively on 
the organization’s previous experiences will prove insufficient to combat a given 
insurgency. Instead, successful COIN efforts need to acknowledge that initial doctrine will 
be incomplete and will require reassessment and adjustment following contact with the 
enemy in order to specifics of an insurgency.81 
Though David Kilcullen agrees with Mackinlay on the fundamental uniqueness and 
necessity for tailoring and customization of a COIN approach, he still postulates the 
feasibility of a basic tactical framework for combating insurgency. In Counterinsurgency, 
Kilcullen uses systems theory to establish that all insurgencies can be conceptualized as 
“organic systems,” composed of seven fundamental components: Nodes (Insurgents and 
the personnel which compose formal and informal support networks), links, boundaries 
(“the limit between the insurgent movement and it’s environment”), subsystems (logistics, 
propaganda, recruitment, etc.), boundary interaction (the “day-to-day events of the 
insurgency”), inputs (the “energy” an insurgency draws from its environment, such as 
people, materials, grievances, and ideology), and outputs (results from insurgent action—
casualties, physical destruction, media coverage, etc.).82 With this framework, successful 
COIN approaches must attack one, if not multiple insurgency components in order to 
isolate insurgencies from their environment.83 
Among popular support COIN proponents, there is also debate about whether 
COIN should be considered a tactic or a strategy, and consequently, this determination also 
defines the parameters of what courses of action are viable and non-viable options for a 
specific COIN operation. Douglas Porch, cautioning that morality and ideology is not an 
absolute constant in warfare, rejects the claim that COIN is a separate warfare category,84 
instead arguing that “each insurgency is a contingent event in which doctrine, operations, 
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and tactics must support a viable policy and strategy, not the other way around.”85 Former 
Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan echoed this sentiment. For Dayan, decision on 
specific counterinsurgency approach were simply a matter of providing “the best solution 
to the problem.”86 Per Dayan, ideology and morality served as two of many contingent 
factors which determined a COIN operation’s rules of engagement. Dependent on the 
political, social, and population particulars, Dayan tailored his specific COIN approach to 
the insurgents and the environments he faced, leading him to at times employ policies 
which sought to “build relationships” among populations, while also, when Dayan 
determined it expedient, using policies which could be described as “cruel” reprisal tactics 
designed to coerce populations into denying insurgent support.87  
 As previously noted, the popular-support COIN approach is not only prevalent in 
theory, but also in operational doctrine and critical analysis. Major militaries which engage 
in COIN emphasize population control over an enemy centric focus. For example, the U.S. 
COIN manual FM 3-24 identifies political power as the central concern for both sides in 
an insurgency, and rejects insurgent elimination as a sufficient stand-alone tactic to 
defeating an insurgency, instead assigning the critical mass point of any insurgent group as 
active and passive support from the population.88 Popular support theory dominates the 
western thinking on COIN, since countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and 
Australia all ascribe population control as the key element in successfully defeating an 
insurgency.89 Some COIN failures, such as Vietnam, are often explained by popular 
support proponents as a failure to prioritize popular support over other military and political 
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objectives.90 More recently, a widespread lack of nuanced and complete knowledge of 
Afghan populations, combined with the failures to produce relevant narratives which 
resonated with Afghans has been cited by popular support COIN proponents as the 
foundational reasons why U.S. COIN in Afghanistan has been unsuccessful overall. 
3. Blended COIN—Theory versus Reality 
COIN operations are not binary choices; COIN does not simply exist in the 
theoretical realm, but is also its own outright military and security discipline with practical 
considerations, which dictates that the means by which a nation or security organization 
develops and shapes the tools, techniques, and approaches it uses to combat insurgency 
come from all corners of COIN theory. Upon review on Joint Publication 3-24, which 
functions as the DoD governing document for COIN, it is evident that depending on 
circumstance, the DoD values both coercive-repressive and population centric approaches 
as viable to defeating insurgency. JP 3-24 acknowledges that “the relevant population” is 
“key” to successful COIN, but also acknowledges that the population may in fact not be 
“the center of gravity” in a struggle between insurgent and counterinsurgent.91 Later, JP 
3-24 acknowledges that in some cases, rather than population control, efforts which 
“remove” or “eliminate organized resistance in a local area” may be the most direct and 
effective means of COIN.92 Similarly, French COIN tactical doctrine advocates that both 
population-centric and enemy-centric approaches need to be used for effective COIN; a 
successful COIN approach must both directly attack “the enemy” and their support among 
“the population.”93 Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that in practice, in Iran as well as 
elsewhere, elements of both coercive-repressive COIN theory and population-centric 
COIN theory are employed either in tandem or as two components of a larger overall COIN 
approach. 
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F. LITERATURE REVIEW—BALUCHISTAN CONTEXT 
While review of COIN theory and practice is critical to analyze Iran’s approach to 
counterinsurgency, the particular context of Sistan-Baluchistan and the factors that fuel its 
counterinsurgency movement bears equal importance to the research questions.  
1. Significant Contributors 
In considering the specific history and modern environment in Sistan-Baluchistan, 
there are several prominent authors whose works prove critical to evaluating the dynamics 
between Baluch insurgent groups and the Iranian State in Sistan-Baluchistan. The weight 
of these works’ importance to discussion of Iranian COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan is 
increased given the fact that there is a distinct scarcity of academic scholarship on the 
Baluch outside of these few authors, particularly when one considers works available in 
English or from Western academic perspectives. The most significant of these authors will 
be discussed below. 
The first noteworthy author considering Baluch issues is Selig Harrison. Harrison 
is considered one of the first Western authors to explore and document the cultural nuances 
of the Baluch, and to explore the prospects of separate, autonomous Baluch state. Upon his 
death in 2016, Harrison was referred to as “the scholar who introduced Balochistan to the 
world.”94 In particular, his work In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet 
Temptations has proven to be one of, if not the foundational pieces of scholarship 
concerning issues of Baluch nationalism and insurgency against both Iran and Pakistan. 
Overall, Harrison is considered the most frequently cited author in matters pertaining to 
the Baluch.95 That said, there are three considerable considerations of bias which must be 
kept in mind when evaluating Harrison’s work. First, timing: In Afghanistan’s Shadow: 
Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations was published in 1981, two years after 
formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. While Harrison provides accurate documentation 
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of the Iranian State and the Baluch during that timeframe, nearly three decades of 
development have transpired since the book was written, and the modern Iranian COIN 
apparatuses, as well as the modern Baluch insurgent groups are not necessarily bound by 
the same dynamics which Harrison describes. Second, focus: Harrison does provide 
comprehensive history of Baluch-Persian interactions, but the vast majority of his book, as 
well as his follow-on work is concentrated the struggle between the Pakistani government 
and Baluch groups, and rarely, if ever, mentions or focuses on Iran-Baluch interactions. 
Finally, bias: Harrison during his lifetime repeatedly and definitively defined himself as a 
proponent of increased Baluch autonomy from the states which presided over them, and at 
times has been described as an outright Baluch nationalist. As late as 2011, Harrison 
advocated for the need for the United States to “support Baluch insurgents” in Pakistan, 
and some of his obituaries describe him as the most “longstanding friend of Balochistan.”96 
A second prominent author in the area of Baluch affairs, particularly Iranian Baluch 
affairs is Stéphane Dudoignon. Whereas Harrison was considered the first prominent 
Baluch expert, it could be argued that Dudoignon ranks among the most prominent modern 
scholars of the Baluch, particularly the Iranian Baluch. The level of his expertise is 
reflected to a certain degree in the journalism which has consulted him for analysis in 
explaining Baluch insurgency. Discussed in Chapter III, Dan Rather, for example, 
dedicated several minutes of his 30 minute exclusive expose on Jundallah to commentary 
from Dudoignon.97 His 2017 book The Baloch, Sunnism and the State in Iran: From Tribal 
to Global provides excellent framework and deep nuanced explanations of Baluch 
populations inside Iran, particularly with consideration to the tribal and religious aspects 
of Baluch which figure prominently both into Baluch identity and how the Baluch interact 
with elements of the Iranian state.98 Dudoignon’s works do, to some degree, focus on 
Iranian COIN, outlining Iran’s selective utilization of tribal elites to help maintain control 
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and support for certain policy in Sistan-Baluchistan.99 However, the majority of his work 
is geared toward the historical and modern context of how Iran interacts with the Baluch 
tribes, and does not necessarily focus on Iran’s express COIN operations since 2003. For 
example, in his entire 279-page book, Jundallah, arguably the most notorious Baluch 
insurgent group, is only mentioned nine times, while Jaish ul-Adl, the second-most 
notorious modern Baluch insurgent group, is mentioned just five times.100 Though he does 
not focus expressly on Iranian efforts against these insurgent groups, Dudoignon’s analysis 
cannot be discounted, and provide valuable background material by which to evaluate the 
efficacy of Iranian COIN against these groups. 
A third noteworthy author is Ahmad Reza Taheri. Like Dudoignon, Taheri provides 
critical background on the Baluch and their interactions with the Iranian state. In The 
Baloch in Post-Islamic Revolution Iran: A Political Study, Taheri details the development 
of Baluch political and religious culture since 1979.101 Taheri’s work does not specifically 
evaluate Iranian COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan, but instead focuses on the root causes of 
Iranian Baluch insurgency, and also provides critical insight on how the insurgents operate 
and recruit in the modern era. These insights are important, particularly when evaluating 
to what extent, Iranian COIN has been effective or ineffective against Baluch insurgents, 
as well as the root causes of that effectiveness. 
2. Baluch Cultural Context 
A cocktail of significant socio-economic, political, environmental challenges, 
steeped in this historical context, lay at the heart of the grievance that insurgent groups 
have with the Iranian state. Religiously, the overwhelming majority of the Baluch identify 
as Deobandi Sunni Muslims, which puts them in the minority, and often directly at odds 
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with, the official Shiite religion of the Islamic Republic of Iran.102 Politically, though the 
ethnic majority in Sistan-Baluchistan, the Baluch remain nearly unrepresented in national 
government, and grossly underrepresented in local government, occupying just five percent 
of Sistan-Baluchistan regional and local government positions.103 Economically, as much 
as 76 percent of ethnic Baluch live below the poverty line in Iran, and Sistan-Baluchistan 
is considered Iran’s most “underdeveloped, desolate, and poor” province.104 Socially, 
alleged heavy discrimination against the Baluch by the Iranian state also extends to 
education as well as employment opportunities.105 Baluchistan also faces environmental 
challenges which have created near-existential crises for Baluch tribes. A “relentless wave 
of environmental disasters” plagues the region, and there is a near constant drought, 
decimating not only the prospects of agriculture critical to most Baluch livelihoods, but 
also access to a constant supply of freshwater.106 In this mixture of environmental crisis, 
socio-economic discrimination, political exclusion and neglect which Baluch insurgent 
groups such as Jundallah, Harakat Ansar Iran, and Jaish ul-Adl frequently combine with 
their own religious ideology to justify their insurgent activities against the Iranian 
government.  
3. Insurgency-Relevant Themes 
Some experts present evidence that Iranian governments past and present have 
attempted to harness Baluch culture, vis-à-vis the selective co-opting of Baluch cultural 
elites, in order to temper the severity of insurgencies. Stéphane A. Dudoignon argues that 
positive, mutually beneficial relationships between ethnically Persian central state 
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authorities and ethnic Baluch community leaders has been intermittently used since the late 
Qajar era to help quell and suppress potential regional insurgencies.107 Dudoignon further 
argues that this type of relationship persists, function currently as the Baluch “Sarbaz 
nexus” that provides “critical support of the Islamic Republic,” in Sistan-Baluchistan.108 
Critical support from this nexus also attacked the insurgency directly, denouncing the 
actions of Jaish Al Adl and Jundallah as illegitimate, thereby curbing the “Islamicization 
of Baluch Society and cross-border Jihad.” 109 Ahmad Reza Taheri deepens the nuance of 
this emphasis, noting how the Iranian government has frequently relied upon local Baluch 
tribal elders to convince insurgents to return hostages and prisoners.110  
Another camp of scholars emphasizes that rather than co-opting the Baluch, the 
Iranian state historically has feared the potential of Baluch culture to serve as a foundation 
for insurgency and attempted to repress it wherever possible. Selig Harrison acknowledges 
that Reza Shah did co-opt sardars in order to temper potential Baluch insurgencies, but 
depicts this arrangement as minimally existent during the Shah’s tenure, limited only to the 
urban Baluch areas where the Shah feared resistance.111 In more rural communities, 
Harrison asserts that displacement and martial law were Reza Shah’s preferred tactic.112 
Further, Harrison argues that once Mohammed Shah Pahlavi succeeded his father, full-
scale repression became the Iranian doctrine of counterinsurgency in Baluchistan, and 
included efforts to stifle development of ethnically Baluch intellectuals, banning of Baluch 
cultural practices, and prohibition of Baluchi language in public or the media.113 Per 
Harrison, co-opting of Baluchi elites was an irrelevant aberration, and instead Shah 
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governments only maintained dominion of sovereignty and control in Baluchistan through 
repression enforced by consistent, heavy military presence.114 
Dudoignon’s assertion the Islamic Republic’s historic and modern reliance on 
friendly Baluch elites to temper insurgency efforts also appears contested. Taj Mohammed 
Breseeg argues that after Ayatollah Khomeini secured his position as the Supreme Leader 
of Iran in the early 1980s, the Iranian state quickly disbanded all existing Baluch political 
parties, and eliminated nearly all ethnic Baluch from positions in the government.115 
Breseeg also opines that mass repression followed, with more than 4,000 Baluch arrested 
and an additional 3,000 fleeing over the Iran-Pakistan border in fear of further oppressive 
Iranian policies.116 Some Baluch experts also argue that these institutionalized cultural 
attacks and erosion in Iranian Baluchistan still persist today. For example, Carina Jahani, 
in her analysis of Baluch language patterns in the region, argues that the Iranian state still 
views Baluchi culture as a regional threat, and continues to attack, “the lifestyle and 
culture” of the Baloch through “intimidation of the culturally active.”117 
There is also some focus among Baluch experts on geography of Iranian 
Baluchistan and how it may affect insurgency and COIN in the region. Firozeh Kashani-
Sorbet argues that harsh terrain and climate makes Sistan-Baluchistan, even in the modern 
era, largely undeveloped, “unwelcoming and fallow.”118 Some argue that this serves as an 
advantage to insurgent groups, since they can use the knowledge of terrain to successfully 
outmaneuver Iranian government forces, as well as traverse the Iran-Pakistan border at 
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will.119 However, this same terrain also may have previously, and might currently, temper 
insurgent cohesion and unification, and instead serve to largely limit insurgent groups to 
local, rather than regional alliances, while also hampering coordination with Baluch 
nationalists and insurgent movements in Pakistan.120 
The implications of Baluch social tribal context for insurgent efforts is also argued 
by some students as an impediment to the insurgencies. Harrison recounts the power 
struggle in the early 1980s between tribal chieftains for primacy and leadership of a 
nationalist movement as a divisive detriment to the Baluch insurgency.121 Modern students 
of Baluch insurgency, such as Chris Zambelis, see similar divisions and fault lines, arguing 
that regional and tribal dynamics both impeded activity for Jundallah, and has contributed 
to the creation of multiple, non-unified Baluch insurgent factions which now compete and 
argue with one another just as much as they do with the Iranian government.122 
G. LITERATURE REVIEW—IRANIAN CONTEXT 
This thesis aims to identify and evaluate Iran’s COIN performance in Sistan-
Baluchistan. As such, this thesis draws on a significant body of literature which by its 
design seeks to analyze and evaluate the Iranian security apparatuses in the performance 
of their duties. The detailed overview of the Iranian security forces involved in Sistan-
Baluchistan, as well as their capabilities, is discussed in Chapter II. However, the 
particularly prominent contributors to this body of literature, as well as notable themes and 
opinions of that body, are discussed below. 
1. Notable Contributors 
One prominent author pertaining to Iranian security apparatuses is Ariane 
Tabatabai. Tabatabai’s most significant contribution to the body of literature on Iranian 
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security matters is her in-depth overviews and analysis of the police, military, and 
paramilitary organizations which constitute the overall Iranian security apparatus. In 
“Other Side of the Iranian Coin: Iran’s Counterterrorism Apparatus,” for example, 
Tabatabai outlines the four primary security service organizations in Iran, detailing how 
these organizations interact and compete with one another, as well as their capabilities and 
operating patterns and procedures.123 Discussed in Chapter II, this thesis also identifies the 
same four major security organizations that Tabatabai identifies as the significant 
organizational players conducting COIN against Baluch insurgents in Sistan-Baluchistan. 
Tabatabai has not written a significant body specifically focused on insurgency in Sistan-
Baluchistan. However, she has made notable contributions to Iran’s specific responses to 
the transnational terrorist organization known as ISIS.124 Given the fact that the most 
significant Baluch insurgent organizations are also widely regarded as terrorist 
organizations, however, Tabatabai’s work on ISIS does bear relevance to this thesis. This 
relevance is increased by the fact that both ISIS and insurgent groups such as Jaish ul-Adl 
and Jundallah share undertones of Sunni Islamic extremism, which ISIS also considers one 
a foundational tenet.125 
A second noteworthy author is Chris Zambelis. A significant body of Zambelis’ 
work has been focused specifically on Iranian internal security issues, to include how the 
Iranian state has performed functions such as COIN and counterterrorism. Zambelis has 
also contributed frequent, significant analysis to specific Iranian COIN efforts in Sistan-
Baluchistan, both during Jundallah’s era and after its demise. Importantly, in discussion of 
Iranian COIN, particularly in Sistan-Baluchistan, Zambelis ranks among the most prolific 
English-language authors; there are few scholars who have focused attention and analysis 
on Iran’s response and operations against Baluch insurgency to the degree that Zambelis 
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has. Some of the characterization Zambelis makes as to Iranian COIN efforts appear 
anecdotal, referencing his perception as an analyst who has covered Baluch events over 
time. As best possible, where this thesis references these perceptions, it has sought to verify 
their validity through independent analysis or corroboration with other scholar’s 
assessments. 
2. Themes of Competition and Unilateral Action 
The first prevalent pattern which emerges from reviewing available literature is that 
a significant portion of scholars who have written on the subject believe that there are heavy 
undertones of competition that drive how security organizations operate inside Iran. 
Authors like Said Golkar, Tabatabai, and Hossein Aryan all frame their characterizations 
of security organizations in Iran in relative terms, defining the abilities of organizations as 
fractions and derivative comparisons of other security organizations.126 Scholars also seem 
to focus heavily on potential organizational penetration by competing security 
organizations. For example, a significant portion of Golkar’s analysis of the Law 
Enforcement Forces of Iran is dedicated to exploring the degree to which the IRGC has 
penetrated that organization.127  
Related, a significant portion of the scholars that have written on Iranian internal 
security services illustrate that organizations generally do not practice interagency 
cooperation, and instead to default to acting unilaterally without consulting their 
counterparts. For example, Tabatabai notes that both the Artesh and the IRGC have 
initiated action against ISIS, but that these two organizations have largely refrained from 
coordinating their actions.128 Similarly, Udit Banerjea notes that both the IRGC and MOIS 
have robust intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, but these two organizations 
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rarely, if ever, share intelligence with one another unless compelled by a higher 
authority.129  
3. Press and Media Sources 
Iran, when compared with many other nations, has an incredibly large amount of 
domestic control over the press and media within its own borders. To compare Iran to the 
rest of the world, for example, Reporters Without Borders in 2019 ranked Iran 170’th out 
of 180 total nations in terms of a “Press Freedom Index.”130 By Iran’s constitutional law, 
“publications and the press have freedom of expression,” but this freedom is null and void 
in situations where freedom of the press would create or dispense information that is 
“detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public.”131 
Specifically, Iran effectively can control and censor essentially all journalism inside of its 
own borders. Radio and television broadcasts are controlled outright, as the government-
run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting controls both “internal and external” Iranian 
broadcasts.132 Iran also heavily monitors citizen access to internet content, with both 
pervasive content restriction systems which limit citizen access and comprehensive 
systems of surveillance which allow Iranian security services to monitor citizen behavior 
online.133 In terms of print media, the Iranian state also exercises near-total control, since 
the Iranian state either owns outright, or partially funds the majority of print media sources, 
and the remaining major newspapers it does not significantly fund are owned by prominent 
government figures. For example, the conservative newspaper Kayhan is owned by Iran’s 
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.134 
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The controlled, and therefore, inherently biased nature of Iran’s media and press 
sources is of significant value to this thesis because it yields significant data with respect 
to the narrative COIN elements Iran seeks to employ against Baluch insurgent groups. As 
discussed in the COIN Literature Review section of this chapter, narratives are a critical 
battlefield between insurgent and counterinsurgent. Precisely because Iran controls media 
and press content so heavily, the Iranian press and media content Iran either produces or 
allows to be produced by independent sources can provide a massive cache of data in 
determining narrative structures in Sistan-Baluchistan. Subsequently, this thesis employs 
significant news and media reporting from Iran to more completely analyze Iran’s COIN 
narratives. Some Iranian news sources, such as Iran Daily, Tehran Times, and Iran News 
are fully funded and run by the Iranian state.135 Others, such as the Iranian Student News 
Agency (ISNA) or the Islamic Republic News Agency are either “semi-official” or 
privately owned and operated.136 Importantly, because both types are ultimately controlled 
by Iran’s tight censorship restrictions, these sources equally can be mined to make 
determinants about the Iranian COIN narrative in Sistan-Baluchistan. 
H. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND PROPOSITIONS 
Broadly, the outcome to date for insurgencies in Sistan-Baluchistan has been in the 
favor of the Iranian government. According to a RAND 2010 study of historical 
insurgencies, absolute victory or defeat can be presented as a series of questions: whether 
or not an insurgency ends, whether or not the government remains in power and “retained 
sovereignty” over the physical territory of the insurgency, and whether or not the 
government was forced to make or offer concessions to insurgents and/or forced to yield 
to insurgent demands.137 Iran clearly retains territorial sovereignty over Sistan-
Baluchistan, and to date, no convincing evidence of Iranian capitulation to insurgent 
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state control. For that reason, this thesis intends to explore what factors and approaches of 
Iranian COIN have allowed Iran to thus far retain sovereignty and exercise state control in 
Sistan-Baluchistan. To examine and test these factors, this thesis advances the following 
propositions. 
(1) Proposition 1 
Iran’s success thus far has been because it has not used a specifically tailored 
approach of COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan since 2003; instead, Iran’s approach has been 
largely a default, general approach which Iran employs toward all internal opposition 
groups throughout the history of the Islamic Republic. This general approach consists of 
repression and reprisal toward the dissenting population, attempting to discredit the 
insurgents by connecting them to foreign adversaries, and directly targeting insurgents 
utilizing Iran’s security apparatuses. Over time, this approach has discouraged a sufficient 
portion of the Baluch from meaningfully supporting insurgent groups. 
(2) Proposition 2 
A combination of co-opting key leaders of Baluch ethnicity, and targeting of 
specific high-level, key individuals in the insurgencies reduces insurgent groups’ capacity 
to act and gain ground among the population. By simultaneously cultivating relationships 
with leaders friendly to the Iranian state and targeting elites who are less supportive, the 
Iranian state may have an effective dual-pronged approach to prevail over insurgents in the 
arena of popular support.  
(3) Proposition 3 
The environment in Sistan-Baluchistan is so restrictive that it allows the Iranian 
state to retain power despite a high level of unrest. Under this logic, the Iranian COIN 
effectiveness, or lack thereof, is irrelevant, because the climate in Sistan-Baluchistan is so 
harsh, its people so poor, and its communities so disconnected from one another that the 
political will among the population cannot be raised toward sustainment or support of an 
effective insurgency. 
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(4) Proposition 4 
The abject failure of the insurgent, rather than a specific effective Iranian COIN 
approach, is what has led to Iran’s current advantage over insurgents thus far. There have 
been three overlapping, parallel insurgencies which all operate on the same territory. This 
fragmentation is compounded by a dearth of funding, and a limited population that all 
insurgent groups must compete with one another to gain support. This disunity mitigates 
the threats and capabilities of insurgent activity in Baluchistan to disrupt, undermine, or 
challenge the Iranian state in any manner which would prove significant or sustained. 
Further, because of radical ideology, violent acts of terrorism, and insufficient endorsement 
by Baluch-Sunni clergy, insurgent groups have failed to convince the Baluch people that 
they are a viable alternative to the Iranian state. In this proposition, the insurgents have 
been defeated mostly through self-inflicted wounds and a failure to cultivate a cohesive 
narrative, public image, and reputation which resonates among the population. 
(5) Proposition 5 
Iran’s COIN approach in Sistan-Baluchistan has evolved and improved over time, 
and the COIN improvements have outpaced the growth and adaptation of the insurgents, 
effectively coalescing into an Iranian state victory. Beginning in 2003, the Iranian security 
apparatuses have over time developed a tailored, sophisticated, and comprehensive COIN 
approach to Baluch insurgent groups, which rather than being a default approach, was 
specifically designed to attack critical insurgent centers of gravity and neutralize potential 
relevant insurgent advantages. These developments have been conducted at a scale and 
speed which the insurgents as of yet have failed to evolve beyond or overcome, effectively 
limiting if not reducing the efficacy of the insurgency. 
I. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will be a case study of the insurgency in the Iranian province of Sistan-
Baluchistan from 2003 to 2020. The temporal limit is to focus exclusively on the 
particularly violent brand of ethnic Baluch jihadist insurgency in the province which began 
with the establishment of Jundallah in 2003, and extends through 2020 to include groups 
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which are still active such as Jaish ul-Adl.138 Though there are violent Baluch 
organizations in both Iran and Pakistan, this thesis will focus exclusively on the insurgency 
and counterinsurgency in Iranian territory. To date, Sistan-Baluchistan based insurgent 
groups on the have focused their efforts exclusively against the state of Iran.139 Though 
Iran has accused the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan of supporting Baluch 
insurgents, the Iranian state’s efforts at COIN largely remain a national instead of 
multinational affair.140 Discussed in Chapter IV, Pakistan and Iran have collaborated on 
specific events for Baluch insurgency in the past, with Iran applying heavy pressure for 
Pakistan to pursue Iranian Baluch insurgents within its own borders.141 However, as will 
be discussed, this is just one piece, rather than a plurality or outright majority of Iran’s 
COIN approach.  
This study’s objective is a determination of the specific Iranian state COIN 
approach to Baluch insurgent groups, and an assessment of the degree to which this 
approach has been effective in reducing or eliminating the relevancy of the insurgencies. 
To evaluate the proposition discussed above, significant attention will be paid to whether 
methods employed by the Iranian State concentrate on deterring the population from 
supporting the insurgency, and attacking, apprehending, and targeting insurgents or 
insurgent behaviors. In addition, further consideration will be paid to increases, decreases, 
and the nature of insurgent and counterinsurgent operations, media releases of each side, 
and economic and civil society reactions, implications, and complications of both insurgent 
and counterinsurgent activity. Finally, this thesis will pay specific attention to the Iranian 
state narrative surrounding Baluch insurgent groups and assess the implications of that 
 
138 “BAAD—Jundallah—2003,” National Consortium for The Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, February 2015, https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/database/jundallah-2003; Zambelis, “Evolution 
of the Ethnic Baluch Insurgency,” 17. 
139 Zambelis, “A New Phase of Resistance and Insurgency,” 17. 
140 “Are Foreign Powers Sponsoring Sunni Insurgents in Iran?” World Politics Review, April 30, 
2019, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/27803/are-foreign-powers-sponsoring-sunni-
insurgents-in-iran. 
141 Muhammad Akbar Notezai, “Trouble at the Pakistan-Iran Border,” The Diplomat, October 30, 
2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/trouble-at-the-pakistan-iran-border/. 
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narrative on both on a national level inside of Iran, as well as at the international, global 
level. 
This thesis’s research material will draw from both primary and secondary sources. 
Secondary sources will include books, journal articles, government writings, non-
governmental organization (NGO) publications, and scholarly discourses about relevant 
topics to COIN, the Baluch and Sistan-Baluchistan, and Iranian security forces. Primary 
sources will include news posting from Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Western sources, 
foreign government websites, statements, and social influence materials, such as social 
media, press releases, postings on official insurgent or counterinsurgent organization’s 
pages, and other pertinent sources. Research will be limited to works either originally 
written in English, or which can readily be translated into English. 
J. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis’s composition is six chapters. The Chapter I functions as introduction, 
overview, and literature review. The Chapter II will provide relevant background to the 
current insurgency, detailing the historical and cultural contexts of the Iranian state and 
Baluch nationalist movements, the major organizations involved in COIN is Sistan-
Baluchistan, and the significant patterns within Iranian response when responding to 
internal threats. The Chapter III will examine Iran’s COIN approach during the tenure of 
Jundallah, from 2003 to 2012. The fourth chapter will focus on Iranian State 
counterinsurgent efforts after Jundallah’s demise, from 2012 to the present. Chapters III 
and IV will each be subdivided into the significant event summaries for both Iranian State 
and insurgent activities, the specific tactics employed, and discussion of how Iran 
employed their approach to manage and combat the insurgency. Further subdivisions will 
also exist for analyses of how effective the counterinsurgent efforts were. The Chapter V 
will contain a comparison of each case’s significant attacks and counterinsurgent events, 
presence and evaluation of overall resolution or de-escalation to the conflict, and 
effectiveness of the Iranian counterinsurgency approach; and this approach’s effectiveness 
and contribution to Iranian sovereignty and control over Baluchistan will be analyzed. 
Furthermore, Chapter V will seek to explain any changes, or differences between the 
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performance of Iranian COIN in the era of Jundallah and the post-Jundallah era. Chapter 
VI, the final chapter, will conclude with a discussion of the implications of thesis findings 
to scholarly debates about counterinsurgency, security and politics in the Middle East 
relating to Iran, and overall United States foreign policy opportunities and issues as 
relevant to Baluch nationalism and insurgencies. 
Chapter II provides relevant background material on both Baluch insurgency and 
the Iranian State’s security organizations. First, Chapter II discusses the history of Baluch, 
tracing how the Baluch became a nation of their own, then later specifically focuses on 
insurgency and COIN efforts that have pertained to the Baluch, to include clashes with the 
British, Persian dynasties, the Iranian Shahs, and the Islamic Republic up until 2003. Next, 
Chapter II outlines the four relevant COIN organizations active in Sistan-Baluchistan: The 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the National Law Enforcement Forces of 
Iran (NAJA), the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and Iran’s conventional 
armed forces (Artesh). Additionally, the advantages, disadvantages, and behavior of these 
four organizations are outlined. Finally, Chapter II discusses patterns of behavior 
concerning matters of internal Iranian security, and identifies significant, recurrent, and 
apparently default tactics, techniques and strategies which Iran uses against perceived 
threats to its security. First, Iran makes little no distinction between insurgent and terrorist. 
Second, Iran blames all insurgent and armed opposition on foreign interference. Third, Iran 
typically will respond to insurgent or other armed internal threats with mass arrests and 
largescale law enforcement action. 
Chapter III examines Iranian COIN against Jundallah from 2003 to 2012. 
Ultimately, this examination demonstrates that Iran’s COIN organizations made three 
crucial errors against Jundallah which ultimately led to the Baluch insurgency perpetuating 
beyond Jundallah’s tenure. First, Iran believed that Jundallah’s center of gravity lay with 
Jundallah leader Abdolmalek Rigi and his inner circle, and that the arrest and eventual 
killing of this critical leadership would represent a death knell for the insurgency. As 
Chapter III demonstrates, however, this characterization of Jundallah’s center of gravity 
was incorrect, and Rigi’s death not only failed to lead to the end of the insurgency, but 
actually resulted in a Jundallah which was more violent as well as more threatening to Iran 
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in the short term. Second, Iran responded to an ascendant Jundallah by cracking down on 
criminality and suspected insurgency in Sistan-Baluchistan, unleashing a sweeping 
campaign of arrests and law enforcement actions designed to assert Iranian control. 
However, these rule of law operations in effect backfired, since they actually failed to stop 
Jundallah from attacking, and also may have exacerbated unrest in the region, creating a 
larger constituency for the insurgency. Finally, Iran continuously sought to portray 
Jundallah as an American-supported puppet in order to discredit the organization. 
Ultimately, this tactic also backfired, since such a characterization created a larger 
international interest in Jundallah, and also in effect increased Jundallah’s domestic 
reputation as a legitimate threat to Iranian control. 
Chapter IV examines COIN after Jundallah’s disbandment, from 2012 until the 
present. Where Iran largely failed at COIN against Jundallah, Chapter IV’s analysis 
indicates an improved COIN performance in Jundallah’s aftermath, which can be evaluated 
as ultimately successful. This successful performance is because Iran’s COIN evolved 
during and after Jundallah’s tenure and began to utilize operations and tactics designed to 
contain and isolate the insurgent. First, Iran embarked on an exhaustive border security 
program, erecting a series of physical security measures along the Iran-Pakistan border 
which effectively denied Baluch insurgents easy cross-border access, while also utilizing 
mass deportations of Pakistanis in Sistan-Baluchistan and outright border closure to reduce 
Iran’s exposure to insurgent attacks. Second, Iran used diplomatic, economic, and military 
means to influence Pakistan to pursue Iranian Baluch insurgents inside their own territory, 
effectively opening up a second front of conflict and increasing pressure on Baluch 
insurgents operating against the Iranian government. Finally, where Iran’s counter-
narrative to Jundallah was largely predicated on Jundallah being a foreign puppet, from 
2012 onwards Iran began to craft a comprehensive, coherent COIN narrative which above 
all other emphases, stressed the Iranian competency and improvement at COIN and 
security matters. 
Chapter V compares the Jundallah and post-Jundallah periods and analyzes the 
sources for the improved COIN performance. Ultimately, there are two factors which drive 
the improvement of Iranian COIN against the Baluch from the end of Jundallah to the 
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present. First, since Jundallah’s end, the Baluch insurgency has been plagued by self-
inflicted wounds which are reminiscent of previous eras of Baluch nationalism and 
insurgency. Competition, rather coherence or coordination among insurgent groups 
detracts from the operational capacity of the Baluch insurgency. Sectarian and 
transnational themes have increasingly become part of Baluch insurgent’s narratives, 
which have failed to resonate with the insurgent’s constituency and potential supporters. 
Tribalism has further fractured insurgent cohesion between groups. Second, and more 
significantly, since the final years of Jundallah, the IRGC has assumed an increasingly 
active and authoritative role in combatting insurgency in Sistan-Baluchistan, and the 
IRGC’s increased role is the single-most significant reason why Iranian COIN has 
improved against the Baluch. The IRGC has unmatched resources, experience, and 
expertise in COIN, and with absolute umbrella command and control over Sistan-
Baluchistan since 2009, the IRGC has successfully woven a coherent tactical COIN 
approach which has driven Iran’s improved COIN performance. Upon further analysis, it 
then becomes apparent that the IRGC’s assumption of control is at least partially 
responsible for Jundallah’s eventual collapse, as well as the conditions under which the 
Baluch insurgency has inflicted wounds upon itself in Jundallah’s aftermath.  
Chapter VI serves as the conclusion of this thesis. First, the findings of the thesis 
research, based on analysis conducted in Chapters II through V, are presented. Second, 
based on the findings, the propositions presented in Chapter I are evaluated for validity and 
relevance to the research question. Next, implications of the results of this thesis, as they 
pertain both to internal Iranian security and political matters, as well as the geopolitical 
climate of the entire Middle East are discussed. Finally, this thesis concludes with 
recommendations for future U.S. policy regarding both Iran and Counterinsurgency 
matters in the Middle East. 
K. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The introductory chapter to this thesis presented the thesis research question, 
explored the literature on COIN, the Baluch, and Iranian internal security as it pertained to 
the research question, and posited several propositions to address the research questions. 
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A brief overview of Sistan-Baluchistan, the Baluch, and Baluch insurgents were presented, 
while the terms “insurgency,” “counterinsurgency,” “terrorism” and “counter-terrorism,” 
were defined as they pertained to the research. With this background and definition set 
accordingly, the subject of inquiry for this thesis was articulated: what has been Iran’s 
approach to counterinsurgency [COIN] with respect to the Sistan-Baluchistan insurgency? 
How successful and effective have Iranian counterinsurgency efforts been in Sistan-
Baluchistan; what tactics, techniques, procedures, and initiatives have proven effective in 
Iran’s defense against the Sistan-Baluchistan Insurgency? A review on COIN literature 
concluded that while in theory there are those who argue either for population-centric of 
enemy-centric driven COIN, the practical reality of modern military COIN doctrine 
indicates that often COIN forces utilize a synthesis of the two camps to tailor their 
responses to insurgency, designed to create policies which ultimately both pursue 
insurgents while seeking to control and influence the population. The review on Baluch 
literature revealed the potential historical, cultural, and social sources of Baluch insurgency 
against Iran. The review of literature on Iranian security forces revealed a consensus 
opinion among scholars that Iranian security forces are heavily influenced by competition 
among organizations, and operate independently, rather than in cooperation with one 
another. This chapter presented five propositions to address the thesis subject of inquiry: 
1) The Iranians have successfully combatted Baluch insurgency since 2003 by using their 
standardized, default responses to insurgency and other internal threats, characterized by 
repression, reprisal, discreditation, and leadership targeting. 2) Iran has contained Baluch 
insurgency by simultaneously targeting high level insurgent leadership and co-opting 
Baluch tribal elites 3) The environment of Sistan-Baluchistan has limited the impact and 
threat of the insurgency 4) The insurgents have defeated and hamstrung themselves with 
poor performance; these self-inflicted wounds, rather than Iranian COIN success, explains 
the reduction in insurgency 5) Iran’s COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan has improved over time, 
and the rate of this improvement has outpaced the evolution of the insurgent, yielding Iran’s 
success over the Baluch insurgent.  
Presented in Chapter VI, the inquiry findings demonstrate that propositions 1, 2, 
and 3 do not sufficiently reflect the occurrences between insurgent and counterinsurgent in 
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Sistan-Baluchistan. Hypotheses 4 and 5 prove far more valid in examination of Iran’s 
COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan. Against Jundallah, Iran failed to effectively neutralize 
insurgency. However, since Jundallah’s final years, the Baluch insurgency has increasingly 
lost ground to Iranian COIN efforts. In short, it is a combination of insurgents’ flaws, and 
a drastically improved Iranian COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan which have allowed Iran to 
emerge victorious against Baluch insurgencies from 2003-2020. The most significant root 














II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT, 
ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUNDS, AND 
IRANIAN COUNTER-OPPOSITION PATTERNS 
According to the U.S. DoD Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency, COIN 
should be considered a separate, distinct category of warfare because it focuses not on 
physical destruction of an enemy “militarily,” but instead hinges upon operations designed 
to “gain or maintain control or influence over” populations of strategic significance.142 JP 
3-24 identifies that successful COIN must “understand the population, anticipate insurgent 
actions, be comfortable among the population, and appreciate the comprehensive approach 
of unified action.”143 Therefore, an effective counterinsurgent needs to not only 
understand the basic principles of COIN, but must also possess deep, thorough 
understandings of the insurgents, the populations among which the insurgent and the 
counterinsurgent compete for support, knowledge of the historical successes and failures 
of COIN relevant to the area, and a self-awareness of COIN organization and patterns of 
behavior. 
As this thesis aims to understand and evaluate the Islamic Republic of Iran’s COIN 
approach to Baluch insurgency in the country’s southeast, it is important to understand the 
historical trajectory of Baluch-Iranian government interactions, the organizational makeup 
of contemporary Iranian COIN apparatuses, and the patterns of Iranian security behavior. 
Toward this end, this chapter functions as a primer of relevant historical context and 
background as pertaining to the Iranian government and Baluch insurgency in Sistan-
Baluchistan Province. Section A of this chapter provides the relevant historical elements 
of Iranian COIN against the Baluch, and the relevant history of Baluch insurgency. Section 
B outlines the four main organizations involved in COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan. Section C 
of this chapter details the significant patterns and themes in Iranian State responses to 
internal opposition, dissent, and perceived threats. 
 
142 Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterinsurgency, xiii.  
143 Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, xiii. 
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A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The first section of this chapter is designed to function as a historical primer for 
Baluch insurgency and Iranian COIN. First, the origins of Baluch identity shall be 
discussed as it pertains to insurgency. Next the British and Qajar Dynastic Persian 
interactions (1805-1923 and 1716-1925, respectively) shall be cataloged as they pertain to 
conceptualizations and justifications for distinct, autonomous Iranian Baluch identity. The 
reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi from 1923 to 1941 is presented as arguably the era of the first 
true COIN operations against the Baluch in Iran. Additionally, this section provides 
background information on Iranian COIN during the era of Mohammed Reza Shah (1941-
1979), including the successes and failures against the Baluch. Finally, background on 
Baluch insurgency and Iranian counterinsurgency relevant to the Islamic Republic from 
1979 to 2003 is discussed. 
1. History of the Baluch 
There is significant ambiguity and uncertainty concerning the origin of the Baluch 
identity. Though Baluchi is an old language, it had no written form until well into the 19th 
century.144 Per Carina Jahani, this absence of “written literary tradition” heavily 
contributed to porous continuity in tracing the history of the Baluch.145 Ahmed and Khan 
note that reference to the Baluch is exceedingly “rare in ancient and historical 
literature.”146 This characterization bears further weight, since available references to the 
Baluch in ancient times inherently carry an outsider’s perspective, further complicating 
Baluch origins with biases and preconceived notions which may not at the time have 
reflected the Baluch self-perception. This outside perspective further confounds Baluch 
origin by divergence of assessment as well. For example, some of the earliest written 
records of the Baluch are Arabic Texts from the 8th, 9th, and 10th centuries, and these 
 
144 Mansej Longworth Dames, A Text Book of the Balochi Language (Lahore: Punjab Provincial 
Government, 1922), 3, https://archive.org/details/textbookofbaloch00damerich/page/n11/mode/2up. 
145 Jahani, “The Balochi Language and Languages in Iranian Balochistan,” 158. 
146 Manzoor Ahmed and Gulawar Khan, “The History of Baloch and Balochistan: A Critical 
Appraisal,” South Asian Studies 32, no. 1 (June 2017): 39, http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/
3_v32_1_17.pdf. 
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sources having divergent identifiers and characteristics for the same people. While earlier 
texts identify the Baluch as “autonomous mountain communities,” later Abbasid Empire 
writings identify the Baluch “in association with other tribal populations in the area.”147 
Instead of basing Baluch identity on disputed origin, most scholars argue that 
Baluch conceptualizations of identity are based more on the commonalities in Baluch 
culture and language. There exists no consensus on Baluch origins.148 Instead, the 
prevailing theories share an assertion that the Baluch migrated long distances over time. 
Baluch tribes have assimilated and absorbed cultural and ethnic aspects over the course of 
their history. It is these migrations, and interactions with other cultures and ethnicities, 
which drive Selig Harrison to argue that the Baluch should not be considered 
“homogenous.”149 Instead, Harrison argues, the Baluch identity is based on the cultural, 
historical, and linguistic elements of each tribe, which have been “remarkably” well-
preserved.150 Similarly, Manzoor Ahmed and Gulawar Khan argue that rather than 
disputing how the Baluch arrived in the territory they currently occupy and over time 
evolved into a group that is “heterogenous” in both “composition and characters,” 
delineating Baluch origin should instead be focused on the “genesis” of a Baluch “nation-
state” equivalent.151 Moreover, this constant interaction, absorption and partial adoption 
of cultures, practices and materials over time is precisely what makes the Baluch an 
exceptional, separate identity from any other group, especially pertaining to common 
ancestry. 
The concept of a Baluch nation-state thus may be considered to have coalesced 
from the late 1400s to the 1700s. The first semblance of a Baluch nation arises during the 
1480s, when the Baluch “chieftain and warrior” Mir Chakar Khan Rind successfully 
 
147 Mahrukh Khan, “Balochistan: The Forgotten Frontier,” Strategic Studies XXXII–XXXIII, no. 4-1 
(Mar 31, 2013): 201. 
148 Khan, 202–204; Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, 10; Ahmed and Khan, “The History of 
Baloch and Balochistan,” 39. 
149 Harrison, 11. 
150 Harrison, 10. 
151 Ahmed and Khan, “The History of Baloch and Balochistan,” 43–45.  
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formed a “confederacy” of Baluch tribes.152 Harrison, Ahmed, and Khan describe the 
alliance as a “short-lived” aberration among a historical record whose course had been 
dominated by “frequent internal wars” which made “political unity and harmony” all but 
impossible.153 Nevertheless, they all acknowledge Rind’s accomplishment as a seedling 
of the Baluch nationalist movement.154 After tribal and factional rivalries fractured Rind’s 
unified Baluch state, it was nearly 200 years before the next significant Baluch tribe 
coalescence. Mir Ahmed Khan created the Kalat Confederacy in the 1660s.155 Unlike 
Rind’s confederacy, the Kalat Confederacy endured, and eventually expanded. Mir Ahmed 
unified the Saravan and Jhalawan regions under his banner, which endured well past the 
end of his reign.156 A successor of Mir Ahmed, Mir Naseer Khan Noori, further 
consolidated the power of the Baluch confederacy while expanding the territory which it 
could claim as its own sovereign land between 1749 and 1805,.157 Naseer Khan’s reign 
expanded the Baluch territory to modern limits, and contained advanced institutions of 
governance including a two-house parliament, advanced irrigation systems, and a system 
of political power that gave tribal chiefs the preponderance of power.158 
2. Clashes with Imperialism and First Signs of Insurgency 
In the beginning of the 19th century, the area now known as Baluchistan became 
strategically relevant to global powers. As Selig Harrison describes, the Kalat Confederacy, 
which could have been considered a fully sovereign kingdom or state, found the prospects 
of its sovereignty afoul of British strategic interests. Per Harrison, the demise of the Kalat 
confederacy, and dissection of its sovereign territory to a multitude of other states in the 
1800s was executed by Great Britain to obtain advantageous leverage over Russia in a 
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155 Ahmed and Khan, “The History of Baloch and Balochistan,” 45. 
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“Great Game” for dominant influence in South Asia.159 According to Harrison’s analysis, 
Britain wanted to maintain Afghanistan as a “buffer state to shield their Indian empire from 
Russia.” 160 To do so required that the British-backed Indian Empire both acquire and 
maintain “unimpeded military dominance in the frontier region” of Afghanistan.161 
Unfortunately, Afghanistan and the Indian Empire’s frontiers intersected over the Kalat 
confederacy of Baluchistan, which made it a target for British conquest and influence.162 
Neither the British and Qajar dynasty attempts to conquer Baluchistan, nor the 
Baluch’s fierce and violent resistance to these incursions were without precedent. Per 
Harrison, the Moghul Empire waged several campaigns in the 16th and 17th centuries to 
conquer the Baluch, all of which were defeated by temporary alliances between tribes.163 
Harrison also notes frequent Baluch repulsion of Persian and Afghan invasions.164 In the 
early 1700s, Abdullah Khan, the fourth head of the Kalat Confederacy, checked Iranian 
ambitions by “tribute” payments designed to prevent Iranian incursions into Western 
Baluch territory.165 In Nasir Khan’s reign, the Kalat confederacy stopped paying tribute to 
Persia after 1747, and then successfully fought off attempts by Ahmad Shah Durrani’s 
Afghan forces to conquer Baluch territory.166 
As with previous foreign incursions, Baluch responses to British and Qajar 
dominion were far from submissive; Britain and Persia could at best claim tenuous control 
over Baluch territory, and they both had to continuously fight to maintain it. Dominion 
over the Baluch was neither a quick nor painless achievement. According to Harrison, it 
took four decades of “bloody battles” before the British finally were able to conquer the 
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tribes in 1876.167 Subsequently, subjugation was only achieved by co-opting tribal chiefs, 
which was tantamount to converting Baluchistan into a semi-autonomous region where 
chiefs still “enjoyed virtually complete control of their tribal affairs.”168 The Qajar dynasty 
was forced to resort to similar levels of bloodshed in the 19th and early 20th centuries to 
assert their authority over Western Balochistan. The entirety of Persian-Baluch relations, 
according to Nasser Dashti, is a history of “bloodshed” and “antipathy.”169 An 1897 revolt 
led by the Baluch chieftain Hussain Khan effectively asserted control over a preponderance 
of Western Balochistan, and even brought a large Persian army to a stalemate.170 Similar 
to the British experience, the Persians only succeeded in quelling Hussein Khan’s revolt 
by co-opting him, effectively making him the “ruler of the Baloch areas under Persian 
sovereignty.” 171  
British interference during this period is responsible for the differentiation between 
Iranian Baluch and Pakistani Baluch identities, as well as the first de facto contemporary 
Baluch State. Weary of Russian aggression, and seeking to maintain British-aligned control 
of Baluchistan, in 1871 Britain and Persia reached an agreement which saw official control 
of Baluch tribal territories divided between Great Britain, Afghanistan, and Persia.172 The 
Persian territory, referred to as Western Balochistan, constituted nearly 50 percent of 
Baluch tribal lands.173 This territorial division created a Persian Baluch territory separate 
from the rest of Baluchistan. This division, and the Qajar Dynasty’s subsequent loss of 
control created the first modern precedent of Baluch territory separate and sovereign from 
any other state. After Mir Bahram Khan succeeded his father as ruler of Western 
Baluchistan in 1907, he began to consolidate his power.174 To contain a rising autonomous 
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Baluch force, the Persian government sent its army to suppress Khan’s forces in 1910.175 
The army failed, and according to Naseer Dashti “retreated without accomplishing its 
objective.”176 Following Persian retreat, Western Baluchistan was effectively left to 
govern itself, with Mir Bahram Khan as ruler. Mir Bahram Khan gained official recognition 
of his authority over Western Baluchistan from the British.177 This autonomous Baluch 
territory, consolidated under Barakzai tribe leadership, persisted “for nearly three decades” 
until it was brought back under Iranian control in the early 20th century.178 
3. Reza Shah and the Birth of Iranian Baluch Insurgency 
Once Reza Shah Pahlavi took over Iran in 1923, he sought to re-establish and 
consolidate centralized government authority, and in so doing embarked on a campaign 
which brought the Baluch tribes and territories under unprecedented levels of Persian 
control. Reza Shah Pahlavi executed this strategy nationwide through military campaigns 
designed to undo previous autonomy which some regions of Iran had gained throughout 
his predecessors’ rule. In the early 1920s, the Pahlavi Dynasty as well as its predecessor, 
the Qajars, used superior military might to solidify Tehran’s control in outlying provincial 
regions such as Khuzestan, Iranian Kurdistan, and Gilan.179 In late 1927, the Shah regime 
then moved into Baluchistan, and using a technologically superior military, crushed armed 
resistance that had coalesced under the Baluch chieftain Dost Mohammed.180 It took the 
Shah’s forces almost an entire year to bring the Baluch territories fully under their control, 
and the resistance of the Baluch was reportedly so fierce that the Shah’s army had to 
ultimately use “air power and artillery” to defeat Dost Mohammed’s forces, which at the 
time was unprecedented in Iran.181 
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Where the British and Persian forces had allowed the Baluch to maintain significant 
autonomy, the Iranian state under Reza Shah Pahlavi systematically dismantled 
manifestations of Baluch sovereignty. British domain over Baluchistan was simply 
concerned with gaining unimpeded access to secure lines of communication and supply 
into Afghanistan. Though the British at times took action against the Baluch to secure this 
access, so long as the British access of the “frontier areas” between Iran, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan remained unimpeded, they effectively allowed the Baluch to govern 
themselves as their leaders saw fit.182 Harrison notes that British administrators 
deliberately abstained from imposing “the administrative machinery of the Raj into the 
Baluch areas.”183 Iranian control, by contrast, made no provision for Baluch autonomy. 
During his reign as the Iranian head of state from 1923 to 1941, Reza Shah Pahlavi, 
according to Harrison, conducted wholesale “subjugation” of Baluch tribes, using an 
approach designed to “break the power” of traditional Baluch elites, first through militarily 
defeating tribes, then co-opting these tribes into Iranian regional governance through 
“carrot and stick techniques.”184 
Following Reza Shah’s rise to Iranian state sovereign, the first true Baluch 
insurgency groups emerged. According to the United States Counterinsurgency Manual, 
insurgency is defined as “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or 
challenge political control of a region.” 185 One cannot seize what they already have in 
their possession. Until Iran took over, as argued above, there could be little to no claim of 
Baluch insurgents, because the Baluch retained a preponderance of self-governance over 
their own territory. However, they lost their autonomy under the first Shah, and the degree 
to which they were subjugated is thus why this thesis considers the Shah Pahlavi period 
the first actual era of Baluch insurgents. 
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Baluch insurgents during Reza Shah’s tenure were numerous, but they lacked the 
organizational structure and trans-tribal elements of later insurgencies. Harrison notes that 
throughout much of Reza Shah’s reign, there is “little coordinated insurgent activity” in 
Sistan-Baluchistan.186 Nevertheless, insurgent and rebel groups were numerous and active 
in the province. Per Harrison, Iranian and government military officials were constantly 
harassed by “scattered bands of rebellious tribesmen” who initiated repeated attacks against 
military and government installations and maintained caches of weaponry despite Iranian 
decree outlawing personal possession of firearms.187 
The Shah’s methodology for COIN once he had conquered and fully subjugated 
Baluchistan relied on presence of security forces and co-opting of local elites. As Harrison 
mentions, Iranian control over Baluchistan was largely guaranteed by a permanent, 
systemic, and exhaustive presence of the Iranian army and Gendarme.188 These forces 
allowed Reza Shah to quickly and overwhelmingly neutralize frequent attacks by armed 
rebels, responding in kind with “intermittent punitive expeditions.”189 In southern areas of 
Baluchistan, where less nomadic, and more sedentary tribes of Baluch resided, military 
occupation was the most effective tool of the Shah’s COIN, and Tehran was able to 
“completely displace” tribal elders and replace their influence with military and Gendarme 
rule.190 In the north, where Baluch tribes were more nomadic in nature, Reza Shah’s forces 
made Baluch tribal elites agents of Iran’s authority. Harrison notes that the tribal Sardars 
throughout Baluch territory were effectively bribed into cooperation and compliance.191 
This bribery came in two forms. First, tribal chieftains received a direct salary from the 
Shah as agents of the state.192 Second, tribal elites were awarded executor status for “the 
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influx of development resources from Tehran, which provided ample opportunities for 
lucrative rake-offs.”193 
The Shah’s COIN operations were successful, especially when compared to the 
strength of Baluch insurgency from 2003 onward, post-1979 Revolution, and during the 
reign of Mohammed Reza Shah. From 1928 to the Shah’s deposition from the throne in 
1941, there was no named Baluch insurgency, insurrection, or nationalist movement which 
has made its way into significant historical record. This achievement is one which no 
Iranian regime since has been able to replicate. The perceived effectiveness of his methods 
is also reflected in their utilization to quell insurgencies from 2003 onwards. For example, 
as discussed in Chapter V, the expanding influence and presence of the IRGC in Sistan-
Baluchistan has played a large part in combatting insurgent groups over time. This increase 
in IRGC presence corresponds to the Shah’s heavy deployment of the army and Gendarme, 
which he used to contain budding insurgent elements. Just as the Shah co-opted Baluch 
elites into his own governance, Dudoignon notes that currently, IRGC and the current 
administration have co-opted a set of Deobandi religious elites he calls the “Sarbaz Nexus” 
in order to counter religious sectarian ideologies of Jundallah, Jaish ul-Adl and other 
insurgent groups.194  
4. Mohammed Reza Shah: Baluch-Iranian Insurgency Comes of Age 
Compared with his father, Mohammed Reza Shah’s control over Sistan-
Baluchistan was marked by significant rises in Baluch violence, insurgency, and rebellion 
against Iranian control. Like his father, the reign of Mohammed Reza Shah in Sistan-
Baluchistan remained characterized by the heavy, frequent appearance of local armed 
bandits and rebels harassing military and government officials.195 There were also two 
major insurgencies in Sistan-Baluchistan during Mohammed Reza Shah’s tenure, which 
covered more than half his reign over Iran. Beginning in 1944, a landowning farmer named 
Dad Shah, along with a network of friends and family, led an armed rebellion against 
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Iranian forces for nearly fifteen years.196 His rebellion was all but crushed in 1958, when 
following the kidnapping and murder of three Americans by Dad Shah’s forces, some of 
the tribal elites which had been supporting or tolerating his efforts effectively set up an 
ambush where Dad Shah was killed.197 A second major insurgency followed from roughly 
1968 to 1973, with a conglomerate of insurgent and rebel organizations coalescing into the 
Baluch Liberation Front.198 Receiving training, arms and other forms of support from Iraq, 
at its zenith BLF had upwards of 500 militants, and conducted frequent operations inside 
Sistan-Baluchistan against the Shah’s forces.199 However, by 1973, Iranian forces had 
“decimated” The BLF, and the vast majority of the groups associated with the BLF banner 
negotiated a ceasefire with Mohammed Shah’s forces.200 Pockets of insurgency persisted 
after the ceasefire, but they were minimal, and according to Harrison achieved few, if any 
victories against the Iranian state, especially since the vast majority of the BLF 
concentrated their efforts on insurgency in Pakistani Balochistan following the peace 
agreement.201 
Compared with his father, Mohammed Reza Shah’s policies toward security and 
COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan were more aggressive, invasive, and repressive. Mohammed 
Reza Shah, seeing a growing Baluch nationalist movement in Pakistan, feared that 
nationalist fervor would spill across the border and foster insurgency in his own 
territory.202 In response, he sought to repress significant elements of Baluch identity. The 
Shah made the mandatory language of all education in Sistan-Baluchistan Persian, and 
forbade the use of Baluchi.203 The regime also criminalized the production, publication, 
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or possession of any document written in Baluchi, and outlawed the wearing of traditional 
Baluch clothing in public.204 Mohammed Shah’s regime further sought to minimize the 
political threat of the Baluch through what Harrison characterizes as “political 
gerrymandering,” merging Sistan and Baluchistan into a single province, undercounting 
the Baluch population in censuses, and assigning other prominent Baluch tribal areas to the 
provinces of Kerman and Khorasan.205 
The creation of SAVAK and its subsequent activity in Sistan-Baluchistan added 
further unprecedented repression against the Iranian Baluch. Created in 1957, the State 
Security and National Intelligence Organization, better known as SAVAK was the Iranian 
internal security service whose express purpose was to monitor and dismantle internal 
resistance to the Shah’s authority.206 SAVAK was “notorious” throughout Iran for its 
frequent use of “jailings, beatings, and torture.” 207 As with the rest of Iran, SAVAK’s 
activities in Sistan-Baluchistan used a heavy hand which made dissent, much less 
insurgency, a difficult and costly prospect. Leaders of Baluch nationalist groups and other 
prominent anti-Iran Baluch constantly found themselves on the run. As Harrison recounts, 
“relentless” SAVAK pursuit of suspected insurgents placed most insurgents in a constant 
state of flight, which effectively cut them off with consolidating or increasing levels of 
popular support.208 The majority of BLF leaders were either killed or fled Iranian territory 
to avoid SAVAK’s grasp.209 Moreover, Harrison’s research indicates there was 
“pervasive” fear among the Baluch of SAVAK.210 In the interviews he conducted with 
Baluch in 1978, he noted that “terror-stricken silence and a degree of alarm” were 
ubiquitous whenever he broached subjects of insurgency or independence.211 
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Though the policies of Mohammed Reza Shah repressed and contained Baluch 
uprisings, the cost of maintaining control was an erosion of any prospect of popular support 
for the regime. Whether from causation or correlation, Mohammed Reza Shah’s repressive 
policies coincided with larger, more organized, and better-connected insurgent movements 
than Reza Shah experienced during his tenure. Harrison argues that Mohammed Reza 
Shah’s efforts, though brutal, repressive and reprehensible, did succeed in driving Baluch 
nationalism and insurgency “underground.”212 Nevertheless, these methods of repression 
failed to defeat insurgency outright. Dudoignon argues that Mohammed Shah’s use of 
repression in COIN created a feedback loop, one where his only recourse for maintaining 
order and discipline in Sistan-Baluchistan was an ever-increasing reliance of the tactics and 
methods of SAVAK.213 As Harrison dictates, the Shah’s efforts to soften repression and 
rebuild positive relationships with Baluch populations largely failed because of a shared 
collective memory of his regime’s repression.214 Instead, Harrison argues, the repressive 
COIN approach created an irreparable situation where counterinsurgents could only 
continue the status quo through a constant cycle of heavy-handed surveillance and 
punishment, which over time “prepared the ground” among the Iranian Baluch tribes for 
“rapid nationalist resurgence” at the first sign of loss or erosion of Iranian control.215  
5. Islamic Revolution Era (1979-2003) 
With the overthrow of Mohammed Reza Shah and subsequent establishment of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, there was initially positive outlooks that the Baluch would regain 
significant rights and autonomies under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. Regionally, 
when the Shah’s government fell, so did the heavy security and surveillance presence in 
Baluchistan, which allowed the Baluch, as Harrison notes, “for the first time in half a 
century,” to engage in political activity, identity expression and cultural celebration.216 
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This vacuum of governance paved the way for an unprecedented level of self-
representation and determination for the Baluch in Sistan-Baluchistan. Baluch insurgent 
groups began to gain strength and managed to attain smaller victories over the remnants of 
the Shah’s government. The Iranian Baluch expressly began to “reassert their own power” 
by ousting Persian and other government officials from their offices.217 There are frequent 
references from 1979 to 1981 of armed Baluch groups forcibly disarming and disbanding 
the remaining Army and Gendarme units in the province.218 The Baluch pressured the 
local provisional governor to appoint Baluch to positions of authority within the 
government, to include the Governor General.219 Finally, the prospects for inclusion of the 
Baluch as equal citizens under Iranian law seemed high. Shortly after Khomeini assumed 
power, leaders of the Islamic Unity Party, at the time considered to be “the principal 
spokesman for Baluch interests,” met with Khomeini to discuss Baluch and Sunni inclusion 
in the new state.220 Reportedly, the IUP delegation received verbal promises from 
Khomeini that the Baluch, via the IUP would be able to choose their own people for 
positions of authority in Sistan-Baluchistan, and that Sunnis and Shiites would be treated 
“on a par.”221 
This positive outlook, however, was short-lived, and conditions underpinning the 
grievances which function as critical foundation for Baluch insurgency soon returned. 
Despite Khomeini’s assurances, the constitution for Islamic Republic contained no 
provision for Sunni equality, nor did it provide any recourse for ethnic Baluch to determine 
who would govern Sistan-Baluchistan.222 Instead, Baluch rights and autonomy under the 
constitution echoed the reigns of the Shahs. Persian remained the mandatory language of 
education and government affairs, Baluch publications remained heavily restricted, and all 
provisional government decisions, to include both those of policy and appointment, were 
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subject to Tehran’s “veto.”223 Outrage and resentment over these issues quickly exploded 
into violence. By January 1980, riots and violent clashes between ethnic Baluch and the 
Ayatollah Khomeini-loyalist Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps(IRGC) were a frequent 
occurrence in Sistan-Baluchistan.224 Baluch rioters burned ballot boxes, sacked the 
Governor-General’s compound and took him hostage.225 In total, violence between the 
IRGC and locals killed 24 and injured 80 more, and it was only after Tehran had declared 
a state of emergency, deployed armored military divisions to urban areas, and flooded the 
province with IRGC patrols that violence finally subsided.226 The period of lighter military 
supervision and Baluch self-autonomy was over, and in its place emerged a heavy military 
and security-driven governance which mirrored Mohammed Reza Shah’s handling of 
Sistan-Baluchistan. 
The unrest from constitutional exclusion gave way to the first Baluch insurgencies 
the Islamic Republic faced. The largest organization was the Baluchistan People’s 
Democratic Organization [BPDO].227 Comprised largely of disaffected IUP membership, 
the BPDO was reportedly behind the preponderance of the riots, protests, and attacks across 
Sistan-Baluchistan and the general unrest in December 1979.228 The BPDO continued 
such attacks, with the group allegedly inciting riots, protests, and daily attacks on the IRGC 
and other government forces well into 1980.229 In addition, several other large Baluch 
insurgent groups began to act against the Iranian government following the 1979 riots. 
Remnants of the BLF, active mostly during Mohammed Reza Shah’s reign, coalesced and 
began to attack the IRGC, while new groups, such as the Baluch Pesh Merga and Vahdat 
Baluch conducted insurgent activity against Iranian state targets.230 
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From 1980 onward, the Islamic Republic pursued a COIN approach that bears 
striking similarity to that of Mohammed Reza Shah. SAVAK, mainly seen as a tool of the 
Shah’s repression, was dismantled with the deposition of the Shah. However, the IRGC 
almost immediately took SAVAK’s place, and “assumed primary responsibility for the 
internal security functions of the old SAVAK organization.”231 Concerning matters in 
Sistan-Baluchistan, it appears that the Islamic Republic has assumed near-identical policies 
when compared with those of its predecessor. Though it temporarily in 1979 allowed for 
Baluch self-determination and permitted Baluch to occupy high offices in the provincial 
government, these allowances were reversed within six months, and Persians have 
occupied these positions ever since that time.232 Subsequently, following the 1979 unrest, 
Tehran banned all Baluch publications outright, and criminalized groups which support 
Baluch autonomy or nationalism inside Iran.233 
At a tactical and operational level, Iran’s approach toward insurgent groups appears 
nearly indistinguishable from that of SAVAK. SAVAK pursued policies of aggressive 
persecution against anyone involved with the BLF. Against the BPDO and other insurgent 
groups, the IRGC has the same approach. Between December 1979 and 1983, the IRGC 
imprisoned an estimated 4000 Baluch on suspicion of association with separatist and 
insurgent movements, with another 3000 fleeing Iranian territory for safe haven Pakistan 
and elsewhere.234 Executions of dissenters and insurgents, according to Taheri, have also 
been frequent.235 Finally, to curb lawlessness, the Islamic Republic has embarked on a 
continuous expansion of military installations in Sistan-Baluchistan, going as far as to 
install military bases on the main highways, costing “billions of rials” to ensure that the 
security and military apparatuses can be felt throughout the entire region.236 
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Overall, the Islamic Republic’s COIN approach from 1979 to 2003 appears mostly 
successful at containing, if not marginalizing Baluch insurgency inside Iran’s borders. 
There are significant, legitimate concerns that the Iranian state has and continues to commit 
human rights abuses and outright atrocities against the Iranian Baluch in the names of 
COIN and security. Despite these concerns, and a high level of underlying grievance 
between the Baluch and the Persian-dominated government, insurgent movements from 
1979 to 2003 failed to achieve any significant support of victory against the Iranian state. 
The most these groups have been able to achieve, at best is what Harrison describes as 
trying to “make it hot” for Tehran to continue governance in Sistan-Baluchistan.237 
However as Ahmad Reza Taheri notes, in reality, until 2003 insurgent groups failed to gain 
any semblance of autonomy or independence from Tehran, and did not achieve any 
significant improvement for Baluch rights or conditions during their tenure.238 
B. PROFILE OF MODERN IRANIAN COIN: AGENCIES, CAPABILITIES, 
AND THEIR INTERACTIONS 
Before evaluating the Iranian approach to Jundallah and subsequent insurgent 
organizations, it is important to understand the critical arms of Iranian authority by which 
the state has responded to Baluch insurgency from 2003 onwards. Four main security 
organizations play a role in Iran’s COIN operations in Sistan-Baluchistan. These four 
organizations, in ascending order of involvement and capabilities are: the conventional 
military (Artesh), the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), Iran’s Law 
Enforcement Force (NAJA), and finally the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). 
1. Artesh 
The first security organization active in Iranian COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan is the 
Iranian conventional military, better known as the Artesh.239 The Artesh is the largest 
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military force in Iran, with an estimated 400,000 personnel in 2019.240 However, of the 
four organizations listed, the Artesh is the organization which is least equipped to deal with 
insurgent threats. A conventional military force, the Artesh is primarily oriented toward 
territorial defense, and repulsion of invaders.241 As a result, it is the force with the least 
effective organization to combat insurgency. Per Hossein Aryan, the 1979 Artesh was 
largely the surviving “remnant of the Shah’s Military.”242 Following the 1979 revolution, 
the Artesh’s leadership and areas of expertise suffered significant diminishment, as the 
organization was “ravaged, intimidated, and gutted to the core in a series of purges.”243 
Although the Artesh is now a fully trusted and empowered military in the Islamic Republic, 
it remains second in standing to the IRGC. This applies both to funding and operational 
influence. The Artesh’s budget pales in comparison to the IRGC and other forces, and the 
Artesh’s equipment and technology is described as “obsolescent and low-quality” when 
compared with that at the disposal of other forces.244  
2. The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) 
As its name suggests, the MOIS’s primary contribution to Iranian COIN against 
Baluch insurgency has been in the area of intelligence and surveillance. According to the 
Iranian constitution, MOIS is to act as the primary gatherer and producer of both internal 
and external intelligence for Iran, and use this intelligence in order to identify and respond 
to “conspiracy, subversion, espionage, sabotage, and sedition.”245 As a 2012 Library of 
Congress report notes, Iranian Baluch are subject to constant surveillance by the MOIS due 
to concerns over separatism and insurgency.246 Through open source monitoring, 
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surveillance, informants, undercover agents, and other collection methods, MOIS’s 
primary function with respect to Baluch insurgencies has been to build bodies of 
information which profile the character, nature and intent of insurgent groups like 
Jundallah.247 MOIS is also suspected of heavily tracking the movements and patterns of 
key membership of Baluch insurgent groups.248 
A second significant contribution that the MOIS brings to Iranian COIN is 
information operations, particularly concerned with persuasion of narratives. The largest 
branch of the MOIS is reportedly its Department of Disinformation.249 According to U.S. 
congressional research, this department is effectively able to “manipulate the media” inside 
of Iran to disseminate information designed to satisfy state interests and narratives.250 
Furthermore, research indicates that the MOIS influences Iranian efforts to control and 
suppress media sources it deems counter-productive to state interests.251 In addition to 
shaping the overall narrative through information released on insurgent and 
counterinsurgent activities, MOIS control of information and its effect on narratives can 
produce windfalls in psychological warfare. One example of this control is the MOIS 
narrative developed around the capture of Jundallah leader Abdolmalek Rigi in late 2010, 
where the MOIS narrative of the operation, as well as the purported broadcast of Rigi’s 
admission of U.S. involvement in Jundallah was heavily covered by internal and external 
Iranian media sources.252 
Though the MOIS has at times conducted significant, critical operations for COIN 
the majority of their sustained capability lies as a supportive function. At times, the MOIS 
has initiated capture and kill missions against Baluch dissidents. Preceding the purported 
MOIS apprehension of Abdolmalek Rigi, U.S. congressional reports confirm that the 
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MOIS was behind assassinations of at least 4 prominent Baluch dissidents in the 1990s.253 
Overall, however, the MOIS lacks the personnel required to maintain the physical presence 
necessary for sustained COIN operations. Of the four discussed, MOIS is the only 
organization which does not have a significant conscription force, and instead ends up 
rejecting two thirds of its applicants.254 MOIS is also the smallest force discussed, with as 
few as 30,000 personnel.255 As a result, with the exception of a few aberrations, MOIS’s 
primary, critical contributions to Iranian COIN remain in the realms of information, 
surveillance and intelligence. 
3. Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran (NAJA) 
Another organization which has been prominent with respect to Iranian COIN 
against the Baluch has been the Law Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
better known as NAJA.256 As a component of Interior Ministry, NAJA is the conventional 
national police force, and functions as an umbrella organization which covers the multitude 
of what one would expect from normal law enforcement. Under its umbrella are 
suborganizations designated to combat specific crime and enforce sections of law, to 
include criminal intelligence, antiterrorism, metropolitan police forces, and counter drug- 
organizations.257 The NAJA is estimated to have 300,000 personnel nationwide, 
approximately half of which are conscripts fulfilling a mandatory two years of service.258 
In addition, due to its wide range of missions, and a mix of professional and conscript 
forces, NAJA’s level of expertise, both in armed combat as well as functional components 
of COIN such as counterterror or security planning are widely unpredictable. While there 
are forces who are specially trained, such as NOPO, who owns counterterror and hostage 
 
253 U.S. Library of Congress, 50–51. 
254 U.S. Library of Congress, 24. 
255 U.S. Library of Congress, 24. 
256 Esfandiary and Tabatabai, “A Comparative Study of U.S. and Iranian Counter-ISIS Strategies,” 
460.  
257 Esfandiary and Tabatabai, 460. 
258 Golkar, “Evolution of Iran’s Police Forces,” 4.  
61 
rescue missions on a national level, there are also local conscripts who receive little to no 
training whatsoever.259 
Increasingly, NAJA has become an organization which executes, supports, and 
augments the functions and goals of the IRGC. Among the organizations involved in COIN 
in Sistan-Baluchistan, NAJA is the youngest, having only gained an official national 
charter in 1991.260 Increasingly, former prominent members of the IRGC and Basij 
leadership have been appointed to key NAJA leadership positions. An IRGC veteran, 
General Reza Seifolahi, became NAJA’s chief executive in 1992, and since then the 
organization has increasingly seen NAJA’s upper and middle tier leadership dominated by 
former IRGC personnel.261 Entry-level recruitment directly from the membership of the 
Basij has increasingly made influence of the Revolutionary Guards equally pervasive 
throughout the lower ranks.262As Said Golkar presents, this dominance by Revolutionary 
Guard leadership in NAJA has effectively created a secondary organization to directly 
carry out the will of Ayatollah Khamenei, the first being the IRGC.263 
NAJA has successfully been able to stand on its own to counter both insurgent and 
other dissent groups inside of Iran. NAJA has been increasing its presence throughout Iran, 
more than doubling the number of police stations between 2000 and 2003.264 NAJA forces 
have also increasingly been used as a force to counter and suppress government opposition 
throughout the nation, particularly in urban settings. NAJA forces were employed by the 
Iranian state to suppress student-led anti-government protests and riots during 1999 and 
2003, and to contain similar protests from professional organizations between 2001 and 
2005.265 Furthermore, following the Green Movement protests in 2009, NAJA expanded 
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technologically, focused on modernizing intelligence and cyberwarfare capabilities.266 
Increasingly, NAJA continues to be employed toward containing and quelling internal 
dissent, as has been the case with their heavy involvement in suppression of the massive 
2009 and 2010 protests across Iran.267 NAJA also seems able to solve threats from internal 
dissent without assistance; per Golkar, the 2017-2018 protests were handled by NAJA 
almost exclusively, with little to no assistance from Revolutionary Guards, a marked 
change from the 1995 protests that NAJA was all but helpless to contain.268 
Importantly, the Iranian Border Guard Force falls under NAJA jurisdiction.269 
Border Guards have been the insurgent’s most frequently targeted authority figures, and 
their assigned jurisdictions along border outposts as well as at official Iran-Pakistan border 
crossings have often made them the front line first responders against insurgent activity. In 
terms of personnel and training, the Border Guards have likely born greater loss and 
damage inflicted due to the inherent nature of their forces. As Golkar notes, NAJA force 
training and proficiency tends to be best in urban areas which are located far from the 
frontier.270 By contrast, more rural areas especially those with forces consist largely of 
conscripts, often suffer from “unprofessionalism.”271 Because of the geography and 
population composition of Sistan-Baluchistan, the forces on the border are often the less 
well-equipped to deal with insurgents, particularly because they are often conscripts with 
little to no training, and in remote areas with slower response times for support. The Iranian 
state in recent years has attempted to compensate for this shortfall in training and personnel 
talent through improvement of infrastructure and electronic surveillance as well as 
increased budgetary allowances for the Border Guards, but their vulnerability to attack 
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remains and thus they have been a frequent point of focus for insurgent attacks throughout 
the period this thesis studies.272 
4. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) 
The IRGC constitutes the most powerful, and in most considerations, most 
formidable COIN force involved in the Sistan-Baluchistan. Per Afshon Ostovar, the 
IRGC’s influence and role in Iran transcends that of a simple government or military 
organization, but must be seen as powerful force in the “political, economic, strategic and 
sociocultural arena.”273 Unlike the other organizations, the IRGC is not solely concerned 
with defending Iran, but instead ensuring the continued survival and prosperity of the 
nation’s “theocratic system.”274 Official IRGC numbers are estimated around 125,000 
total personnel.275 However, that estimate discounts the Basij, the “millions” strong, 
IRGC-controlled volunteer organization inside Iran.276 The IRGC control and use of the 
Basij bears significant weight in matters of COIN and security, particularly since the IRGC 
has utilized the Basij during crises to maintain security and suppress dissent activities, as 
they did during the Green Movement protests in 2009.277 Based on news reporting, it is 
evident that the IRGC has also mobilized and employed the Basij as an augmentation of 
their own efforts both against Jundallah as well as its successor groups.278 
A large part of the IRGC’s power as a COIN apparatus comes from its self-
contained absolute advantages in capabilities; the IRGC can unilaterally perform the 
functions and services provided by other Iranian organizations with little to no support. 
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The IRGC has had its own, free-standing intelligence service since 1997, which has 
steadily grown to the extent that by 2009 IRGC intelligence functions either equaled or 
surpassed that of the MOIS in nearly every qualitative and quantitative method of 
evaluation.279 As discussed above, the IRGC effectively controls NAJA, but separate from 
them, per Afshon Ostovar, could, and for that matter does mobilize the Basij to perform 
parallel functions.280 Finally, the IRGC dwarfs the Artesh in considerations of access to 
equipment and technology, funding, and general talent within its ranks.281 
The IRGC has unparalleled access to nonconventional resources relevant to COIN 
that no other organization can truly compete with. The IRGC has significant sway and 
access to swarths of nearly every industrial “sector” inside of Iran, and has nearly boundless 
revenue streams independent of government oversight and budgetary concerns.282 The 
IRGC’s special political standing and reputation relative to Ayatollah Khomeini further 
places it in a unique position in that it has a direct line of communication to the absolute 
arbiter for all Iranian affairs.283 As will be discussed in depth in Chapter V, the cocktail of 
the IRGC’s advantages, if utilized properly, have the potential to significantly alter a COIN 
operation to a government’s benefit. 
C. GENERAL COIN TRENDS: HOW IRAN ASSERTS ITSELF AGAINST 
DISSIDENTS 
The Baluch insurgency is one among many internal challenges which Iran faces 
inside of its own territory. At least twice in the last two decades, Iran has been forced to 
contend with general nationwide unrest and antipathy against the government. From 2009 
to 2010, there was an upsurge in general protests, rioting and unrest across Iran amid 
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allegations of election result illegitimacy.284 More recently, nationwide protests against 
the government have occurred in 2017, 2019, and 2020.285 The Baluch also cannot claim 
that they are the sole ethnic or territorial-based opposition group seeking to fight the Iranian 
government. In its Northwestern territories, the Iranian government frequently battles with 
Kurdish separatist and insurgent groups.286 In the Southwest, Iranian forces have struggled 
against ethnically Arab separatists in Khuzestan.287 Finally, Iran has also been targeted by 
Islamic fundamental terror groups, such as ISIS, who mirror the same Sunni-Shia sectarian 
dynamics frequently espoused by Baluch insurgents.288  
Since Baluch Insurgency in Sistan-Baluchistan represents just one of many 
opposition and insurgent movements that Iran faces, it is therefore possible, as well as 
relevant to discuss enduring themes and patterns in Iran’s response to insurgent, opposition, 
and separatist groups nationwide. For consideration of Iranian COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan, 
there are three enduring, relevant patterns prevalent throughout Iran’s response to internal 
threats, discussed in this section. 
1. No Distinction between Terrorism and Insurgency 
Reviewing Iran’s responses to armed and violent opposition groups, it is evident 
that state apparatuses rarely, if ever, distinguishes terrorism from insurgency. Throughout 
the Islamic Republic’s history, it has experienced significant clashes between government 
and militant forces, and the nature and composition of these groups has led to them widely 
being labeled as “insurgents” vice terrorists by the outside world. For example, in Iran’s 
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northern provinces, there has been frequent clashes between government forces and 
Kurdish separatists, consisting of organizations such as the Democratic Party of Iranian 
Kurdistan (PDKI), and the Iran-Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), and these groups have 
often been labeled by non-Iranian analysts as “insurgents.”289 Similarly, in 2009 the 
Brookings Institute labeled the Islamic-Marxist group Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) as an 
“insurgency” organization which if supported by the U.S. might undermine Iran’s rule of 
law.290 As Ariane Tabatabai discusses, these same groups are frequently labeled inside of 
Iran as “terrorist” vice insurgent organizations.291 Per Tabatabai, Iran’s labeling of these 
groups as terrorists is the norm, not the exception, as Iran liberally applies the terrorist label 
to both armed dissidents and separatist groups as a means “to neutralize” or otherwise 
portray groups which it sees as threatening to its own advantages.292 
Iran’s reticence to distinguish between insurgent and terrorist is understandable, 
since acknowledgement of a domestic insurgency could be construed as an admission of 
ineptitude and inflation of insurgent reputation. As Mark Stewart and John Mueller noted 
in 2009, the labels of insurgent and terrorist violence lie on the same spectrum, with the 
difference between their designations being based on frequency and severity of action.293 
Acts of violence by militants are generally considered to be terrorism until they reach a 
sufficient threshold of becoming “sustained and extensive in an area,” after which they are 
labeled as insurgency.294 Terrorism carries with it an inherent association of being “the 
weapon of the weak,” because it poses no actual threat to state control, and instead can 
only intermittently “inflict damage.”295 By contrast, attacks by those labeled as insurgents 
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are regarded as a “harbinger” of impending civil conflict which either challenges or 
deposes state authority in a given territory.296 With this consideration, it is not surprising 
that one of the trademarks of Iranian COIN is the liberal labeling of potential insurgent 
groups as terrorists. 
2. Ascription of Foreign Influence 
As part of its default response to opposition of any significance, insurgent, terrorist, 
or otherwise, Iran will typically accuse opposition groups of having links to the United 
States or other foreign adversaries to discredit the organization. According to Maike 
Warnaar, the Islamic Republic’s rise and continued survival is continuously framed in 
Iranian narratives as “resistance” and defiance of foreign powers, who for centuries have 
interfered with and attempted to control Iranian affairs.297 As part of this narrative, Iran 
has frequently accused any organized internal dissent of either being manipulated or 
directly supported by Western powers, who they portray as using these groups to reverse 
the Islamic Republic’s progress and reestablish Western influence.298 According to 
Warnaar, the greater the threat an opposition movement poses to the Iranian status quo, the 
greater the effort will be to associate that opposition movement with Western influence. 
Such was the case during the nationwide unrest in the aftermath of the 2009 elections, when 
the Iranian state launched an exhaustive narrative which sought to dismiss nationwide 
unrest as simply a “product of Western interference.”299 As Daniel Byman notes, this 
discreditation by association tactic is commonly used against more violent acts of 
opposition, to include acts of terrorism and insurgency.300 As an example, in response to 
a terrorist attack which killed 25 people in the Southwestern Iranian city of Ahvaz in 2018, 
President Rouhani’s rhetoric included accusations that the terrorist group who committed 
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the attack was supported by the United States.301 In addition to U.S. associations, the 
Iranian state has attempted to discredit groups by associating them with other perceived 
foreign enemies, to include Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E.302 
3. Mass Arrest and Law Enforcement Action Relative to Dissent 
Against most dissidents and opposition movements Iran will utilize apprehensions, 
arrests, imprisonments, and public executions as a means of asserting its own authority. 
Mass arrests, especially in anticipation of or responding to widespread unrest are common 
in Iran. During the 2009 protests, Iran admitted arresting at least 4,000 people, and during 
widespread protests in 2018 the Iranian state arrested at least 3,700 more protestors.303 
Mass arrest is particularly common during areas of heightened tension in Iran’s frontier, 
particularly in areas containing underlying ethnic or sectarian tensions between Iran’s 
Shiite Persian majority and minority groups. For example, in Khuzestan, where there have 
been previous insurgencies, uprisings, and separatist movements, there are frequent reports 
of mass arrests, executions, and various other police action, often without clear-cut 
evidence that those arrested were responsible for a specific act of violence or crime.304 
This response of swift law enforcement is also seen against overtly militant and violent 
groups. Following the Islamic State’s June 2017 terror attack in Tehran, the Iranian 
government announced numerous raids, arrests, and killings of purported terrorists, some 
directly linked with the attack while others had no such clear-cut causality.305 
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There are two main reasons that Iran uses widespread law enforcement activity in 
such an open, public manner as response to perceived threats to the government’s authority. 
First, by engaging in mass detainment, sweeping law enforcement raids, imprisonments, 
and executions, the Iranian state likely aims to contain the threat against it. Under this logic, 
by comprehensively removing dissidents and key leaders from the rest of society, they can 
forestall the center of gravity with respect to an opposition movement, and either cripple 
or dismantle their capability entirely. Moreover, these acts can produce a psychological 
effect, reducing the incentive in would-be supporters of a given movement to lend their 
assistance or direct participation to the movement. Historically, mass arrests, 
imprisonments, and executions have been utilized effectively in this manner. One example 
of mass arrests changing the paradigm of a COIN-insurgency struggle occurred in Brazil 
between the Brazilian Army and the Ação Libertadora Nacional, where national mass 
arrests led to the eventual removal of a critical core of the insurgent elements, and resulted 
in intelligence which led to the apprehension of their leader.306 Secondly, the public 
display of these operations are themselves an assertive self-portrayal of a government in 
control. Chris Zambelis’ analysis of Iran’s response to the Tehran ISIS attack must 
therefore be seen as a comprehensive effort to reinforce the perception of the Iranian rule 
of law after its credibility was potentially damaged or undermined due to a terrorist attack. 
The string of arrests, counterterrorism operations, and raids announced in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks create a narrative that the Islamic State attack amounts to nothing more 
than “firecrackers,” a lot of noise and disturbance but bearing no indication or signal that 
the Iranian government has somehow weakened.307 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has served as a primer to trace the relevant background and history of 
the current Iran-Baluch insurgency environment. First, it has traced the origins of Baluch 
national identity, relevant Baluch history, and previous developments and approaches of 
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Iranian COIN against the Baluch. Second, the security organizations responsible for the 
rule of law, as well as COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan, were described. Finally, the overarching 
patterns of response Iran utilizes to combat internal dissent and threat were outlined to 
establish a baseline reflexive response for the Iranian state. 
As the next chapter will demonstrate, the Iranian response to Jundallah fell far short 
of effectively countering insurgency precisely because it was largely a default plan, which 
failed to tailor its COIN approach to the particulars of the population it was trying to 
influence, and the organizations it was attempting to dismantle.  
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III. THE JUNDALLAH ERA: 2003-2012 
The ethnic Baluch insurgent group Jundallah arguably ranks among the most 
formidable, as well as most violent insurgencies the Islamic Republic has faced in the last 
40 years. Founded by Abdolmalek Rigi in 2002, Jundallah fought a violent insurgency 
against the Iranian government until 2012. Through a campaign of bombings, shootings, 
and kidnappings, conservative estimates indicate that Jundallah killed more than 150 
Iranians and injured 300 more.308 Jundallah’s attacks even succeeded at times in claiming 
the lives of senior IRGC staff, to include brigadier generals.309 The insurgent threat was 
deemed so large and significant that the IRGC had assumed full, absolute command 
authority over all police and security matters, and counterinsurgency in Sistan-Baluchistan 
as of 2009, which it still retains.310 After nearly 10 years of fighting, the IRGC and other 
Iranian security forces successfully facilitated the dismantling of Jundallah. 
Since Jundallah’s former membership continues to fight against the Iranian state, 
and the underlying dynamics which gave Jundallah such popularity and notoriety remain, 
the Iranian COIN efforts against Jundallah cannot be considered a success. Though 
Jundallah is now defunct, Baluch insurgency continues into the modern day. When 
Jundallah disbanded, Jaish ul-Adl rose from the ashes of Jundallah and continues to wage 
an ethnic Baluch insurgency against Iran. Additionally, the underlying grievances among 
the Baluch which made Jundallah so attractive to aspiring insurgents remain. As Chris 
Zambelis describes, Jundallah framed its battle with the Iranian government as opposition 
fighting against Iran’s “deliberate policy of subjugation, discrimination, and repression” of 
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the Baluch, based on “ethno-sectarian and linguistic” lines.311 In particular, Jundallah in 
its later years emphasized the Baluch’s Sunni identity, and the Baluch marginalization at 
the hand of the Shiite-dominated state, as central to the Jundallah identity.312 As Audun 
Kolstad Wiig notes, the sectarian tension in Sistan-Baluchistan has a depth and history 
which pre-dates Jundallah. Since 1979, Iran has “embarked on an aggressive Shi’a 
advocacy campaign in all spheres of the society,” and as a result, among the Baluch, as 
predominantly Deobandi Sunni, strong “anti-Shi’a sentiment” has grown “among the 
Iranian Baluch.”313 This sentiment did not end with the dismantling of Jundallah, and 
Sunni Jihadist extremism remains a consistent undertone in Jundallah’s successor 
organizations.  
This chapter will examine three critical elements of Iran’s COIN efforts against 
Jundallah. The first section of the chapter outlines the specific decapitation COIN approach 
Iran took toward Jundallah, and the reasons why it failed to forestall the insurgency. The 
second section examines the methods by which Iran asserted its own rule of law against 
Jundallah from 2002 to 2012, and why this assertion of authority failed. The third section 
examines the Iranian narrative against Jundallah and explains how Iran’s repeated 
accusations of a U.S. connection to Jundallah backfired and allowed Jundallah to become 
stronger.  
A. KILLING ABDOLMALEK RIGI: DECAPITATION COIN 
Iran’s first serious error against Jundallah was that it overestimated the value and 
endurance of the organization’s origin as a familial, tribal, Rigi-centric vendetta against the 
government, and then assumed that removal of Abdolmalek Rigi and his inner circle would 
provide the quietus for the Baluch insurgency. Based on those assumptions, the Iran 
adopted an enemy-centric, decapitation COIN approach, which it assessed would be 
sufficient in quelling Baluch insurgency. However, analysis reveals that Jundallah was 
widely unpopular among Iranian Baluch tribal constructs. Instead, Jundallah increasingly 
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drew its strength from a multitude of cross-border networks, and this dynamic became the 
most critical element in Jundallah’s identity. Iran’s failure to correctly identify and attack 
Jundallah’s center of gravity rendered the enemy-centric, decapitation approach to their 
COIN approach ineffective, and allowed Jundallah to persist and evolve after the death of 
Abdolmalek Rigi. 
1. Iranian Perception of Abdolmalek Rigi as Jundallah’s Center of 
Gravity 
The Iranian state, throughout its encounters with Jundallah demonstrates a 
consistent perception of Jundallah as critically centered on Abdolmalek Rigi and his 
associates. Zambelis highlights that the Iranian state’s assessment of Jundallah, and its 
perceived concentration around Abdolmalek Rigi yielded the estimate that Jundallah’s 
reach ended with Rigi’s personal and criminal relationships.314 Zambelis’ argument is 
supported by the fact that state-run Iranian news agencies such as Tehran Times, Iran 
Daily, and Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) often referred to Jundallah with epithets 
such as “terrorist clan,” “the Rigi Group,” and “the Rigi terrorist group.”315 Such 
characterizations endured through Jundallah’s tenure as an active insurgency, and beyond. 
Qods force propaganda, for example, continues to refer to Jundallah as “the Rigi Group” 
in 2014,316 and in 2018 Tehran Times continued to portray Jundallah as the limited 
brainchild of Abdolmalek Rigi.317 
The Iranian state acted on the assessment of Jundallah as the product of Abdolmalek 
Rigi and adopted an enemy centric decapitation approach as a significant element of their 
COIN approach. Ariane Tabatabai notes that Iran’s default tactic for countering armed 
dissident groups, is direct extermination, seeking to kill, capture, or otherwise render the 
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threatening elements of anti-government movements.318 Zambelis notes that an enemy 
centric approach has also been the default counter to Baluch nationalist movements, both 
before and after the 1979 revolution.319 What differentiates the Iranian state’s enemy-
centric approach toward Jundallah is heavy emphasis on specifically targeting Jundallah’s 
critical leadership. In COIN theory, this approach is referred to as “decapitation.” 320 Iran’s 
concentration of efforts on Abdolmalek Rigi’s tribal and other connections in defeating 
Jundallah is clear. Zambelis and Stratfor’s analyses of Jundallah both confirm this 
approach. The majority of those killed and imprisoned on charges related to Jundallah have 
the surname Rigi.321 Furthermore, the capture and kill raids against Jundallah have 
commonly targeted those with known ties to Abdolmalek Rigi or his family.322 
It is evident that the Iranian assessment that Abdolmalek Rigi’s removal would all 
but defeat Jundallah endured through Rigi’s death. Alirezah Ronaghi, reporting on Iran’s 
assessment of a post-Rigi Jundallah, expressed his “doubt in continuing” operational 
capacity after Rigi was in Iranian custody.323 After Abdolmalek Rigi’s arrest, Iranian 
Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi saw Rigi’s apprehension as a critical strike against 
Jundallah, calling it the “great success and great victory.”324 The actions taken by the 
Sistan-Baluchistan provincial government in the wake of Rigi’s arrest further demonstrate 
the perception that Jundallah threat was over. Sistan-Baluchistan Governor General Ali 
Mohammad Azad offered and granted clemency to hundreds of Jundallah fighters 
following Rigi’s arrest, while other officials released statements of “full security” being 
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restored to Sistan-Baluchistan.325 Similarly, after Abdolmalek Rigi’s execution, the IRGC 
commander for Sistan-Baluchistan remarked that “the arrest and execution of this vicious 
[person] plays a significant role in the security issues of the province ... and creating unity 
among Sunnis and Shi’is.”326 
2. Fault in Iranian Perceptions of Rigi Pertaining to Jundallah 
To characterize Jundallah or Abdolmalek Rigi as a tribally associated insurgency 
is incomplete. Rigi and Jundallah were both demonstrably unpopular among the Rigi tribe, 
as well as the other major Baluch tribes in Iran. The Rigi tribal leadership is expressly pro-
government. High-ranking Baluch Rigi elders and chiefs have frequently cooperated with 
the Iranian government, especially toward enhancing local security, in major cities such as 
Saravan, Sarbaz, and Zahedan, the very same cities which Jundallah frequently 
attacked.327 Rigi tribal leadership’s support for the Iranian State remained constant 
throughout the existence of Jundallah. Per Stéphane Dudoignon, Bashir-Ahmad Rigi, the 
head of the Rigi tribe, is regarded as having the highest degree of “loyalty to Guide 
Khamenei,” making him “one of the rare Iranian Baluch political tribunes.”328 The Rigi 
tribe’s official stance is also explicitly anti-Jundallah. In response to Abdolmalek Rigi’s 
death in 2010, Bashir-Ahmad Rigi stated: “We thank God that the Rigi tribe was cleansed 
of such a disgrace by Rigi’s execution.”329 Furthermore, there is a dearth of evidence to 
indicate that Jundallah enjoyed significant support from any of the other major Baluch 
tribes. Per Stratfor, other Baluch tribal leaders, to include the Marri, Narouie, Shahnavazi, 
Gamshadzai and Shahbakhsh consistently, condemned and acted against Jundallah.330 
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Jundallah was actually an organization with membership and operational capacity 
grounded in pre-existing as well as cross-border networks. Dudoignon notes that even in 
its infancy, Jundallah is not contained to the Rigi tribe, and includes significant numbers 
of non-Rigi, such Isma’ilzayi and Naruyi tribe members who were criminal associates of 
Rigi through “the international smuggling and abduction trade.”331 Rigi himself is largely 
a product of Pakistan. Rigi’s secondary education primarily consists of years spent at 
madrassas in the Pakistani cities of Binnori and Karachi.332 Abdolmalek Rigi was also an 
associate of the Pakistani chapter of Tablighi Jamaat, a global Deobandi movement whose 
membership includes some with links to terrorist attacks worldwide.333 Furthermore, per 
Audun Kolstad Wiig, as of 2006, Jundallah was networking with and receiving direct 
support from both insurgent groups in Iran, and cross-border organizations.334 Iranian 
Ahwaz insurgent organizations have released messages conveying praise for and solidarity 
with Jundallah.335 Per Wiig, until 2008 Jundallah’s primary bomb maker was likely 
Kurdish, Jundallah has received training from Afghan and Pakistani insurgent 
organizations in both Waziristan and Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area, and 
used explosives in a manner consistent with Afghan and Pakistani insurgents.336 Wiig’s 
analysis further indicates that whatever validity the “family affair” characterization of 
Jundallah initially possessed rapidly evaporated, particularly as the group began to identify 
itself more with Islamic Fundamentalism.337 By 2009, Jundallah’s center of gravity no 
longer stood solely on the shoulders of Abdolmalek Rigi and his inner circle, which meant 
that targeting and removing Rigi had no guarantee of defeating Jundallah’s insurgency.338 
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3. The Post-Rigi Reality: Baluch Insurgency Continues 
The arrest and execution of Abdolmalek Rigi did not immediately end Jundallah. 
Instead, Jundallah became a more sophisticated, and threatening entity after June 2010. 
Considering casualty rates, Jundallah’s worst attacks occurred after Abdolmalek Rigi’s 
death. The July 2010 Zahedan bombings had 300 casualties, eclipsing the 2009 Pishin 
bombing (at the time Jundallah’s worst attack) by almost 100 people.339 Zahedan was also 
just the second instance of Jundallah using suicide bombings.340The July 2010 Zahedan 
bombings mark the first time Jundallah used dual quick successive blasts to maximize 
injuries, reflecting previously unseen evolutions in sophistication.341 Jundallah again 
proved their undaunted virility as an insurgency in December 2010, when four bombers 
attacked a ceremony in Chahbahar, killing 39 and injuring at least 100.342 This attack was 
Jundallah’s third most lethal, killing just four less than the 2009 Pishin bombing.343 
Jundallah effectively remained an insurgency for at least two years following Rigi’s death. 
Iranian media reported numerous clashes between Iranian Border Guards, the IRGC, and 
Jundallah operatives into 2012.344 Jundallah carried out another bombing in October of 
2012.345 Additionally, Jundallah remained politically relevant. In 2012, Pakistani defense 
Minister Chaudry Ahmed Mukhtar, seeking to improve relations with Iran, and clearly of 
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the opinion that the organization was alive and well, publicly declared his nation’s refusal 
to allow Jundallah to establish a base of operations against Iran.346  
Jundallah’s disbandment can be considered a defeat of an insurgent organization in 
name only, since the post Jundallah reality is that the insurgent groups that became 
prominent following Jundallah’s end remain direct products and descendants of their 
predecessor. Jaish ul-Adl, the dominant Baluch insurgent group in Sistan-Baluchistan, is 
often considered the “successor” to Jundallah, with one of Jaish ul-Adl’s leaders being a 
previous Jundallah leader.347 There are other, less active groups which are also direct 
products of Jundallah. A less well-known Baluch insurgent group, Harakat Ansar Iran, 
sourced its core membership from Jundallah remnants.348 Similarly, some more marginal 
groups have formed splinter cells from Jundallah remnants. For example, Jaish al-Nasr is 
headed by Abdul Sattar Rigi, Abdolmalek Rigi’s cousin.349 
B. JUNDALLAH, IRAN, AND ASSERTING THE RULE OF LAW 
Iran’s second critical error against Jundallah was its attempt to emphasize control, 
competency and authority of rule by responding to Jundallah attacks with exhaustive law 
enforcement and counterterror action. Rather than reinforcing state legitimacy, these 
actions largely backfired, making the Iranian state seem desperate and less competent. The 
fallout from these actions subsequently exacerbated the degree and pervasiveness of 
Baluch grievances against the Iranian State. 
 
346 “We Will Not Allow Jundallah to Use Pakistan Soil: Defense Chief,” Tehran Times, April 21, 
2012, NewsBank. 
347 “Jaish.ul-Adl’ Publishes Images of Abducted Iranian Soldiers,” Asharq al-Awsat, October 23, 
2018, https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1435501/jaish-ul-adl-publishes-images-abducted-iranian-
soldiers; Shezad Baloch, “Jailed Abroad: Jundullah Commander Arrested in Quetta,” Express Tribune, 
March 1, 2015, https://tribune.com.pk/story/845999/jailed-abroad-jundullah-commander-arrested-in-
quetta/. 
348 Aaron Merat, “Iran Calls For Return of Abducted Border Guards Held in Pakistan,” The 
Telegraph, March 28, 2014, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10729946/Iran-
calls-for-return-of-abducted-border-guards-held-in-Pakistan.html. 
349 “Iranian Terrorist in Pakistan’s Custody,” Dawn, May 2, 2015, https://www.dawn.com/news/
1179449. 
79 
This section will discuss the dynamics of Iran’s swift justice approach in response 
to Jundallah’s attacks, and why this approach actually made things worse. Initially, 
Jundallah’s attacks, served to undermine the Iranian rule of law in Sistan-Baluchistan, 
thereby undermining state legitimacy. Iran countered Jundallah undermining of its 
authority with scores of arrests, convictions, and killings of suspected Jundallah operatives 
designed to emphasize state authority and control over the region. However, Iran’s 
emphasis of its own authority failed to achieve the intended result for two reasons. First, 
the Iranian state does not necessarily hold a hegemony on authority in the eyes of the 
Baluch tribes. Second, Jundallah’s capability to continue attacks despite the swift justice 
responses detracted from the effectiveness of the Iranian tactic, and the effect of 
Jundallah’s persistent attacks amplified by state overestimations of the effectiveness of 
their own efforts against Jundallah. Additionally, Iran’s swift justice approach likely 
worsened underlying conditions which made insurgency an attractive option to disaffected 
Baluch. For these reasons, Iran’s use of rule of law operations as a weapon for COIN 
backfired against Jundallah. 
1. Jundallah’s Threat to Iranian Authority and State Response  
Jundallah’s violent activities threatened to undermine the public perception of 
Iran’s authority in Sistan-Baluchistan. In COIN theory, perceptions of legitimacy, rule of 
law, and security are often considered critical fields of an insurgent-counterinsurgent battle. 
David Kilcullen argues that victor between insurgent and counterinsurgent will be the side 
that succeeds in “establishing a system of control” which maintains public perception of 
“order and a sense of security where they sleep.”350 Tabatabai’s analysis indicates that the 
Iranian state considers perception of control critical to COIN, since Iran’s approach toward 
insurgent and opposition groups frequently involves policy designed to “project an image 
of the state as ... in control.”351 Unchecked, Jundallah’s attacks thus threatened to 
undermine the Islamic Republic’s rule of law, and by extension, legitimacy of the 
government. Per Kilcullen, preserving state rule of law against a violent insurgency rests 
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on the concepts of reprisal and consequence; when preventing violence against the 
population and government is impossible, what remains critical is for each act of violence 
by the insurgency to be publicly addressed with consequence and reprisals for those 
responsible.352 
As a means of reinforcing positive perceptions of the Iranian rule of law, Iranian 
COIN against Jundallah sought to project an image of swift justice, responding to Jundallah 
operations with rapid arrests, convictions and killings. With every major Jundallah attack, 
the Iranian state’s response involved large-scale police action, including arrests en masse, 
raids against suspected Jundallah members, and executions. For example, following 
Jundallah’s February 2007 bombing, within three days Iranian security forces claimed 
apprehension of the attack’s mastermind and key perpetrators, and arrested an additional 
65 insurgents.353 Within five days, the Ministry of Justice convicted and publicly executed 
the alleged leader of the attack.354 Similarly, in the first five days after the May 2009 
Zahedan bombing, Iranian state agencies arrested 20, and publicly executed three alleged 
Jundallah members, and arrested 15 additional alleged operatives within a month.355 
Iranian emphasis on rule of law via swift justice appears to be a standard response to 
Jundallah attacks. Except for the March 2006 Tasooki massacre, every Jundallah attack 
that resulted in more than 10 casualties had corresponding arrests and executions within 
two weeks.356 
2. Baluch Perceptions of Iranian Rule of Law 
From the perspectives of the Iranian Baluch, the state has neither monopoly nor 
hegemony on legitimacy in Sistan-Baluchistan and is at best an intermittent presence in the 
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lives of most non-elite Baluch; this contributed to a muted effect for Iran’s swift justice 
approach. Ganesh Sitaraman comments that traditionally COIN “rule of law operations” 
hyper-focus on “criminal justice,” vis-à-vis “police, prosecutors, and prisons.”357 Based 
on Iranian security force responses to Jundallah attacks, it can be asserted that Iran fits this 
profile. However, FM 3-24 notes that excessive focus on the asserting rule of law risks 
critical ignorance of the other key features in establishing governmental legitimacy. 
Successful rule of law operations should not limit themselves to the process of 
apprehending and punishing insurgents, but also must consider the cultural, institutional 
and economic influences on a population and how these factors cause populations to view 
and interact with the government.358 Sitaraman notes that rule of law COIN operations in 
Afghanistan failed because they did not account for the relevant semi-state or non-state 
institutions of authority such as the Shirga and Jirga.359 This nexus between rule of law 
operations and cultural considerations is relevant to the Iranian Baluch. Cultural 
considerations reveal that the state is one among several elements of authority in Sistan-
Baluchistan. Per Ahmad Reza Taheri, the Iranian government is at best on equal, 
competitive footing with local religious and tribal authorities when considering 
perspectives of non-elite Iranian Baluch.360 Moreover, the majority of the Baluch only 
infrequently interact with conventional elements of the state authority, instead preferring 
to avoid them outright unless “compelling or pressing circumstances” exist.361 Iran’s 
interactions with Baluch in Sistan-Baluchistan indicates state awareness of their own lack 
of hegemonic dominion on authority with the local population. As Dudoignon notes, 
Iranian governments past and present have a history of harnessing and employing Baluch 
cultural and religious elites to maintain order and security.362  
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3. Failure to Reduce Jundallah Activity 
The facts that Iranian reprisal and law enforcement efforts likely captured or killed 
few strategically significant members of Jundallah, and that Iranian reprisal efforts failed 
to prevent, or reduce Jundallah’s operational capacity also undercut the efficacy of Iran’s 
swift justice approach. In review of available Iranian state media reports, the Islamic 
Republic either arrested, killed or executed at least 219 suspected Jundallah members 
between January 2006 and January 2008.363 During that period, Jundallah spokesmen 
declared their own strength as upwards of 1,000 fighters, while analysis of Jundallah’s 
actual insurgent force estimated their strength as far less, as small as a “few hundred 
militants.”364 Were all those arrested, killed, or imprisoned by Iran during this period 
actually members of Jundallah, the organization would have lost at least one quarter, but 
possibly more than one half of its fighting force. It seems likely that many of those which 
the state captured or killed had little, if any significant relation to Jundallah. Amnesty 
International, other Non-Governmental Organizations, and the European Union have 
called for stays of execution on those convicted in Jundallah attacks on grounds of 
potentially unfair, excessively swift trials.365 Evidence of confessions coerced through 
torture and blackmail further impugns the guilt of those convicted.366 Jundallah also 
disputed their involvement with those convicted. For example, Jundallah denied that 
anyone executed in connection with the May 2009 Zahedan bombing was an organization 
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operative, and stated that only one of the executed had any association with the group.367 
Responding to Iran’s “summary detentions and executions” of alleged insurgents in June 
2009, Jundallah again denied involvement with executed by the state.368 The weight of 
these doubts as to the effectiveness of Iranian assertion of authority becomes compounded 
when one considers that the mass arrests, executions, and reprisal actions carried out by 
the Iranian state fail to forestall Jundallah over time. Despite the consistency of Iranian 
state response, year over year Jundallah continued to execute successful attacks.  
The tendency for Iranian state apparatuses to overestimate their own progress 
against Jundallah further detracted from assertions of state authority. Per Martin Mykelbust 
and Tom Ordeman, “Control of Information” and “Effective Information Operations” are 
critical modern COIN requirements, especially considering the need for operational ability 
to “immediately dispel insurgent accusations or claims of victory.” 369 Through repeated 
premature claims of victory, however, Iranian COIN against Jundallah sustained self-
inflicted wounds when Jundallah’s persistent attacks debunked the “claims of victory.”370 
In April 2006, the state funded Kayhan newspaper reported that Abdolmalek Rigi had been 
killed during a raid.371 In May 2008, the Iranian Interior Minister declared that Pakistan 
had captured Abdolmalek and Abdolhamid Rigi, and their extradition to Iran was 
imminent.372 In December 2008, NAJA deputy police commander Ahmad Reza Radan 
claimed a “deadly blow” had been delivered to Jundallah when simultaneous raids 
reportedly killed a critical mass of its inner circle.373 As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
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the arrest and subsequent execution of Abdolmalek Rigi drew scores of Iranian government 
officials hailing the “ensuing collapse” of Jundallah, and the restoration of “full-security” 
to Sistan-Baluchistan.374 In all of the cases listed, Jundallah in fact was not defeated, or 
diminished in any significant way. The Tasooki Massacre was only weeks after the 2006 
Kayhan report.375 Abdolmalek Rigi was not extradited to Iran in 2008.376 Jundallah 
executed a bombing in Saravan six days after Radan’s comments.377 Finally, the 2010 
Zahedan bombings were less than a month after Rigi was executed.378 
4. Exacerbation of Baluch Grievances with the Iranian State 
The Iranian waves of arrests and executions risked further exacerbation of the 
conditions for the Iranian Baluch, fueling higher prospects for support and participation in 
the insurgency. Chris Zambelis notes the “persistent grievances,” most notably a strong 
Baluch perception of a history heavy persecution of the Baluch by Iran, shade the 
relationship between the Baluch and the Iranian government.379 Thus, the scores of arrests, 
convictions, and killings of ethnic Baluch in response to Jundallah likely triggered an 
increase in anti-state sentiment among the Baluch, exacerbating what FM 3-24 identifies 
as the “underlying grievances” that can be the “root cause” of an insurgency.380 Increasing 
sources of tensions between the Baluch and the state benefitted Jundallah’s projection of 
its identity and purpose. Per Abdolmalek Rigi, Jundallah was established in response to 
Iranian government forces killing his family.381 Highlighting these same perceived 
injustices, Jundallah consistently claimed that it was fighting for the rights, safety, and lives 
of the Iranian Baluch, and often refers to itself as The People’s Resistance Movement of 
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Iran after 2006.382 Exacerbation of grievances toward the Iranian government, combined 
with Jundallah’s narrative of its own identity, thus makes it more appealing to potential 
insurgents and networks of local support. As Dudoignon indicates, supporters of  
Jundallah in Pakistan and Iran regarded them as “Robin Hoods ... defenders of the interests 
of the local population.”383 Zambelis’ analysis of the Baluch insurgency directly identifies 
the harsh treatment of Baluch by the Iranian government as a lifeline for insurgency 
because it increases prospects of aggrieved Baluch accepting “violent resistance ... as a 
political choice.”384 
C. DISCREDITATION AND REPUTATION ELEVATION 
Iranian messaging concerning Jundallah played heavily upon discrediting the 
organization as an American or foreign government puppet, but by doing so Iran actually 
strengthened Jundallah. The Iranian state consistently argues that the United States 
sponsors and directs opposition to the Islamic Republic, and Jundallah, as an organization 
which stands against the state, was consistently subjected to this characterization.385 The 
unpredictability of a narrative’s effectiveness when exposed to a globalized media and a 
worldwide audience is a well-established aspect of COIN theory. The attempts to discredit 
Jundallah through association with the United States yielded unprecedented levels of 
international exposure for the insurgency. This exposure gave Jundallah access to critical 
avenues of support among the Baluch diaspora worldwide. Exposure further sparked 
increased prospects of U.S. support for Jundallah. Finally, this international exposure 
enhanced Jundallah’s local and regional credibility, contributing to their effective strength 
within Sistan-Baluchistan. Considering these developments, the Iranian narrative of a U.S. 
backed Jundallah benefitted Jundallah more than it did the Iranian state. 
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1. National Versus Global Dynamics in COIN Narratives 
In considering the Iranian state’s narrative characterizations of Jundallah, it is 
important to discuss the well-established risk that COIN narratives, once exposed to 
international audiences and global digital media, can prove counter-productive to a COIN 
approach. David Kilcullen comments that all modern insurgency and COIN must contend 
with a “globalized audience,” and the “omnipresence of a globalized media.”386 John 
Mackinlay also argues that exposure to “multiple populations and mass communications” 
have shifted the center of gravity in an insurgent-counterinsurgent struggle of narratives 
from “the national to the international level.”387 As this shift grows into a “torrent of 
information,” it becomes difficult for the counterinsurgent to control, with narratives often 
failing to proceed as the counterinsurgent originally intended.388 By contrast, insurgency 
relies upon media coverage to champion their cause. Per Zoe Tan “mass communication” 
must simultaneously be regarded as “means for stimulating change ... contributing to the 
climate of terrorism reality, and disseminating information in response to terrorist 
situations.”389 Similarly, Mihail Orzeata notes that media exposure serves as a critical 
means for opposition groups “to communicate with the public and to promote their 
goals.”390 It is for this reason that Mackinlay concludes that a “deluge” of attention 
insurgencies receive often unfolds to the insurgent’s benefit.391 Influxes of international 
media attention highlight “the visibility of insurgent actions in the eyes of their supporters,” 
allowing “the insurgents to develop into a global movement and mobilize more individuals 
and communities to their side.”392  
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2. Unintended Exposure of U.S.–Jundallah Association 
It is important to note that Jundallah’s early existence coincided with a period of 
elevated antagonism between the United States and Iran, which likely combined with Iran’s 
allegations of a U.S.–Jundallah connection to create higher international media interest for 
Jundallah. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, U.S. President George W. Bush labeled 
Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil.”393 As Maria Ryan argues, however, Bush’s designation 
of Iran was largely seen as a “manufactured” line of reasoning for the United States to 
engage in more aggressive behavior toward the Islamic Republic.394 After the 2003 U.S. 
invasion of Iraq, significant portions of the press and academia viewed the invasion as “the 
opening scene” of Bush Administration plans to depose Iranian leadership by force.395 
Amidst increasing tensions, anonymous leaks to the press of internal Bush Administration 
documents from January 2006 onwards further demonstrated a possible U.S. plan to invade 
Iran. The United States asked Turkey about using airbases to stage strikes against Iran, 
deployed minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, and stationed two aircraft carriers within 
striking distance of Iran.396 Furthermore, Vice-President Cheney repeatedly stated that “all 
options were on the table” with respect to Iran.397 There were also reports that U.S. military 
and intelligence organizations were reportedly creating plans for massive airstrikes, as well 
as possible collusion with opposition groups inside Iran.398 
With purported U.S. plans to overthrow the Iran’s leadership, Jundallah benefitted 
from unprecedented levels of exposure due to global media investigation of the group in 
exploration of purported U.S.–Jundallah connections. In February 2007, London’s Sunday 
Telegraph investigated Iranian allegations of U.S. support for Baluch and other opposition 
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groups inside of Iran, claiming to have CIA and U.S. Department of State testimony 
employees that corroborated Iranian allegations, with specific mention of Jundallah.399 
Telegraph highlighted this allegation the following week by with editorial responses to the 
original article.400 Telegraph reporting in effect gave Jundallah exposure and promotion 
to the estimated 900,000 Telegraph readers in 2007.401 However, that exposure pales in 
comparison to that which Jundallah received a few months later. In April, ABC News 
corroborated Telegraph’s reporting, citing Pakistani and U.S. intelligence sources.402 
Within days, the ABC News story had attracted worldwide attention, being reiterated and 
investigated by other media conglomerates, including Press Trust of India, and the 
BBC.403 As Jundallah operations continued, media outlets produced more content that 
profiled Jundallah, specifically investigating whether or not they were receiving U.S. 
support. This includes content from larger organizations, such as the New Yorker, NPR, 
Foreign Policy, and Frontline.404 It also includes smaller, more partisan outlets such as 
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Infowars, The Daily Beast, The Christian Science Monitor, and Mint Press News.405 
Interest in the purported connection partially drove Dan Rather, one of the most prominent 
and renowned journalists worldwide, to produce a thirty-minute segment on Jundallah, 
which featured face-to-face interviews with Abdolmalek Rigi.406  
Iran’s characterization of Jundallah as a U.S. States puppet was consistent and 
forceful, and remained an unwavering constant of the Iranian COIN narrative even when 
evidence emerged which demonstrated that the characterization was unsubstantiated. By 
January 2006, just one month after Jundallah’s first confirmed attack, the Iranian Ministry 
of the Interior was leveling unsubstantiated charges of American support for Jundallah.407 
When London’s Telegraph and ABC News published articles alleging that Iranian claims 
of a connection were true, Iranian state-run media treated these stories as de facto 
admissions of U.S. support for Jundallah.408 However, there was significant reason to 
doubt the reporting as factual. Seymour Hersh, the journalist who authored a critical New 
Yorker piece which allegedly corroborated the U.S.–Jundallah link, had previously been 
accused of reporting unconfirmed information, and was accused of the same with 
Jundallah.409 Additionally, Alexis Debat, an ABC News journalist whose sources had 
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reportedly confirmed Hersh’s reporting and been used for the original ABC News blog 
post, was fired for lying about credentials and sources just months after the original story 
was published.410 In addition, the Pakistani government, U.S. officials, and Abdolmalek 
Rigi himself repeatedly refuted the connection.411 Nevertheless, Iran continued to treat a 
connection between the United States and Jundallah as universally accepted fact. Iranian 
government officials reasserted U.S.–Jundallah links following attacks in October 2009, 
July 2010, and December 2010.412 Iran further emphasized this narrative by airing 
confessions of U.S. support to Jundallah by both Abdolhamid and Abdolmalek Rigi after 
their arrests.413 Iran also asserted this narrative diplomatically, with President 
Ahmadinejad requesting UN reprimand the United States for its support of Jundallah in 
April 2010.414  
3. Effects of Additional Exposure  
The attention Jundallah ultimately received as a result of Iran’s insistence on a 
U.S.–Jundallah connection increased insurgency exposure to a Baluch diaspora potentially 
sympathetic to its cause, providing critical avenues of sustainment that it otherwise would 
have been hard-pressed to obtain. In 2006, a RAND COIN study concluded that “outside 
governments or diaspora groups” can provide the political, economic, and other means of 
support which prove the difference between an insurgency remaining a “weak rebel group,” 
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and becoming “more successful.”415 Analysis indicates that Jundallah sustained itself by 
donations and support on the international stage. Inside the Persian Gulf, the increased 
media attention served to advertise for Jundallah in prominent Sunni countries, where 
Jundallah was able to draw funding from Baluch individuals and communities in Kuwait, 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.416 Outside the Middle East, increased attention also 
helped spur further funding and support. Significant Baluch populations exist in countries 
such as the United States, Europe, Scandinavia, and Australia, and individuals in these 
populations were assessed as funding and support sources for Jundallah.417 Through the 
widespread, mainstream exposure of Jundallah vis-a -vis international media, bolstered by 
exploration of a connection between Western powers and the insurgency, Jundallah 
essentially acquired free advertising and facetime to rally additional support among 
prospective supporters.  
Regardless of whether foreign nations were actually supporting Jundallah prior to 
2007, the attention the organization received in worldwide media coincided with 
sustainment, if not increases in U.S. government interest in possibly supporting Jundallah 
and the Baluch. Less than a month after Hersh’s article was published, President George 
W. Bush gave the CIA written endorsement for limited operations fostering regime change 
in Iran, including provision of limited support to insurgents.418 Congress subsequently 
authorized an expansion of U.S. covert support to Iranian dissent organizations, which 
according to media sources included Jundallah.419 Politically, international attention took 
the near-unknown cause of Baluch nationalism and made it an issue of special interest. In 
2012, Congressman Dana Rohrbacher, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
held congressional hearings exploring the possibility of U.S. support for an independent 
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Baluch state.420 Rohrabacher also introduced legislation for direct U.S. support to Baluch 
insurgencies against Iran in 2013.421  
Domestically, Jundallah’s increased profile from international media attention 
correlated with increases in its strength and notoriety. Per Nicholas Johnston, an insurgent 
group’s “perceived legitimacy” rises and falls with the group’s reputation; the more 
formidable an insurgent group is perceived “in the eyes of society,” The more successful 
it will be in expanding its network of support at local levels.422 As attacks by Jundallah 
continued, Iran continued to denounce the organization as a U.S. puppet to both discredit 
Jundallah and provide an explanation as to why the Iranian state failed to defeat the 
organization. However, a consequence of Iran’s narrative was reinforcement of Jundallah’s 
legitimacy. The narrative simultaneously betrayed Iran’s continuing failure to forestall the 
organization and created accidental propaganda which implied Jundallah’s strength by 
association to a world power. Per Audun Kolstad Wiig, other armed opposition groups in 
Iran consistently offered endorsement and praise for Jundallah’s accomplishments against 
the state.423 Wiig notes that when formed, Jundallah was just 30 members strong , but by 
2009 had grown to a strength of at least 600.424 Jundallah’s constant absorption of “myriad 
of small armed opposition groups operating in Baluchistan” fueled this growth.425 Wiig’s 
analysis also shows that Jundallah membership had grown beyond Sistan-Baluchistan as 
of 2008, and according to Abdolmalek Rigi’s own assessment, this increased support and 
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membership was fueling an ambition, as well as a capability to conduct attacks in Tehran 
and other areas of Iran, if necessary.426  
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated in this chapter, Iran’s COIN efforts against Jundallah carried at 
least three critical failures. First, Iran focused on decapitation tactics, expecting that killing 
and capturing the critical leadership nexus and family of Abdolmalek Rigi would prove 
enough to defeat Jundallah. However, Iran’s assessment of Jundallah’s center of gravity 
was incorrect and outdated, and Iran failed to accurately identify the organization’s 
operational and organizational constructs, which allowed the insurgency to thrive well 
beyond Abdolmalek Rigi’s lifespan. Second, Iran employed reprisal and rule of law 
operations in the wake of Jundallah as an assertion of their own competency and authority 
over the province. Again, this emphasis failed to accurately account for ground truth. Iran’s 
COIN ignored established COIN precepts and cultural nuances of the Baluch tribes, which 
gave Jundallah increased opportunity to defy the Iranian state. This also expanded the 
magnitude of grievance which underpinned support for the insurgency. Finally, Iran 
repeatedly reinforced its standard counter to internal opposition by dismissing Jundallah as 
a U.S.-supported puppet. Regardless of how much validity there was to this claim, Iran’s 
repeated assertion of a U.S.–Jundallah connection contributed to an explosion of exposure 
for Jundallah on the international stage. This connected the organization to additional 
avenues of support from government and non-state organizations and helped foster an 
enhanced credibility and reputation at the local and regional level. 
These three mistakes hamstrung the prospects of Iran’s COIN from defeating the 
Baluch insurgency that Jundallah revived in 2002. Moreover, these mistakes failed to stop 
insurgency beyond Jundallah’s end. Jaish-ul Adl may be considered the child of Jundallah. 
Its founding members consist of former Jundallah operatives, and one of Jaish ul-Adl’s 
leader was a confirmed Jundallah member. As Jundallah’s organizational successor, Jaish 
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ul-Adl has killed and injured scores of Iranians from 2012 to the present. Furthermore, 
Jaish ul-Adl appears more internationally connected, more fundamentalists, and initially, 
just as threatening to Iran’s control over Sistan-Baluchistan. Iran’s COIN approach to Jaish 
ul-Adl, and its effectiveness shall be discussed in the next chapter.  
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IV. THE POST-JUNDALLAH ERA: JAISH UL-ADL AND 
THE IMPROVEMENT OF IRANIAN COIN 
The period following Jundallah’s demise involved significant changes to Iranian 
COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan. After Jundallah, multiple insurgent organizations emerged 
which claimed to champion causes of the Iranian Baluch. Most groups appear to be smaller 
in scale, mounting handfuls, if any, noteworthy attacks against Iranian COIN and security 
apparatuses. However, one group, Jaish ul-Adl, stands overwhelmingly as the largest and 
most threatening insurgency to Iranian rule of law in the province. Jaish ul-Adl’s 
membership is mostly remnants and associates of Jundallah, to include Jaish ul-Adl’s 
leader, Salahuddin Farooqi, as well as Abdol Sattar Rigi, Abdolmalek Rigi’s cousin.427 By 
some estimates, Jaish ul-Adl is stronger than Jundallah, and therefore worse for Iranian 
COIN. These estimates draw on the purported activity level of Jaish ul-Adl. Some analysts 
assert that Jaish ul-Adl has conducted more than 200 attacks inside of Iran since 2012.428 
Compared with at best the several dozen major attacks Jundallah conducted, 200 attacks 
over a seven-year period appears to outpace Jundallah’s operational tempo nearly tenfold. 
Jaish ul-Adl’s threat and performance as an insurgency appears far less colossal 
when evaluated in a more qualitative manner. In terms of lethality, Jaish ul-Adl has killed 
or kidnapped upwards of 150 Iranians.429 When one considers that Jundallah accomplished 
similar levels of fatality with only a fraction of attacks, it undercuts the significance of 
Jaish ul-Adl’s number, and indicates that Iranian forces more often than not have been able 
to prevent Jaish ul-Adl inflicting mass casualties. Considering rates of nonlethal injury, 
Jaish ul-Adl’s record also pales in comparison to the 300 injuries from Jundallah 
attacks.430 The identities of Jaish ul-Adl’s victims provide further testament to improved 
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Iranian COIN performance. While Jundallah regularly targeted bystanders and non-
government civilians, the overwhelming majority of the dead and injured by Jaish ul-Adl 
have been either IRGC or NAJA border guards. This indicates that security apparatuses are 
functioning as intended, functioning as bulwarks against Jaish ul-Adl attacking or gaining 
access to populations of Sistan-Baluchistan. In comparison of their most deadly attacks, 
Jaish ul-Adl further proves to be a shadow of their predecessor. To date, Jaish ul-Adl’s 
deadliest attack was the February 2019 IRGC bus bombing that killed 27.431 Jundallah 
committed at least three attacks which were far more fatal: the 2009 Pishin bombing, the 
July 2010 Zahedan bombings, and the December 2010 Chabahar bombings.432  
The Iranian government’s approach to COIN against Baluch insurgents following 
Jundallah’s demise has improved dramatically, marking significant alterations of course 
away from Iran’s mistakes against Jundallah. Instead of pursuing enemy-centric 
decapitation, Iran adopted a population-centric COIN approach designed to physically 
isolate and expel insurgents from the population through exhaustive, overlapping measures 
of border security. Where Iran sought to produce operational information that stressed its 
dominance and reprisal capabilities against Jundallah, Iran successfully manipulated 
Pakistan into creating a second governmental pressure on Jaish ul-Adl and other insurgent. 
Finally, where Iran’s counter messaging against Jundallah was overwhelmingly 
underpinned by placement of blame for Jundallah’s success on U.S. involvement, since 
2012 Iran has crafted a comprehensive narrative marked by optimism, proactiveness, and 
improvement, designed to create the perception that Iran is not only succeeding against 
Baluch insurgents, but also improving security inside of Sistan-Baluchistan. 
This chapter will discuss the particulars of Iranian COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan 
following Jundallah’s demise. The following section describes how both insurgent and 
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counterinsurgent are products of Jundallah. Next, this chapter details the particulars of 
Iran’s border security operations, focusing on physical and personnel barriers, 
deportations, and border closures. The fourth section of highlights Iran’s successful use of 
diplomatic, economic, and military leverage to produce increased Pakistani security force 
efforts against Baluch insurgency. Finally, this chapter discusses Iran’s improved COIN 
narrative, where Iran portrayed itself as optimistic, proactive, and successful at 
counterinsurgency, demonstrated by emphasis on offensive raids, the Jaish ul-Adl hostage 
crises, framing of Jaish ul-Adl attacks, and Iran’s portrayal of both Pakistan and itself in 
combatting Jaish ul-Adl and other Baluch insurgent groups. 
A. CHILDREN OF JUNDALLAH 
Iranian COIN in the post-Jundallah era is also a product of Iran’s experiences with 
Jundallah. While facing adversaries who could be considered the insurgent descendants of 
Jundallah, Iran’s modification and adaptation to combat Baluch insurgency from 2012 to 
the present has been shaped by Jundallah. Indeed, all the elements of Iran’s approach to 
Jaish ul-Adl and other Baluch insurgent groups following Jundallah’s collapse draw their 
roots, if not their actual genesis, from the era of Jundallah. For example, the Iranian border 
wall, discussed in the border security section of this chapter, began construction as early as 
2000.433 Some Pakistani incursions, discussed as a critical enhancement of Iranian COIN 
in this chapter also occurred during the Jundallah era. Pakistani security forces raided 
Jundallah hideouts in 2007 to rescue hostages taken earlier that year.434 Finally, Pakistan’s 
ineptitude at managing its border, which became an integral part of the Iranian COIN 
narrative post-Jundallah, was a recurring element of the narrative against Jundallah.435 
Though many of the developments discussed in this chapter were already underway 
within Iranian COIN prior to Jundallah’s demise, they did not fully materialize as primary 
arms of weaponry used by the Iranian state until after Jundallah’s disbandment in 2012, 
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and thus should be considered part of Iranian COIN operations after Jundallah, and not 
before. The Iranian border wall, for example, did not reach any semblance of completion 
until at least 2012.436 With consideration to Pakistani aggression toward Baluch-Iranian 
insurgency, though it did exist during Jundallah’s tenure, the frequency, scope, and 
magnitude of Pakistani actions only expanded as Iran increased pressure for Pakistani 
action after Jundallah’s demise and the subsequent emergence of Jaish ul-Adl. Finally, as 
will be discussed in this chapter, though Iran blamed Jundallah for continued insurgent 
attacks, that blame remained largely negative, and was not incorporated into a coherent 
COIN narrative that stressed the optimistic, proactive, and persistent projection of Iranian 
forces against Baluch insurgents as it has been since 2012. 
B. ENHANCED BORDER SECURITY 
One defining element that differentiates the Iranian government’s response to 
Jundallah and its approach to Jaish-ul-Adl involves increased measures of border security. 
During Jundallah’s tenure, the Iran-Pakistan border remained essentially unsecured. David 
Kilcullen, in some of his opening remarks in Counterinsurgency, notes that one of the 
fundamental dynamics of coin is that “while guerillas are fluid, populations are fixed,” and 
that an insurgent’s ultimate “source of power” lies in the insurgents “connectivity” with a 
“local population in a given area.”437 It is precisely this connection which Baluch 
insurgents sought to exploit, and their means to do so lay in the porous border between Iran 
and Pakistan. Per Zahid Ali Khan, when compared with its other land borders Iran 
traditionally has spent significantly less time and effort restricting the Iran-Pakistan border, 
both constrained by and relying upon the harsh terrain that defines the border to discourage 
and restrict prospects of border crossings.438 However, Iran’s existing deterrence methods 
proved insufficient to preventing guerilla “fluidity;” until Jundallah’s demise, Baluch 
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insurgents were able to straddle the Iran-Pakistan border, crossing into Iran when necessary 
to conduct operations, while retreating unopposed into the safety of Pakistan once Iran 
moved to respond. 
Following Jundallah’s demise, however, Iran sought to sever Baluch insurgent’s 
capacity to traverse in and out of Iranian territory by fundamentally altering border control 
dynamics. Specifically, Iran utilized a population-centric approach of population control 
COIN, seeking to sanitize Sistan-Baluchistan from insurgent access by restricting cross-
border movement. Toward this end, Iran adopted measures of border and immigration 
control in Sistan-Baluchistan which constricted previously near-unfettered access to border 
crossings that Baluch insurgents enjoyed, significantly limiting insurgent capabilities to 
attack and undermine the authority of the Iranian government. First, Iran improved its 
physical and personnel security apparatuses at the border, severely constraining the 
physical feasibility of crossing from Pakistan. Second, Iran embarked to expel from Iran 
all those with non-legal residence status in the Sistan-Baluchistan province. Finally, Iran 
completely shut down all cross-border traffic immediately following attacks, as well as 
pre-emptively doing so during occasions of strategic value and opportunity to insurgent 
groups, which severely restricted insurgent capacity to make an impact of attack. 
1. COIN Theory on Porous Borders 
Porous international borders can provide a massive boon to an insurgency’s 
prospects of success. Daniel Byman, et. al highlighted in their 2006 Trends in Outside 
Support for Insurgent Movements that “safe havens,” particularly those “across 
international boundaries, are essential to insurgent movements because they can serve as a 
base of operations from which insurgents can plan and execute attacks with little to no fear 
of counter-targeting from the government which they are fighting against.”439 Byman, et. 
al list multiple cases where insurgent access to “cross-border sanctuaries” were the critical 
factor in an insurgency’s “effectiveness.”440 They also argue that access to insurgent safe 
haven is only relevant if insurgents can transit to and from areas vulnerable to attack, 
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because “when rebels can trans/it through neighboring states (either through the 
connivance of an allied government or because of its weakness), it becomes far harder for 
their adversaries to defeat them.”441 Seth G. Jones argues that extraterritorial safe havens 
increase the prospects and frequency of violence in an insurgency, yielding greater death 
and injury rates within affected populations.442 Per Jones, since 1800, 70 percent of 
successful insurgencies possessed significant access to cross-border safe havens and other 
elements of external support, and groups with little to no external support, to include safe 
havens, only had a 28 percent success rate.443 
Insurgent access to safe havens, and the capacity to travel across the border 
indiscriminately, is relevant to the geopolitics of Iranian Baluch insurgencies. The 
geography of Sistan-Baluchistan lends itself well to insurgent exploitation of the border. 
The Iran-Pakistan border is 900 kilometers, and the border extends through both mountain 
ranges and desert, making them hard to cross, but even more difficult to monitor without a 
force of significant personnel.444 Ranking within the bottom 20 percent of population 
density in Iranian provinces, Sistan-Baluchistan has just 14 people per square kilometer.445 
These combined factors, undisturbed, create a higher prospect for insurgents being able to 
cross the Iran-Pakistan border with little to no concern of detection or repulsion. The 
efficacy and threat of this route is also illustrated by its heavy utilization by transnational 
criminal networks, specifically those linked to illicit drugs. Per John Calabrese, this mix of 
harsh terrain, low population density and the ease of crossing without detection, is the 
critical reason that the Iran-Pakistan and Iran-Afghanistan borders have been utilized to 
ship heroin produced in Afghanistan to Europe and other destinations.446 Finally, the 
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cross-border aspects of Baluch insurgency have been confirmed as a factor in both Iranian 
and Pakistani-based Baluch insurgencies. Pakistani Baloch insurgents have used Iranian 
territory to avoid post-attack reprisal from Pakistan, while Iran frequently accused Pakistan 
of failing to capture Jundallah.447 
2. Border Construction 
Installing overlapping elements of physical security around areas of insurgent 
operations has proven to be a viable tool toward defeating insurgency. The most prominent 
example of physical barrier constructions reducing and preventing cross-border insurgent 
movements is the French use of Morice Line during the Algerian Revolution during the 
1950s and 1960s. As U.S. Army Major Timothy Bairstow describes, the French faced a 
violent insurgency in Algeria which sought to counteract insurgents’ military and 
technological inferiority by seeking easily accessible lines of supply, bases of operation, 
and safe havens outside of Algeria’s borders.448 The French response the Front de 
Libération Nationale insurgency was construction of an exhaustive, overlapping, and 
heavily manned physical barrier. Completed in 1957, The Morice Line was a series of 
physical barriers and deterrents constructed along Algeria’s borders with Tunisia and 
Morocco, and designed to severely constrict the FLN’s capacity to traverse in and out of 
Algeria at will.449 With lethal deterrents, tens of thousands of personnel monitoring and 
defending the line, and an exhaustive swarth of military surveillance, intelligence, and fire 
support at its disposal, the Morice Line is considered to be the single-most significant 
aspect of France’s COIN during the Algerian revolution, endorsed by COIN theorist 
heavyweights such as David Galula.450 The positive impact of what Alexander Alderson 
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characterizes as a “well-resourced obstacle” is also witnessed by the attempts to replicate 
the Morice Line’s effect in subsequent COIN efforts.451 Although eventually abandoned 
as a failure, “The McNamara Line” was a well-funded, high priority effort initiated by the 
U.S. DoD to restrict the Vietcong’s capacity for cross-border entry and exit from South 
Vietnam.452 Rhodesian forces, battling two distinct insurgencies simultaneously, utilized 
a physical barrier and deterrent approach called Cordon Sanitaire to constrict insurgent 
movements into and out of Rhodesian territory from 1965 to 1980.453 In a contemporary 
context, a significant body of COIN experts have argued for establishments of well-staffed 
physical barriers as a means improve COIN performance against insurgencies in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.454 
Iran’s border security plan also relies on its own version of a Morice-style barrier 
to constrain Jaish-ul-Adl and associated Baluch insurgent groups. Per Major Bairstow’s 
assessment, one of the reasons the Morice Line was effective against the Algerian 
insurgency was that the French spared little expense and resource in construction, 
reinforcement, and surveillance of a physical border.455 Similarly, Iran has allocated 
significant efforts and resources toward producing an effective physical barrier. Iran began 
comprehensive construction of the Iran-Pakistan border wall in 2007, and by the time Jaish-
ul-Adl was established in 2012, an Iranian-built, three foot thick, ten foot high physical 
barrier separated Sistan-Baluchistan from Pakistani Balochistan everywhere except 
Zahedan.456 Iran completed the border wall, including around Zahedan in 2015.457 The 
Morice Line had overlapping physical elements surrounding an eight foot electrified fence, 
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while the Iranian barrier system in Sistan-Baluchistan consists of ten foot wall 
supplemented by a series of “linked embankments and ditches ... walls, berms, dry moats, 
and other fortifications.”458 Just as surveillance support helped to bolster the efficacy of 
the Morice line, Iran has installed air and ground surveillance radars along the Iran-
Pakistan border.459 Aerial unmanned surveillance is also a component of border security, 
since the NAJA employ Mohajer unmanned aerial drones along the Sistan-Baluchistan 
Western border.460 
Insurgent attack patterns indicate that robust, layered physical defense has at least 
partially reduced Jaish-ul-Adl’s attack capabilities. Jaish ul-Adl has carried out just six 
attacks which have successfully penetrated more than five miles from the Iran-Pakistan 
border: The February 2019 attack on a Nik Shahr Basij post, the February 2019 Khash-
Zahedan road bus bombing, the January 2019 Zahedan bombing, the December 2018 
Chabahar bombing, the February 2014 Jakigour border Guard kidnappings, and the 
December 2013 Saravan bombing.461 Moreover, since Iran finished construction of 
physical barriers on the Iran-Pakistan border wall in 2015, only four Jaish-ul-Adl attacks 
have occurred more than five miles inside Iranian territory. These attacks excluded, the 
preponderance of Jaish ul-Adl’s engagement with Iranian forces have occurred at the 
border, if not just inside of it. These attacks can be subdivided into three categories. First, 
Jaish ul-Adl has targeted Iranian border guard outposts, located within several thousand 
yards of the Iran-Pakistan border. The October 2018 border guard kidnapping is an 
example of these operations.462 A second category of attacks are the clashes between 
Iranian forces and Jaish ul-Adl which have Border traffic checkpoints. The April 2017 
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Mirjaveh ambush is an example of this type of attack.463 Finally, a significant number of 
attacks by Jaish ul-Adl have failed to even penetrate Iranian territory, and instead were 
directed at border outposts and IRGC facilities from within Pakistan. Examples of these 
attacks include April and June 2018 clashes between Jaish ul Adl and Iranian forces.464  
3. Relocation 
Though unpopular, and unacceptable in many political climates, there is evidence 
that forced population migrations in certain circumstances prove an effective COIN tool to 
constrain insurgency. Per Daniel Byman’s study of COIN in non-democratic regimes, 
population relocation has historically proven to be a measure which limited insurgent 
threats over longer periods of time, while also proving more effective than more violent 
repression.465 Specifically, Byman’s reviews of Russian COIN in the 1940s Caucasus 
region and Burmese COIN demonstrates that so long as the population groups which 
contain insurgents and their supporters are correctly identified, deportation can be an 
amplifying or decisive factor which neutralizes, or even defeats insurgency.466 Per Byman, 
deportation holds tactical value because it directly attacks the insurgent’s ability to blend 
back into an indigenous population once threatens, extends their lines of operation and 
communications to potential battlefields, and cripples their ability to react effectively and 
in a timely manner.467 Spyridon Plakoudas makes a similar argument for the efficacy of 
Greek COIN efforts against communist insurgents in the 1940s. He argues that the Greek 
monarchy “profiled” The identity groups of insurgents and their supporters, then conducted 
“involuntary transfers” that physically separated these groups from the territory where the 
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insurgency was taking place.468 Plakoudas concludes that “under very specific 
circumstances,” The Greek COIN success with population relocation could be 
replicated.469 
The Iranian government in Sistan-Baluchistan employed population relocation as 
part of an operation to forcibly remove the possibility of illegal Pakistanis contributing to 
Baluch insurgency. Per Zahid Ali Khan, the Baluch in both Pakistan and Iran do not 
recognize their counterparts on the other side of the border as a distinct culture or ethnicity 
from their own; under normal conditions, the Baluch frequently engage in cross border 
travel for religious, social, and economic reasons.470 Iran’s normal policy for the Pakistani 
Baluch recognizes and accounts for this aspect of Baluch culture. Prior to recent upticks in 
Baluch insurgency, the Iranian visa systems had institutionalized processes for “Rahadar,” 
where Baluch living in Pakistani border regions, would be permitted to enter Iran so long 
as they could demonstrate a reasonable family, business, or religious reason for the visit.471 
Zahid Ali Khan’s assessment indicates this process was tenable for the majority of 
Pakistani Baluch.472 Since 2012, however, Iranian has massively increased deportations 
of Pakistani citizens found unlawfully residing in Sistan-Baluchistan. Though complete 
estimates from Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency are not available for 2013, 2017, 
and 2019, based on available information, since 2012, Iran has deported at least 113,000 
people from Sistan-Baluchistan to Pakistan via the Taftan border crossing.473  
4. Border Closures  
The Iranian state frequently shut down cross-border traffic entirely because of the 
Baluch insurgency. Basit mentions that since 2009, the Iranian security apparatus has 
reacted to Baluch insurgent attacks by closing the Taftan-Mirjaveh border gate, which is 
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the sole Iranian-Pakistani land crossing between the two countries.474 However, beginning 
in the period after Jundallah’s disbandment, border crossing closures increased in both 
frequency and length. Based on the information that this research has been able to obtain, 
in 2018 and 2019, Iran secured border crossing at Taftan-Mirjaveh for at least 30 of 104 
total weeks, in effect shutting down the vast majority of conventional cross border traffic 
between Iran and Pakistan for more than a quarter of the time.475 Iran has also pre-
emptively shut down border crossings to prevent insurgents access to high visibility targets. 
For example, research indicates that the Iranian state suspended all border admissions from 
Pakistan during the religious periods during Ashura and Arba’een in 2017, 2018, and 2019 
based on security concerns.476 These closures were initially enacted not as a reaction to 
Jaish-ul-Adl operations, but instead as a preventative measure to deny potential Jaish-ul-
Adl insurgents based in Pakistan from crossing into Iran and carrying out attacks. 
Building on strong border integrity, Iran’s border closures serve as an effective 
leverage tool toward population centric COIN. As Austin Long summarizes, the ability of 
counterinsurgents to “seal” borders at will proves “very useful” in COIN operations.477 
Building off of strong border security, the ability to constrict, and if necessary, completely 
cut off cross-border traffic to deny the insurgent access to the environment. This is 
historically demonstrated by French COIN efforts during the Algerian insurgency, who 
would secure all cross border traffic in response to Algerian insurgent activity, enforced by 
the Morice Line.478 Particularly as border security presence increased, and the physical 
barriers that Iran erected on the Pakistan-Iran border grew, shutting down Taftan 
effectively sealed the Iran-Pakistan border to cross-border travel. Reactively, in cases 
where Iran quickly shut down Taftan following major attacks, a triage and damage control 
effect emerged; closures created pressure on insurgents still in country, and allowed the 
Iranian security and police apparatuses to close in, arrest, and hold accountable insurgents 
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still in their territory. Proactively, when the Iranian State shuts down Taftan in advance of 
Shia or other national commemorations, it effectively denies access to these attractive 
psychological targets for the Baluch insurgency because it reduces, mitigates or neutralizes 
the insurgent capacity to conduct attacks. 
C. PAKISTAN ACTION AS COIN AUGMENTATION 
As previously discussed, the combination of cross-border safe havens and insurgent 
groups’ unfettered capability to traverse borders has often proven a fatal combination for 
COIN operations. The previous section of this chapter highlighted how Iranian COIN 
efforts against Jaish ul-Adl sought to attack insurgent access to Iranian territory. However, 
Iranian COIN also embarked on operations designed to diminish the safe havens Jaish ul-
Adl enjoyed in Pakistani territory. Iran used diplomatic, economic, and military 
engagement to persuade Pakistan to increase aggression and pursuit of Jaish ul-Adl and 
other Iran Baluch insurgent groups. Combined with increased measures of border security 
which constricted previous unfettered access to Sistan-Baluchistan, this created two-sided 
pressure and Baluch insurgent groups which operated in Iran. 
It is apparent that over time, Pakistan has acted in Balochistan at the behest of and 
benefit toward Iranian COIN efforts. First. Pakistan has increased surveillance and 
intelligence activities against Jaish ul-Adl, and furthermore has shared the information and 
products of these efforts with their Iranian counterparts. An example of this occurred in 
February 2014, where Pakistan provided Iran with the location of Jaish ul-Adl hostages, 
and similar intelligence sharing, and hostage updates Pakistan provided to Iran in 2018.479 
Second, Pakistan has attacked Jaish ul-Adl directly, like when Pakistani security forces 
raided Jaish ul-Adl strongholds in March 2014 to rescue five abducted Iranians.480 Third, 
Pakistani forces have arrested critical Iranian Baluch insurgent leadership, such as Abdul 
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Salam Rigi, the former Jundallah leader.481 Pakistan has also offered to extradite Baluch 
insurgents, as was the case with Abdul Sattar Rigi in 2015.482 Finally, Iranian pressure has 
pushed Pakistan to begin its own border construction along the Sistan-Baluchistan-
Balochistan provincial border, which could multiply Iran’s border security 
effectiveness.483 
This section discusses the diplomatic, economic, and military leverage Iran used 
against Pakistan to achieve greater levels of Pakistani aggressive action toward Iranian 
Baluch insurgents. Diplomatically, Iran initiated frequent summits with Pakistan, and 
created bilateral organizations with specific focus on countering Baluch militancy. 
Economically, Iran targeted Pakistan’s oil dependency and cross-border trade reliance as a 
means of persuasion. Militarily, Iran demonstrated a willingness to violate Pakistani 
territorial sovereignty in pursuit of Jaish ul-Adl, while leveraging military activity as 
positive reinforcement and encouragement of Pakistani cooperation with Iranian COIN. 
1. Diplomacy 
Diplomatically, Iran frequently engaged with Pakistan to secure their intervention 
against Jaish ul-Adl. As early as February 2014, Iran was deliberately engaging with 
Pakistan through the foreign ministry and MOIS to constrain, pursue, and target Jaish ul-
Adl within Pakistani territory.484 These diplomatic efforts have taken two forms. First, 
bilateral meetings, the use of which is illustrated below through their instrumentality to 
resolving hostage crises. Second, Iran has created and reinforced permanent bilateral 
institutions between Pakistan and Iran. 
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Iran used high level diplomatic exchanges to influence Pakistani behavior during 
both Jaish ul-Adl hostage crises. In response to Jaish ul-Adl’s 2014 border guard 
abductions in Jakigour, at least 12 face-to-face diplomatic meetings occurred which either 
focused on freeing the Iranian hostages, improving bilateral counterinsurgency, or 
counterterrorism efforts.485 These bilateral communications were pervasive at all levels of 
government, including the provincial governorships of Balochistan and Sistan-Baluchistan, 
members of the Iranian and Pakistani Parliament, both nations’ Foreign Ministries, the 
Iranian President, and the Pakistani Prime Minister.486 The exhaustive pattern of 
diplomatic engagement was repeated following Jaish ul-Adl’s Mirjaveh abductions in 
October 2018. In the two months after the initial abductions, Iranian officials held at least 
7 official meetings with Pakistani authorities in pursuit of securing hostage release, again 
involving high level IRGC, parliamentary, and foreign ministry officials.487  
Proactively, Iran’s bilateral diplomatic efforts with Pakistan have established 
permanent cross-border entities which improve Iranian COIN operations. To date, the Joint 
Border Commission has convened 23 times for bilateral coordination on countering cross-
border criminality, insurgency, and terrorism, and the delegations for each nation usually 
involve high ranking diplomats and security apparatus executives.488 Moreover, the 
frequency of Joint Border Commission convenings appears to be increasing, having met 
seven times since July 2019.489 These meetings often produce new or overhauled 
agreements between Iran and Pakistan on cross-border security which directly increased 
both Iran’s and Pakistan’s capacity to cooperatively combat Baluch insurgency. In a 2014 
Joint Border Commission, Iran and Pakistan signed an extradition memorandum of 
understanding, providing clear causeway by which known insurgents wanted by either 
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nation could be held accountable for offenses committed on the other side of the border.490 
Similarly, a 2016 Joint Border Commission agreement targeted potential safe havens of 
militants and insurgents in the vicinity of border communities, and a December 2017 
agreement created open, direct communications lines between both nations border force 
headquarters, while committing to future joint border patrols.491 These diplomatic summits 
have also provided recourse by which Pakistan and Iran can share critical intelligence, and 
enhance one another’s COIN approaches. For example, the February 2014 Joint Border 
Commission included exhaustive Pakistani intelligence updates on the border guard 
abductions and created a specific task force dedicated to a safe resolution of the crisis.492 
At times, this diplomatic engagement has yielded pre-emptive windfalls for Iranian COIN. 
During the May 2015 summit, Pakistan revealed that they had arrested Abdul Sattar Rigi, 
Abdolmalek Rigi’s brother and leader of a Jundallah offshoot called Jaish al-Nasr, based 
on suspicion that he was conducting low-level attacks in Sistan-Baluchistan, and if Iran 
sought his extradition, that it was feasible.493 
2. Economic 
To convince Pakistan to act in the interest of Iranian COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan, 
Iran has leveraged the Pakistan’s dependence on imports, particularly in the energy sector 
using intermittent border closures. Pakistan’s importations from Iran are highly involved 
with its own energy security. According to a 2015 report, Pakistan is energy deficient, often 
experiencing shortfalls between 20 and 40 percent of national demand, resulting in regular 
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power outages in urban areas, and more hours without power than with it in rural areas.494 
According to the Pakistan Business Council, the top three Pakistani Imports from Iran from 
2014 to 2018 were gaseous and liquefied hydrocarbons, light oils, and electricity; 23.74%, 
13.33%, and 10.82% of Pakistan’s entire import volume for these items, respectively.495 
As Iran has constrained, limited, and intermittently shut down the border, it seems that 
Pakistan has suffered negative effects resultant from loss of exchange. Per Saira Basit, the 
frequent border closures which Iran has enacted have a distinctive, palpable “annulment of 
all trade.”496 Amidst the multitude of border closures Iran has imposed, Pakistani import 
and export with Iran still remains a fraction of its decade-high of a $1.2 billion export-
import volume from 2009.497 Moreover, the highest echelons of Iranian governance have 
indicated that there is a direct relation between Iranian-Pakistani COIN and security 
cooperation and increased level of economic exchange. During a bilateral exchange 
between Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan and President Rouhani, Khan noted that his 
“most important” priority for the meeting was countering militants and “terrorism” which 
he identified as the most inflammatory factor that “caused differences” between Iran and 
Pakistan. Meanwhile, Rouhani expressed satisfaction at Pakistan’s recent performance 
toward Baluch militant groups, while announcing an agreement to increase Iranian 
exportation of electricity to Pakistan tenfold.498 
Considering Pakistan’s energy security, there are economic cooperative projects 
that function as leverage tools for influencing Pakistani behavior, as well. Pakistan is 
keenly aware that it will likely be wholly import-dependent to satisfy its energy needs in 
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the coming decades.499 Iran and Pakistan have been negotiating construction of a pipeline 
which would transfer Iranian natural gas to Pakistan since the early 1990s.500 In 2013, 
months before Jaish ul-Adl’s first attack, Iran and Pakistan began pipeline construction on 
both sides of the border.501 Securing natural gas reserves in the early years after 
Jundallah’s disbandment was also important to Pakistan. Per the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, as of 2015, Pakistan had a yearly shortfall in natural gas demands of at 
least 730 billion cubic feet per year, roughly 33 percent of its overall demand.502 The Iran-
Pakistan pipeline provides an answer to this deficit. With initial capability estimates of 
transferring 22 billion cubic meters per year from Iran to Pakistan, this energy provision 
provided redressal of a critical energy shortfall for Pakistan.503 
Beginning with even early Jaish ul-Adl attacks and abductions, it is evident that 
Iran utilized the continued construction and participation in the joint pipeline as leverage 
toward influencing action against Jaish ul-Adl and other insurgents. When Iranian 
president Rouhani met with the National Assembly Speaker of Pakistan after the February 
2014 Jakigour abductions, he demanded that Pakistani forces do more to secure their border 
regions, calling Jaish ul-Adl’s capacity to strike at Iran from of the safety of Pakistan “by 
no means acceptable.”504 In response, Sadiq reaffirmed his commitment toward deepening 
“ties with Iran in all fields,” and noted that Pakistan “would not allow such acts of terror 
to negatively impact ties with Iran.” 505 The association between continued work on the 
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pipeline and Pakistan’s continued pursuit and applied pressure on Baluch groups endures 
beyond the Jakigour hostage crisis. Gholam Reza Asadollahi an Iranian Parliament 
representative, and the head of the “Iran-Pakistan Parliamentary Friendship Group” 
specifically noted that continued progress and completion of the pipeline was directly 
dependent on Pakistan taking more aggressive measures against Jaish ul-Adl and other 
Iranian Baluch insurgent groups.506 In May 2014, Asadollahi called completion of the 
cross-border pipeline “an important and strategic project,” that should be “implemented 
and finalized” without delay, but also noted that the attacks by Jaish ul-Adl and other 
insurgent groups “produced many problems” and put continuation of the project at risk.507 
Similarly, during a May 2014 meeting between Pakistan Prime Minister and Iranian First 
Vice President Es’haq Jahangiri, both entities linked continued construction on the project 
a “safe and secure” environment in the Iran-Pakistan border region.508 
3. Military 
Iran has threatened as well as demonstrated the capability and willingness to 
commit violence inside of Pakistan if Pakistan’s efforts to contain Baluch insurgent groups 
prove insufficient. Iranian officials, particularly those from the IRGC, have frequently 
threatened to cross into Pakistan and attack Jaish ul-Adl if Pakistan fails to do so.509 On 
several occasions, Iran has made good on this threat, conducting unilateral military action 
into Pakistani sovereign territory as punishment and redressal for Iranian Baluch insurgent 
attacks. In October 2014, in the wake of back-to-back insurgent attacks in Zahedan, Iranian 
security forces pursued Baluch insurgents into Pakistan, violating Pakistan’s sovereign 
territory, and causing the death of at least one Pakistani soldier.510 In May 2015, following 
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two fatal Jaish-ul-Adl attacks within a month, and prefaced with previous warnings that 
failure of Pakistani forces to capture those responsible for the attacks would force Iran to 
destroy Jaish ul-Adl in Pakistan themselves, Iranian forces launched a two day barrage of 
rocket and mortar fire into Balochistan, purportedly directed at Jaish ul-Adl bases of 
operation.511 At least one Pakistani was killed.512  
Iran is further able to influence Pakistan in military and security affairs through 
positive reinforcement, and Iran’s military and security behavior toward Pakistan factors 
into Iran’s pressuring Pakistan to crack down on Baluch insurgents. One of the largest 
actions Iran has taken in terms of military and security action toward Iran-Pakistan relations 
has been inaction. As Afshon Ostovar notes, throughout the Middle East, one of Iran’s 
most powerful and often-used tools for influencing foreign states has been the creation and 
support of “militant clients,” particularly those “among co-religionist Shiites ... in foreign 
countries at the substate level.”513 Pakistan, however, with the second largest 
concentration of Shia Muslims in the entire world, has not been a target for Iran’s militant 
client creation.514 This dynamic is persistent, both in previous eras of Iran-Pakistan 
relations, as well as the time period which is subject to the study of this thesis.515 
Furthermore, Pakistan struggles against its own Baluch insurgencies, and at times these 
insurgents have based themselves in Sistan-Baluchistan and attacked across the border.516 
These attacks have intermittently prompted Pakistan to demand from Iran their assistance 
in prosecution and extradition of Baloch insurgents using their side of the border as a safe 
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haven, as was the case with a Baloch separatist attack that killed 15 Pakistani military 
members in April 2019.517 In response President Rouhani agreed to the creation of a “Joint 
Border Force” along the Pakistani-Iranian frontier, specifically designed to pool the 
intelligence, border control, and surveillance resources of both nations.518 In addition the 
agreement set up a bilateral “reaction force” designed to quickly respond to militant attacks 
on both sides of the border.519 
D. A COHERENT NARRATIVE  
Coherent Information operations designed to create a relative gap in positive 
opinions between counterinsurgents and insurgents can yield significant windfalls. As 
discussed in previous chapters, effective narratives play a critical role for both insurgency 
and COIN. In Taliban Narratives, Thomas Johnson describes the insurgency-COIN 
conflict as “primarily an information war supported by military kinetics,” where ultimately 
the belligerent faction with the best narrative “will probably win or at least stalemate the 
conflict” to their advantage.520 Johnson also mentions the criticality of a force conducting 
superior “perception management,” which can be summarized as the totality of efforts by 
which a given insurgent or COIN force seeks to manage its reputation in the eyes of a 
population or audience.521  
In the Post-Jundallah era, Iran created a pervasive narrative which positively 
portrayed the Iranian government as wholly superior when compared with Baluch 
insurgents considering impact on the Baluch population. First, Iran’s messaging largely 
jettisoned undertones of U.S. involvement in the Baluch insurgency, which previously was 
the lynchpin of the COIN narrative against Jundallah. Next, Iranian COIN messaging 
emphasized Iranian forces as proactively engaging insurgents, creating a perception of the 
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Iranian government making Sistan-Baluchistan a safer place. Iran continued this self-
portrayal as a forward-leaning government in consideration of the Jaish ul-Adl hostage 
crises, which could be considered a complete reversal in narrative when compared with 
similar incidents during Jundallah’s existence. Iran’s counter-messaging in response to 
Jaish ul-Adl attacks maintained positive outlooks and emphasized an ever-improving 
security situation, converting what could have been Jaish ul-Adl psychological victories 
into events which benefitted the perception of Iranian security apparatuses. Finally, Iran 
utilized this same emphasis of optimism and progressive action to simultaneously deflect 
blame for continued attacks toward Pakistani incompetence, while portraying Iran in a 
positive light as a concerned neighbor and mentor who sought to improve regional, as well 
as national security.  
1. The Absence of the United States in Recurring Villainy  
There is a presence of U.S. association with Jaish ul-Adl in the Iranian COIN 
rhetoric, but it is far less pertinent than COIN rhetoric against Jundallah. Cross referencing 
and Boolean logic-based search tools indicate that both domestically and internationally, 
Iran marketed a heavier narrative association between Jundallah and the United States than 
it did between Jaish ul-Adl and the United States. For example, when cross referencing all 
of the articles that the News Article database Nexis Uni contains for Jundallah, regardless 
of variance of spelling, there is an absolute higher occurrence of articles which contain 
subject matter on Jundallah and the United States when compared with this same frequency 
of association between Jaish ul-Adl and the United States.522 Looking at Iranian domestic 
media, with consideration to these same cross references based on articles in NewsBank’s 
archives, this difference in dynamic is equally apparent.523  
Beyond simple data, Iran’s accusatory rhetoric concerning the United States against 
Jaish ul-Adl is a much more reserved than that which Iran employed against Jaish ul-Adl’s 
predecessor. Iran’s head of state has never written to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations, demanding condemnation of the United States for alleged involvement in a Jaish 
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ul-Adl attack, but they have done so in the case of Jundullah.524 Of note, when  compared 
with Iran’s repeated assertions of connections between Jundallah and the U.S. government, 
the association that Iran chooses to weave into its narrative against Jaish ul-Adl has been 
more tangential and secondary in nature. Iran frequently asserted that Jundallah was 
directly “backed” or “supported” by the United States.525 However, in describing the U.S. 
relation to Jaish ul-Adl, alleged U.S.-insurgent association has been less direct. Rather than 
asserting a direct Jaish ul-Adl-America connection, state officials have framed Jaish ul-Adl 
as part of a larger network of “Saudi-hired terrorists, who enjoy the U.S. endorsement,” 
while portraying the United States as aligned with Israel and Saudi Arabia toward 
historically supporting terrorism inside Iran.526 
2. Positive Reinforcement of Iranian Competency 
The Iranian government’s COIN narrative in the post-Jundallah era emphasized the 
state’s consistent, continuous counterinsurgent efforts inside Sistan-Baluchistan. Whereas 
COIN against Jundallah had an operational narrative emphasis of reprisal, against Jaish ul-
Adl the IRGC and other security apparatuses emphasized their proactive, pre-emptive 
offensives against Baluch insurgent organizations. There were two elements to this 
proactive and consistent emphasis, which will be discussed in this section. 
First, the NAJA, the IRGC, and local police all conducted and emphasized 
operational raids which claimed to strike at, if not fully dismantle terrorist cells in Sistan-
Baluchistan. There were offensive raids which specifically targeted Jaish ul-Adl. In June 
2016, NAJA forces ambushed a Jaish ul-Adl convoy outside the city of Khash, killing 5 
insurgents.527 In July 2017, NAJA forces discovered and confiscated a Jaish-ul-Adl cache 
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of anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns and assault rifles.528 In March 2018, the IRGC 
attacked and killed two Jaish ul-Adl suicide bombers preparing to attack a border 
outpost.529 In September 2018, the IRGC targeted and killed Jaish ul-Adl’s second-in-
command in a raid.530 
Second, Iranian security forces launched offensive operations against unidentified 
insurgent groups in Sistan-Baluchistan. While there was frequent reporting on counter 
Jaish ul-Adl operations, there was an equal, if not greater number of offensive operations 
announced against unnamed organizations. In August 2014, MOIS and NAJA successfully 
announced the recovery two celebrity hostages who has been kidnapped by insurgent 
elements.531 In September 2014, the IRGC foiled an insurgent assault attempt on a border 
security installation near Saravan.532 In April 2016, Iranian security apparatuses allegedly 
killed the head of a Sistan-Baluchistan group called Ansar Al-Furqan.533 In June of that 
year, Zahedan-based security forces claimed to have fully “dismantled” a terrorist cell 
based around Khash.534 In July, the IRGC reported that they had arrested scores of 
insurgents and destroyed an illicit tunnel which they were using to sneak into Iranian 
territory from Pakistan.535 Between March 2016 and March 2017, the MOIS claimed that 
the Iranian security apparatuses had stopped or otherwise defeated 30 bomb plots in total 
nation-wide.536 Though none of these foiled attacks were specifically confirmed to be 
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related to Jaish ul-Adl, Iran still used these operations as a positive reinforcement of their 
effectiveness against Baluch insurgency. 
3. Converting Hostage Crises into COIN Capital 
Iranian COIN’s record of hostage negotiation against Jundallah was abysmal. 
Jundallah conducted two abduction missions, first in 2007, and second in 2008.537 In total, 
38 hostages were taken. All the Chabahar hostages were quickly freed due to rapid 
intervention by Pakistani security forces.538 However, the fate of the Saravan hostages 
proved deleterious to Iranian COIN’s narrative and subsequent credibility. Over the course 
of six months, the hostages taken in Saravan were gradually executed by Jundallah as Iran 
refused to meet their demands, in full view of the public. Jundallah executed two hostages 
a week after the abduction.539 The insurgent group executed an additional two hostages in 
July, and two more in August.540 Jundallah killed the remaining hostages from October to 
December.541 
The Iranian response to Jundallah’s abductions played a large part to the injuries of 
Iran’s own credibility. Alistair C. MacWilson, notes that resolution of hostage crises is a 
zero-sum conflict for a security apparatus’s reputation: “a government that can resolve the 
incident successfully, and that can be seen to have done so, will enhance its public image; 
a government that concedes to terrorist demands, or fails to prevent an unacceptable 
number of hostages being killed, may lose public support as well as its own credibility.”542 
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The Iranian response to Jundallah certainly falls into the second category, and Iran suffered 
the loss of face that MacWilson discusses. As Jundallah continued to execute Iranian 
hostages from the safety of the Pakistani borderlands, Iran accidentally portrayed itself as 
helpless and inept toward protecting those taken. The conveyance of this helplessness or 
ineptitude was reinforced by the comments of several prominent security force executives. 
In July, less than a month after the abductions, the head of NAJA stated that he had no new 
information on the case, and that NAJA’s information stream was based nearly entirely on 
Jundallah’s public assertions.543 An MOIS minister made a similar statement in August, 
claiming that hostage release was being impeded by the political situations in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan.544 MOIS, NAJA, and foreign ministry officials repeatedly refused to 
negotiate with Jundallah.545 These vehement, public refusals to negotiate likely 
exacerbated the situation, because they forced Jundallah operatives to either kill hostages, 
or appear incoherent themselves. Finally, the Iranian narrative during hostage taking placed 
the onus and blame on Pakistan to recover the hostages, which combined with its own lack 
of action, further underlined Iran’s own ineptitude to rescue its own people.546 
Iran also endured major abductions by Jaish ul-Adl, but the ultimate outcomes, 
along with their effects of the Iranian narratives surrounding these events, have been the 
exact opposite of similar incidents during Jundallah’s reign. To date, Jaish ul-Adl has 
conducted two abduction operations against Iran; the insurgent organization kidnapped five 
border guards in February 2014, and twelve border guards in October 2018.547 Contrary 
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to the experience with Jundallah, Jaish ul-Adl has only killed one hostage.548 Moreover, 
Iran has worked with Pakistan to secure the release or recovery of almost all of the hostages 
Jaish ul-Adl has taken.549 
The Iranian COIN counternarrative to Jaish ul-Adl’s hostage negotiation was 
markedly different than that which the state employed against Jundallah. According to 
Washington, D.C.-based Iran Times International, Iranian security services learned from 
their kidnapping experiences with Jundallah, and sought to avoid the same mistakes, 
instead opting for a narrative designed to convince the population that the regime “knows 
what it is doing and is expertly working to free the prisoners.”550 Iranian security apparatus 
officials during both cases made a point of frequently, consistently releasing progress and 
information updates to the public to demonstrate their own forward-leaning capability in 
resolving the issue. For example, within three days of the February 2014 abductions, 
Iranian officials had sent a delegation to press Pakistani forces to help return the hostages, 
and also summoned the Pakistani ambassador to Tehran to further pursue Pakistan’s 
cooperation.551 The Iranian COIN response to the 2018 Jaish ul-Adl abductions followed 
a similar pattern. Iran’s foreign ministry and the IRGC both publicly reached out through 
to Pakistan for cooperation in securing hostages.552 The Iranian COIN narrative has 
continued to update and press for complete resolution to the hostage crises, refusing to 
settle for anything short of full accountability. In 2014, for example, despite Jaish ul-Adl’s 
claims that the remaining hostage had died, multiple Iranian officials rejected this claim, 
and instead vowed to continue to press Pakistan to take responsibility for the hostage’s 
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recovery.553 Despite the successful release of five border guards in November 2018, IRGC 
commanders released statements to the public declaring their refusal to settle for anything 
less than 100 percent safe return for the remaining hostages.554 Simultaneously, Iran has 
avoided rejecting the demands of Jaish ul-Adl outright as it did with Jundallah, while 
simultaneously creating a perception of active negotiation with Pakistan, and not Jaish ul-
Adl, to secure hostage release.  
4. Optimism and Responsibility: Framing Successful Jaish ul-Adl 
Attacks 
According to a preponderance of experts in COIN theory, a strong narrative that 
demonstrates the value added by COIN efforts and insulates the government from a loss of 
face in short term setbacks and crises is a critical element to permanently defeating an 
insurgency. In 1995, the current Afghanistan Director for the United States National 
Security Council Kurt Amen emphasized the centrality of a positive, pervasive narrative 
for any COIN operation, calling it the “foundation of all strategy.”555 Amend further 
argues that narratives are a determinant of all realms of counterinsurgency, to include 
politics, discourse, and operational activity.556 John Mackinlay believes that the “crucial 
task for the insurgent and the counterinsurgent ... is to manipulate the attitudes of the 
population living in this grey area.”557 Per Mackinlay, a successful narrative must be 
sufficiently strong, consistent, and embedded within a population’s consciousness for a 
COIN operation to retain popular support when facing impending catastrophe or 
destruction.558 Per the U.S. military counterinsurgency manual Joint Publication 3-24, 
overwhelmingly successful COIN usually contains narratives which don’t simply 
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“undermine the insurgency narrative,” but “gain the initiative” through demonstration of 
“positive change to regain legitimacy where it has been lost and reestablish stability.”559 
In regards to countering Jaish ul-Adl’s constant attacks on Iranian forces, the Iranian COIN 
narrative has similarly sought to simultaneously insulate itself from a loss of face and 
reputation at the hands of Jaish ul-Adl, while presenting the Iranian government as the 
predominant agent of progress. This serves to frame Jaish ul-Adl attacks as futile, desperate 
attempts by insurgents to stay relevant, and emphasizes the positive delta to security the 
Sistan-Baluchistan region has experienced over time.  
Rather than framing Jaish ul-Adl operations as attacks, the Iranian narrative has 
adopted narrative optimism, emphasizing the security apparatus initiative in meeting Jaish 
ul-Adl. For example, in reporting on an August 20148Jaish ul-Adl attack which killed three 
Border Guards, the Islamic Republic framed the dynamics of the conflict as a successful 
defense of an outpost; the “strong resistance” of the border guards repelled Jaish ul Adl, 
and prevented them from successfully accomplishing their “ominous objective.”560 A June 
2018 Jaish ul-Adl operation in Mirjaveh carries similar dynamics, emphasizing that IRGC 
and Basij deaths were the result of security forces confronting and repelling Jaish ul-Adl 
as they tried to pass through Mirjaveh “to carry out acts of sabotage and conduct terrorist 
acts.”561 This framing not only applies to armed skirmishes, but also suicide attacks. For 
example, with Jaish ul-Adl suicide attacks that injured two in March 2018, Iranian 
government-funded Press TV emphasized that the attack was defeated, noting that Iranian 
forces destroyed the suicide explosives before the Jaish ul-Adl could reach their targets.562 
Simultaneously, government officials characterized their conflict with Jaish ul-Adl 
as an indicator of overwhelming improvement in security. The Iranian government often 
summarized and downplayed Jaish ul-Adl attacks’ severity as the mark of improvement in 
Sistan-Baluchistan since the defeat of Jundallah. In response to one of Jaish ul-Adl’s most 
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deadly attacks in April 2017, IRGC Ground Force Commander Brigadier General 
Mohammad Pakpour remarked that previously, Baluch insurgents were able to attack deep 
into Iranian territory.563 He then compared that paradigm to the contemporary security 
situation, noting that Jaish ul-Adl and other Baluch insurgents “are no more capable of 
[establishing] presence deep in our territory,” and thus can do nothing other than attack at 
the border.564 Similarly, Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, in remarks following the 
February 2019 IRGC bus bombing mourned the loss of the 27 killed as “the price that is 
paid” for stability and security, while also noting that Jaish ul-Adl attacks were 
meaningless because “as long as a nation holds its ground,” insurgent groups like Jaish ul-
Adl “can do it no harm.”565 This narrative of improved levels of security over time is also 
reinforced through individual incident reports as reported by the Iranian media. For 
example, in reporting on Jaish ul-Adl attacks in early February 2019, October 2018, and 
July 2016, Iran Daily continuously emphasizes that Iran is winning against the insurgents, 
concluding reports with characterizations of how security forces are continuously 
“thwarting” Jaish ul-Adl incursions into Iranian territory.566 
5. Pakistan’s Role in the Narrative 
As was the case during Jundallah, Iran blamed the actions of another nation for the 
continued attacks, casualties and deaths caused by Baluch insurgents within Iran. However, 
in the post-Jundallah era, Iran’s ascription of blame for Jaish ul-Adl attacks to Pakistan was 
less an excuse, and more an assignment of responsibility. Instead of outright condemnation, 
Iran’s narrative sought to explain Jaish ul-Adl’s continued attacks were a result of 
Pakistan’s refusal or inability to neutralize insurgent groups. Iran consistently portrayed 
Pakistan as a friendly nation struggling with a similar problem to one that Iran itself was 
withstanding, and that Pakistan’s failure required Iranian assistance to correct. In criticism 
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and condemnation, Iran only resorted to such tactics when their own national security was 
threatened. Shifting the responsibility for Baluch insurgents’ attacks, without admitting or 
betraying any loss of authority and power was thus the narrative approach that Iran adopted 
toward Pakistan concerning their relevance to Jaish ul-Adl. Iran’s messaging concerning 
Jaish ul-Adl in Pakistan sought to avoid loss of face for the Iranian government by more 
subtly shifting the blame for continued attacks to Pakistan through a narrative which 
portrayed Pakistan as a nation who was ineptly struggling in the areas of counterterrorism 
and COIN and would prevail if they just simply followed the Iranian examples. 
COIN theory has established that narratives must carefully manage blaming, buck 
passing, and scapegoating. Kelly Greenland and Paul Stanilad, in “Ten Ways to Lose at 
Counterinsurgency,” identify that one of the most common critical flaws with failed COIN 
approaches is overemphasis of “external support as a scapegoat,” providing an excuse for 
continued failures that acts as a shroud which distracts from a failing, deleterious 
approach.567 However, they note that successful COIN approaches all at some point 
address foreign influences “explicitly and systematically.”568 This balancing act of two 
extremes extends to considerations of COIN narratives and messaging. As part of any 
overall COIN operation, crafted narratives, as the 2009 U.S. government 
Counterinsurgency Guide states, are the “informational components that reinforce 
governmental legitimacy and effectiveness” against insurgent threats.569 It follows, then, 
that blame and scapegoating of foreign entities regarding insurgent successes is a double-
edged sword in COIN. While it may deflect some blame, criticism, and population away 
from government’s failures to stop insurgency, it also inherently admits that the 
government, as the avowed arbiter of power and authority over a territory, is insufficient 
in stopping an insurgency. 
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The Iranian COIN narrative has consistently emphasized that Pakistan has been 
bound by its own commitments to help fight Jaish ul Adl. From Jaish ul-Adl’s first 
confirmed attack in October 2013, Iran has crafted a narrative by which Iran and Pakistan 
have mutually agreed to measures for border security, with Pakistan’s failure to uphold 
their end of the agreement is the cause for Jaish ul-Adl’s continued existence.570 A major 
component woven into the Iranian narrative following the October 2013 attack involved 
reference to a February 2013 bilateral security agreement, and Pakistan’s failure to abide 
by it. This narrative pervaded the commentary of prominent elements of the Iranian 
government, including President Rouhani, The Foreign Ministry, and members of the 
Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Councils.571 Following the April 2017 
Mirjaveh attack, Foreign Minister Zarif again cited Pakistan’s failure to uphold February 
2013 and subsequent security agreements.572 
Throughout the post-Jundallah era, Iran has asserted close ties with Pakistan as part 
of its COIN narrative, conveying the overall Iran-Pakistan dynamic is one of cooperation 
and friendship in the area of militant insurgency. Iran’s narrative of Pakistan-Iran relations 
portrays the Iranians as a benevolent elder brother, with Iran a willing, active participant 
in the partnership. In April 2019, Rouhani described relations between Pakistan and Iran 
as “brotherly and friendly.”573 In a December 2013 visit by Foreign Minister Sharif to 
Pakistan, Sharif conveyed Iran’s intent to provide unwavering reinforcement of Pakistan’s 
counter-terror and COIN efforts, recalling the deep “history of mutual security concerns” 
between Iran and Pakistan, and vowing to “enhance bilateral cooperation and make it 
stronger.”574 This characterization often falls directly adjacent to criticism of Pakistani 
ineptitude. For Example, when Zarif cited Pakistan’s failure to live up to security 
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agreements in December 2013, he also simultaneously stressed that “Pakistan’s safety, 
growth and efflorescence has always topped Iran’s agenda of ties.”575 
Iran’s COIN against Jaish ul-Adl has woven accusations of Pakistan’s ineptitude 
into its overall narrative to deflect criticism from repeated Jaish ul-Adl attacks. Throughout 
the Iranian government’s narrative, officials have voiced concerns of a chronically inept 
Pakistan, who in the border security and countering militancy “have not fulfilled our 
expectations.”576 In 2014, NAJA commander Ahmadi Moqaddam called Pakistan’s 
performance an “unacceptable” failure that costs Iranian lives.577 In 2015, current 
Mohammad-Esmail Kowsari, then the head of the Iranian parliament’s committee on 
national security, accused Pakistan of having little to no control over the border area of 
Pakistani Balochistan.578 In 2017, following repeated attacks, the Iranian Foreign Ministry 
released statements calling the Pakistan’s Western Border with Iran “insecure,” while the 
Iranian border security efforts “provide the most secure border for them [Pakistan].” 579 
This characterization of ineptitude has become more poignant over time, culminating with 
the counter-narrative of Jaish ul-Adl’s February 2019 bus bombing. In the aftermath of the 
bombing, IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani unleashed a diatribe against 
Pakistani security policy, captured by his initial statement: “Can’t you [Pakistan], as a 
nuclear-armed state, deal with a hundreds-strong terrorist group in the region?”580  
Building on this dynamic, Iran’s COIN narrative further shifts responsibility away 
from itself with respect to Jaish ul-Adl attacks by portraying itself as the reluctant 
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interloper, forced to violate Pakistani sovereignty in an effort to protect itself after Pakistan 
fails to handle to control its own territory. Iran has marketed itself as a nation which has 
not dealt with Jaish ul-Adl use of Pakistani territory out of a regard for national sovereignty. 
Updating the press and the public on border guards kidnapped by Jaish ul-Adl in April 
2018, the Iranian Interior Minister stated that Iranian forces would not move against Jaish 
ul-Adl in Pakistan without “Pakistani ... supervision and ... permission,” adding that thus 
far Iran has “refused” to operate within Pakistani territory out of “respect” for Pakistan’s 
territorial integrity.581 In March 2019, the Iranian government reaffirmed that it had no 
intention of violating Pakistan’s territory to deal with insurgents, despite purported 
increases in international pressure for Pakistan to crack down on terror.582  
However, Iran’s narrative also consistently contains an intent to act in Pakistan as 
a last resort if Pakistan is unable or unwilling to do so. Following Jaish ul-Adl attacks, 
Iran’s security services have increasingly called on Pakistan to either improve their security 
performance in Balochistan or to stand aside and let Iran do it for them. In 2014, following 
Jaish ul-Adl’s Jakigour kidnapping of border guards in 2014, the Iranian interior minister 
threatened that continued Pakistani failure to establish border security would warrant Iran 
to “become more involved in the matter.”583 Following the April 2017 Jaish ul-Adl 
Mirjaveh attack, NAJA and IRGC border forces conveyed to Pakistan that they knew 
where Jaish ul-Adl was hiding in their territory, and would unilaterally strike if Pakistan 
did not do so first.584 In March 2019, the Artesh’s Chief of Staff resolved that if Pakistan 
failed to curb Jaish ul-Adl, that Iranian forces would “take action and avenge the blood of 
our dear ones.”585 
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E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter demonstrated that Iran vastly improved its counterinsurgency 
approach against Baluch insurgents after the Jundallah’s disbandment, especially against 
Jaish ul-Adl. Influenced by experiences against Jundallah, Iran has learned from its past 
mistakes and developed a coherent COIN approach in Sistan-Baluchistan. At a tactical and 
operational level, Iran has developed and implemented a population-centric COIN 
approach through comprehensive, exhaustive border control measures which have all-but 
isolated insurgents from the local population in Sistan-Baluchistan. Furthermore, Iran has 
succeeded in persuading Pakistan to expand its border security measures, and increase its 
aggression, attention, and pursuit against anti-Iran insurgent groups which reside in 
Pakistani Balochistan. Finally, Iran has crafted a narrative which above all else, stresses its 
own successes, and portrays the Iranian government as consistently, proactively, and 
aggressively reducing the presence and effectiveness of Jaish ul-Adl and other insurgent 
organizations in the province.  
With this three-pronged approach, Iran has performed far better against Jaish ul-
Adl and other post-Jundallah insurgents than it had against Jundallah. Iran has successfully 
diminished, marginalized, and contained the Baluch insurgency in a manner and scale that 
Iran simply failed to achieve with Jundallah. This delta in performance has a variety of 
influences. Among them are differences in sectarian influence, factionalism among 
insurgent groups, and relevant international developments which have influenced these 
insurgencies. Chief among the reasons for Iran’s difference in COIN performance against 
Jundallah and Jaish ul-Adl, however, is the IRGC. Since 2005, IRGC involvement in 
Sistan-Baluchistan has skyrocketed into an assumption of absolute command and control 
authority over COIN and security considerations. The dynamics and interactions of these 
influences, as they function as causes for Iran’s improvement at counterinsurgency, will be 
the focus of the next chapter.  
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V. SOURCES OF IMPROVEMENT IN IRANIAN 
COIN PERFORMANCE AGAINST THE BALUCH INSURGENCY 
Against Jundallah, the Iranian state failed to construct a coherent, or complete 
COIN approach in Sistan-Baluchistan. Due to several critical errors, outlined in the 
previous chapter, Iranian COIN operations from 2003 to 2012 failed to contain or defeat 
insurgency. However, after Jundallah’s disbandment, Iranian COIN operations have been 
completely re-evaluated and reconstructed, with a far more complete, comprehensive, and 
effective approach which appears to have contained, if not diminished Baluch insurgent 
groups. As discussed in Chapter IV, since 2012, Iran has utilized a COIN approach which 
involves border security, placing pressure on Baluch insurgents in Pakistan, and a multi-
faceted narrative which stresses the optimistic improvements and successes of the Iranian 
government in Sistan-Baluchistan.  
There are two primary factors which explain the transition between a failing Iranian 
COIN against Jundallah and a significantly more successful Iranian COIN approach in 
Sistan-Baluchistan following Jundallah’s disbandment. The first factor involves the 
developments of Baluch insurgency after the death of Abdolmalek Rigi and Jundallah’s 
subsequent demise. Jaish ul-Adl and other insurgent groups which succeeded Jundallah 
represent a relative self-inflicted weakening of the Baluch insurgency’s prospects for 
continued expanding influence in Sistan-Baluchistan. The second factor is that since 2009, 
the IRGC has assumed absolute, total control over all matters relevant to COIN in Sistan-
Baluchistan, and the IRGC’s growing involvement is the single state-controlled factor 
which has made the greatest difference in COIN performance from 2012 to the present. 
The following section of this chapter will discuss the changes to the Baluch 
insurgency since 2012, and how these changes have ultimately weakened it as a force of 
influence in Sistan-Baluchistan as well as among the Baluch population. First, since 
Jundallah has disbanded, there has been an increased level of intra-insurgent interference, 
competition, and infighting which has negatively impacted the insurgency. Second, in 
Jundallah’s wake, the most powerful Baluch insurgent groups have wholeheartedly placed 
ideologies of sectarian divide and pan-Arab/pan-Sunni uprisings against Iran at the center 
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of their narratives, which has had a mixed, if not deleterious resonation within the Baluch 
population. Finally, with the demise of Jundallah, tribal divides have increasingly created 
new tensions between insurgent groups while also opening new areas of contention. 
Importantly, as will be discussed in each subsection, these are mistakes which Baluch 
autonomy and separatist movements have made in the past, which the insurgency now 
appears to be allowing themselves to reiterate. 
Section B of this chapter discusses why the IRGC, upon attainment of absolute 
authority in Sistan-Baluchistan, was able to construct a COIN approach that was 
significantly more successful than those previously attempted. First, the manner by which 
the IRGC were deployed to get Sistan-Baluchistan back under control did not occur in a 
vacuum; the nationwide unrest which raged throughout 2009 created a state consciousness 
which was much less willing to tolerate continued Baluch insurgency in Southeast Iran. 
Second, by declaring the IRGC the absolute arbiter and head of the Command and Control 
authority in Sistan-Baluchistan, the Iranian state created a unity of command that 
successfully sidestepped organizational and political infighting between factions and 
groups inside the government. Third, the organization’s structure, mission, and experience 
with COIN and security throughout the history of the Islamic Republic provide the IRGC 
an absolute advantage in performance and capability in COIN when compared with other 
Iranian security apparatuses. Fourth, the organization has robust sources of funding, 
political authority and influence, and industrial resources which proved critical to 
execution of an effective COIN approach. Finally, revisiting the end of the Jundallah era, 
though the IRGC efforts failed to forestall the Baluch insurgency with their efforts, the 
removal of Rigi as a leadership figure and the subsequent collapse of Jundallah, as an 
Iranian action, has also been an IRGC-initiated action which has led to the self-imposed 
diminishing of Baluch insurgents discussed in Section A of this chapter. 
A. FRAGMENTATION OF INSURGENCY 
While Jundallah was an organization that grew in strength by absorption and 
recruitment, it appears the post-Jundallah era has been one marked by fragmentation and 
competition for Iranian Baluch insurgency and nationalist movements.  
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1. Organizations in Tandem and Competition over Succession 
Though Jaish ul-Adl is definitively the largest, most active, and most avowed group 
to have succeeded Jundallah, it is in fact one among several groups claiming the champion 
the Iranian Baluch cause following Jundallah’s demise.586 According to Nicholas 
Cappuccino, excluding Jaish ul-Adl there was at least one other prominent, noteworthy 
insurgent group which formed as “splinter” organizations following the death of 
Abdolmalek Rigi and subsequent dissolution of Jundallah: Harakat Ansar Iran, more 
recently called Ansar Al Furqan.587 Another long-existing organization, called Hizbul al-
Furqan, was also prominent in the post-Jundallah era.588 In addition, an organization 
linked to the longstanding Pakistani insurgent organization Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan called 
Sipah-E-Sahaba Iran exhibited frequent activity in Sistan-Baluchistan from 2012 
onwards.589 Finally, start-up insurgent groups, such as Jaish al-Nasr, have conducted 
attacks in the region.590  
The parallels between these organizations are significant. Though Harakat Ansar 
Iran and Hizbul al-Furqan both pale in comparisons to Jaish ul-Adl considering their size, 
operational activity, and notoriety with the general public, both organizations have 
executed attacks similar in justification and operational aspects. Ansar Al Furqan and Jaish 
ul-Adl operate within the same territory. For example, both groups have conducted attacks 
against Iranian security forces in Chabahar.591 As Chris Zambelis notes, their tactics as 
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well as their methodology of targeting is also nearly identical.592 Moreover, their 
messaging is strikingly similar. Zambelis further notes that both groups use similar 
language to frame their efforts against the Iranian government, to include the prevalent 
labeling of Iranian forces as a “Safavid” empire.593  
Overlapping, parallel organizations with no coordination present a lost opportunity 
for Baluch insurgency. In general discussion of conflict, per Russell Glenn, as of 1939, the 
United States Army, extrapolating from Clausewitz’s defined Principles of War, had 
identified “unity of effort” as one of seven critical tenets in the successful “conduct of 
war.”594 Currently, the U.S. DoD defines unity of effort as “coordination and cooperation 
toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same 
command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action.”595 Per 
Zambelis, Harakat Ansar Iran and Jaish ul-Adl never publicly acknowledged each other’s 
existence, and analysis indicates that coordination between these groups is scarce, if at all 
existent during Jundallah’s tenure as well as after Jundallah’s demise.596 Fragmentation 
following Jundallah’s demise presents opportunities lost for the capabilities of Baluch 
insurgency to combat the Iranian government; rather than coordinating their efforts, Baluch 
insurgent groups have acted independently, creating an effects of negative interference on 
one another’s notoriety, and capacity to counteract the Iranian government. 
Direct competition and infighting between insurgent groups have heavily 
influenced insurgent developments in the region. Zambelis believes that Jundallah’s 
demise has given way to a period of increased “rivalry and dissension” among the Baluch 
insurgency, where “regional and tribal disputes” drive internal competitions for power.597 
 
592 Zambelis, “Evolution of the Ethnic Baluch Insurgency,”18–19. 
593 Zambelis, 20. 
594 Russell W. Glenn, “No More Principles of War?,” Parameters 28, no. 1 (April 1, 1998): 52, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1306225316/. 
595 U.S. Department of Defense, The Dictionary of Military Terms, Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Defense, 2009, 576. 
596 Zambelis, “Evolution of the Ethnic Baluch Insurgency,” 19. 
597 Zambelis, 19; Umid Niayesh, “Leader of Baluch Rebels Killed in Pakistan,” Trend News Agency, 
August 29, 2014, https://en.trend.az/iran/2306348.html. 
135 
Factionalism has at times directly divided the internal organizational dynamics of Jaish ul-
Adl. Per Jaish ul-Adl’s own statements, Abdul Rauf Rigi, Abdolmalek Rigi’s younger 
brother and one-time leader of Jundallah, broke off from Jaish ul-Adl and formed his own 
separate insurgent organization called Jaish ul-Nasr in the wake of Jaish ul-Adl’s first 
abduction operations.598 Competition also lays at the heart of insurgent groups’ merger. 
Zambelis cites the heightened sense of competition for predominance of the Baluch cause 
as the primary driving factor for Harakat Ansar Iran’s declaration of allegiance and 
solidarity to fellow Baluch insurgent group Sepah-E-Sahaba Iran in 2013.599 Joanna 
Paraszczuk similarly faults factional competition as the root cause of Harakat Ansar Iran’s 
merger with Hizbul Furqan at the end of 2013.600 Per Paraszczuk, the merger of the two 
organizations was executed in order to pool resources and capabilities for a better capability 
to compete with an increasingly relevant and active Jaish ul-Adl.601 There are indications 
that competition for primacy has also driven intra-insurgency violence. In 2014, for 
example, Abdul Rauf Rigi was killed in Pakistan, possibly “as a result of internal disputes” 
between Jaish ul-Nasr and other insurgent organizations, with some sources specifically 
accusing Jaish ul-Adl of carrying out the assassination.602 
Whereas a lack of unity of effort creates inefficiencies and limits capabilities of an 
overall insurgency, intra-force competition and conflict can have a far more deleterious 
effect of any type of war effort. As early as the 5th century B.C., Sun Tzu’s Art of War 
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establishes that as best possible, a key principle of warfare is the criticality of a force 
refraining wherever possible from facing a united enemy.603 Sun Tzu also comments on 
the inferiority of a force that is “split up into fractions” against a “single, united body.”604 
Rather than presenting a unified or coordinated front, the factionalism of the Baluch 
insurgency, particularly post-Jundallah, has created a situation where an increasingly 
unified Iranian COIN battles groups who at least in part are in conflict with themselves, a 
situation Sun Tzu might describes as “the whole being pitted against the separate parts of 
a whole.” 605  
Fragmentation, competition and infighting following the demise of strong 
leadership is a dynamic which is present throughout Baluch history, and the Post-Jundallah 
developments in Iranian Baluchistan with respect to the insurgency can be thought of as 
the most recent iteration of history repeating itself. In the 1400s, the accomplishments of 
Mir Chakar Rind, considered to be “the first nation builder by Baluch historical accounts,” 
were undone following his death, as the Baluch confederacy was “destroyed by a civil 
between the two leading Baluch tribal federations” after his death.606 Similarly, Harrison 
notes that Nasir Khan, who he credits as the ruler who has come closest “to establishing a 
centralized bureaucratic apparatus covering all of Baluchistan,” saw his accomplishments 
undercut by infighting between prominent leaders within his federation.607 Factionalism 
and fragmentation also appear as a critical contributor to the downfall of renewed 
aspirations of increased Baluch rights and autonomy from Iranian central government 
following the 1979 revolution. The Islamic Unity Party, headed by Moulavi Aziz 
Mollazadeh, held talks with, and gained verbal concessions from Ayatollah Khomeini in 
March 1979 on both Baluch and Sunni rights under the new government.608 However, 
when the initial draft of the Islamic Republic’s constitution failed to guarantee any Baluch 
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accommodations, a crippling internal rift developed inside the movement, with Mollazadeh 
and the IUP calling for restraint on one side, and a more violent, “anti-Khomeini” oriented 
faction consisting of a “loose coalition of embattled leftists and national elements” on the 
other.609 The IUP did reach “an uneasy truce with Tehran” in which Khomeini guaranteed 
a constitutional amendment which would in effect allow Sunnis to operate separate court 
systems, but this deal fell apart and became moot as early iterations of the IRGC and more 
violent and nationalist movements began to clash with revolutionary guards in Zahedan 
and other regions of Baluchistan.610  
These historical events in mind, Jaish ul-Adl and current Baluch insurgencies 
appear to suffer from problems previous generations of Baluch freedom fighters have 
endured. As was the case with Chakar Rind, the death of Abdolmalek Rigi and dissolution 
of Jundallah have created an unresolved power vacuum where insurgent groups are in 
direct competition against one another for notoriety, as well as the hearts and minds of the 
Baluch. Just as Nasir Khan struggled to unite the Iranian Baluch tribes under his banner, 
the uncrossing, uncoordinated parallel paths of Ansar Al Furqan and Jaish ul-Adl have 
yielded counterproductive dynamics which certainly fall short of the capabilities a unity of 
effort between these insurgent groups could yield. As with the IUP, disputes over 
agreements reached between the central Iranian government and insurgent groups yielded 
a significant fragmentation as Jaish ul-Nasr seceded from Jaish ul-Adl in the wake of the 
2014 abductions. 
2. Incorporation of Sectarian and Transnational Issues into Narratives 
As the self-proclaimed successor to Jundallah, Jaish ul-Adl has defined itself as and 
its fight against the Iranian government along sectarian lines, but it has often attempted to 
link itself to other non-Baluch Sunni insurgencies and opposition groups operating inside 
of Iran. Reviewing Jaish ul-Adl statements, it is clear that the group defines the 
constituency it represents as not simply Baluch, but “Sunni” Baluch populations, and that 
Jaish ul-Adl portrays itself waging war against an Iranian state, that seek to impose a 
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“Shiite” dominated way of life.611 Jaish ul-Adl’s identity is not simply Baluch, but heavily 
plays on sectarian divides. From its very first major attack against the Iranian state in 
October 2013, Jaish ul-Adl has carried elements beyond Baluch nationalism. In Jaish ul-
Adl’s statement of establishment, there is further emphasis on injustices suffered by Sunnis 
at the hands of Iran’s Shiite regime.612 The declaration of existence mentions Baluch 
injustice, but also makes frequent note of injustice suffered by other Sunni minorities in 
Iran, such as Khorasan, and Hormozgan.613 A critical objective of Jaish ul-Adl’s public 
releases over time appears to be to establish themselves as one of multiple Sunni minority 
populations struggling against the Iranian government. For example, in the wake of several 
significant developments in Iranian Kurdistan from 2013-2017, Jaish ul-Adl has released 
statements expressing solidarity and brotherhood with Kurdish insurgent groups and the 
Kurdish people.614 Of note, Jaish ul-Adl, during its annual Eid-al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha 
messages has called for mass uprisings not only by Baluch, but other groups it identifies 
as marginalized Sunnis inside Iran, to include ethnic Turkmen, Azeri, Kurds, and Arabs.615 
 
611 Jaish ul-Adl, “متن پیام سازمان جیش العدل در حمایت از فرزندان اھل سنت کرد،عرب و بلوچ کھ امروز درتظاھرات 
 Message from] اعتراضی اعدام در کوپنھاگ در جمع تظاھر کنندگان توسط حرکت نضال االحواز بھ نمایندگی از سازمان قرأت شد
Jaish al-Adl’s organization in support of Sunni, Arab and Baluchi children who came to represent the 
organization today at a demonstration in Copenhagen to protest the execution],” Edaalat News (blog), 
November 9, 2013, http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2013/11/blog-post_4480.html. 
612 Jaish ul-Adl, “اعالم وجود سازمان جیش العدل [Declaration of existence for Jaish al-Adl],” Edaalat News 
(blog), April 19, 2012, http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2012/04/blog-post.html. 
613 Jaish ul-Adl. 
614 Jaish ul-Adl, “اطالعیھ جدید سازمان جیش العدل :زندانیان اھلسنت را آزاد کنید [Jaish al-Adl Organization News 
Release: Release Ahlensat Prisoners],” Edaalat News (blog), February 16, 2014, 
http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2014/02/blog-post_16.html; Jaish ul-Adl, “مقاومت پیشمرگان حزب دمکرات 
 ”,[The resistance of the Peshmarga of the Kurdistan Democratic Party is commendable] کردستان ستودنی است
Edaalat News (blog), June 27, 2016, http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2016/06/blog-post_98.html; Jaish ul-
Adl, “ مصاحبھ سخنگوی دوم سازمان با ماف نیوز [Interview With Maf News, The Second Spokesman for the 
Organization],” Edaalat News (blog), July 30, 2016, http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2016/07/blog-
post_49.html; Jaish ul-Adl, “سازمان جیش العدل:در کنار کورد و کردستانیم و از خواستھا و اعتراضات بحق مردم کردستان 
 We stand by Kurds and Kurdistan and support the legitimate demands and protests of the] ”حمایت می کنیم
Kurdish People], Edaalat News (blog), September 8, 2017, http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2017/09/blog-
post_9.html. 
615 Jaish ul-Adl, “اعالمیھ سازمان بھ مناسبت عید سعید قربان” [Declaration on the occasion of Eid al-Adha], 
Edaalat News (blog), September 23, 2015, http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2015/09/blog-post_86.html; 
Jaish ul-Adl, “عید سعید فطر مبارک” [Happy Eid Saeed Fitr], Edaalat News (blog), July 5, 2016, 
http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2016/07/blog-post_38.html; Jaish ul-Adl, “ عید سعید فطر بر عموم مسلمین 
 ,Eid Saeed Fitr to the public of Mubarak Muslims], Edaalat News (blog), July 27, 2014] ”مبارک
http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2014/07/blog-post_27.html. 
139 
Jaish ul-Adl seems to identify its insurgency as one among a larger body of 
transnational Sunni militants. Woven into Jaish ul-Adl’s very first narratives are a 
transnational Sunni Islamism. Multiple analyses of the Jaish ul-Adl’s leadership have noted 
that the group’s chief executive, Salahuddin Farooqui, had a long-standing record of 
criticizing the Iranian government for their support of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in 
Syria.616 Jaish ul-Adl also stakes a large part of its identity in transnational sectarian 
dynamics relevant to Syria. Mention of the Iranian government’s sin was pervasive 
throughout Jaish ul-Adl’s early statements. Jaish ul-Adl cited Iranian support for Assad as 
a near-ubiquitous cause for a multitude of events; According to Jaish ul-Adl, it is one of 
the reasons Jaish ul-Adl conducts operations against Iran, accounts for the Iranian State’s 
failure to adequately respond to the 2012 earthquake in Northwestern Iran, and is 
tantamount to Chinese treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang province.617 In early claimed 
(albeit unconfirmed) attacks by Jaish ul-Adl in 2013, the organization repeatedly justifies 
themselves by citation of Iranian support for Assad.618 Furthermore, Jaish ul-Adl’s first 
avowed strike against the Iranian government, in October 2013, was conducted jointly as 
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retribution for the plight of the Iranian Baluch, as well as for the alleged atrocity and 
“massacre” that the IRGC had committed in Syria.619  
There are significant drawbacks which can arise from insurgent groups seeking to 
place their foundational identity on transnational issues. According to Barbara Gruber and 
Jan Pospisil, “successful revolutionary collective action” requires strong, and cohesive 
“identity formation” among insurgents and their supporters, and the strength of collective 
identity is one primary determinant in “the resilience of insurgent organizations.”620 
Examining the case of the ELN, Gruber and Pospisil note that identity is normally grounded 
in intermingling conceptualizations of “ethnicity, nationality ... or religion.”621 Gruber and 
Pospisil’s study shows, however, that insurgent identities cannot at once have predominant 
elements of trans-ethnic or trans-national and local ethnic and religious elements which 
occupy the same space simultaneously, one or the other must be primary. They argue that 
the ELN’s resilience is only generated by completely subverting and erasing previous 
elements of identity among insurgents, to include those previously mentioned.622 The ELN 
could not claim insurgency identity against Colombia on ethnic, religious, or national lines, 
so their identity was born out of necessity, as opposed to tactical decision for favorable 
circumstances,.623 William Mackinlay further expands on how identity politics can 
confound the insurgent’s identity can confound and impede resonance with local 
populations. In modern insurgencies, Mackinlay identifies a growing number of what he 
terms “globalized insurgents,” militants “animated by Pan-Islamic issues and shared 
strategic narratives.”624 Mackinlay argues that for the globalized insurgent, “nationality is 
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irrelevant” and the “cause has a more universal character,” one that doesn’t necessarily 
place “the need to protect a tribal interest or overthrow a particular regime,” as primary in 
terms of the objectives of an insurgency.625 Mackinlay concludes that heavy and frequent 
inclusion of a the globalized insurgent mindset is risky to the effective resonance of 
insurgent groups’ objectives, as well as how well its own identity is perceived as matching 
those of the population, simply because transnational consciousnesses inherently do not 
carry sufficiently tailored “ambitions for the local population and its locally influenced 
version of Islam.”626  
Jaish ul-Adl has a significant historic claim to the Baluch nationalist and ethnic 
causes inside of Iran, one that significantly predates Jundallah. One of Jaish ul-Adl’s two 
leaders, Mullah Omar, is the former leader of the 1990s and early 2000s militant 
organization called Sipah-e-Rasoolah, which was absorbed into Jundallah’s command and 
control structure in 2006 amidst a struggle to maintain itself in terms of personnel and 
funding.627 Mullah Omar is also the brother of Maula Bux Darakhshan, Abdolmalek Rigi’s 
mentor, as well as the first commander the Jundallah leader served under.628 
Instead, Mullah Omar’s relation to earlier Baluch insurgencies has been suppressed, 
and instead the Jaish ul-Adl narrative focuses on a leader whose identity falls far more in 
line with Mackinlay’s globalized insurgent. Though Mullah Omar is believed to be one of 
Jaish ul-Adl’s two leaders, he receives just a fraction of attention that Jaish ul-Adl’s other 
leader, Salahuddin Farooqi.629 Farooqi falls well into Mackinlay’s classification of a 
“globalized insurgent.”630 Until Jaish ul-Adl’s creation, Farooqi’s renown came not 
necessarily from his championing of Iranian Baluch causes, but for his opposition to 
Iranian involvement in Syria.631 While Mullah Omar is barely mentioned in organizational 
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releases and statements by Jaish ul-Adl, Farooqi has released periodic messages to the 
organization’s followers and supporters, identifying himself as the head of the 
organization.632 Moreover, his statements have frequently focused on the Iranian Baluch 
struggle in relation to Syria, as well as other Iranian Sunni minorities, rather than 
containing content on the Baluch identity itself.633  
Though Sectarianism plays a part in the underlying tensions between the Iranian 
Baluch and their ethnically Persian governance, that sectarianism is by no means the 
predominant, nor the largest source of tension. Writing in 1981, Harrison notes that the 
strongest contemporary source of friction between the Iranian government and the Baluch 
communities in Sistan-Baluchistan falls not along sectarian, but ethnic fault lines; the 
Baluch grievances against the Iranian government have powerful undercurrents of “racial 
hostility,” and the sheer degree and viciousness of this animosity dwarfs that between the 
Pakistani Baloch and their “Punjabi overlords.”634 Per Carina Jahani , the Baluch language 
and culture, and policies and practices by the government which threaten the preservation 
and continuation of that culture and language, is the primary driver which could motivate 
the Baluch populations’ movements toward “more insurgencies and increased demands for 
political determinations.”635 
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Juxtaposing the Baluch with other Arab ethnicities has not been successful 
insurgent narrative in the past. Harrison notes that attempts to link Baluch autonomy and 
nationalist movements to a greater spectrum of non-Baluch kinsman have proven 
destructively “divisive in the past.”636 A narrative of Baluch identity which grounds itself 
on identification as sectarian or an Arab-Persian divide is highly contested, and is but one 
of three Baluch nationalist schools of thought on Baluch origins, the other two arguing that 
the Baluch originated in Babylon, and the “Aryan tribes” of Asia Minor, respectively.637 
Per Harrison, the narrative of Baluch origin as kinsman of Arabs, particularly Sunni Arabs 
only gained significant attention once “the Khomeini regime” generated sufficient Arab 
nation concerns for their own security.638 Baluch culture and language predates Islam, as 
well as the subsequent sectarian divides by as much as a millennium, since Baluch language 
is estimated to have arisen somewhere between 700 and 200 B.C., and bears more 
similarities to Persian than it does Arabic.639 
Conceptualizations of Baluch as one of many kinship insurgents throughout the 
Middle East has proven ineffective in the past. Ahmed Reza Taheri provides one of the 
historical examples of this disunity creating fragmentation and rejection by the Baluch 
populations. As Taheri’s historical characterization provides, the Baluchistan People’ 
Democratic Organization, formed in early 1980, was an organization which integrated 
Baluch intelligentsia with a larger group of “leftist Persians” to “broaden its base of 
support.”640 Harrison also frames the ideology of the movement along the same intentions, 
with the BPDO’s charter and early actions being specifically designed for Baluch 
nationalism “to make common cause with like-minded elements in other parts of Iran.”641 
In attempting to broaden their potential base of support and create a common denominator 
 
636 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, 11. 
637 Harrison, 10. 
638 Harrison, 121.  
639 Philip Carl Salzman, “Book Review: Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini 
by Rasmus Christian Elling,” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 6, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 215–216. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2015.1050625.  
640 Taheri, The Baloch in Post-Islamic Revolution Iran, 118. 
641 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, 117. 
144 
with other independence groups, the BPDO alienated a significant portion of the Iranian 
Baluch, because it stressed messages and themes which were neither resonant or relevant 
to Baluch cultures and identity. According to Taheri the Marxist influences and undertones 
ensured that the BPDO was “doomed to failure,” because the social, economic, and tribal 
structuring of Baluch communities was incongruous with the “class struggle” identity 
politics that Persian Marxists, since there were few, if any industrialized areas in 
Baluchistan in 1980.642 Furthermore, the BPDO expressly moved to reduce the influence 
or religious clerics and tribal leaders, which proved highly controversial, and ultimately 
significant unpopular throughout more conservative Baluch circles.643 
Jundallah’s approach to sectarian issues serve as a cautionary tale for Jaish ul-Adl 
and other Baluch groups seeking to base narratives on a sectarian divide. Abdolmalek 
Rigi’s actions reflect an understanding that excessive emphasis on sectarian and trans-
ethnic issues cost him support among the Iranian Baluch, and a need to re-center the 
movement around the Baluch identity. As early as April 2008, when the Dan Rather-
produced interviews aired, Abdolmalek Rigi was rejecting characterization of himself as 
religious extremist; instead, he argues that Jundallah fights for the Baluch “rights as 
humans, ... beliefs, ... nationality,” and ultimately, “identity” which is in conflict with 
religious extremists in control of Iran.644 In early 2009, Abdolmalek Rigi and his inner 
circle changed the official name of their organization from Jundallah, which means 
“Soldiers of God,” to “The Baloch People’s Resistance Movement of Iran.”645 As Ahmed 
Reza Taheri describes, the group’s resignation was likely encouraged by Baluch 
intelligentsia in exile, who based on their own insurgent and separatist experiences, were 
concerned that growing fundamental and transnational themes woven into Jundallah’s 
narrative made the insurgency less appealing for both internal and international support.646 
Zambelis’s assessment of Jundallah’s re-designation similarly concludes that this measure 
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was enacted to distance Jundallah from unpopular extremist ideologies.647 Per Zambelis, 
Rigi “framed Jundallah’s struggle as a fight for freedom and human rights.”648 Rigi’s 
commitment to this narrative was deep enough that he wrote open letters to President 
Barack Obama, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan 
in late 2009 portraying this identity.649 Per Zambelis, it is only after Abdolmalek Rigi’s 
removal from organizational leadership, due to his arrest and subsequent execution, that 
Jundallah fully embarked on the “incremental resort to sectarian-imbued rhetoric against 
Shi`a Islam.” 650 Zambelis argues that this full embrace of sectarian divide, which linked 
Jundallah’s struggle to other Sunni groups inside and outside Iran was Jundallah’s self-
inflicted hobbling, precisely because it “appeared to lend credence” to Iranian assertions 
that Jundallah was linked to both Al Qaeda and the Taliban, thereby discrediting the 
insurgency.651 Moreover, Jaish ul-Adl and other current Baluch insurgents appear destined 
to repeat these mistakes. As Zambelis indicates, and this thesis’s research has illustrated 
above, Jaish ul-Adl is an organization that unlike its predecessor, fully places “radical 
Salafism,” as the central basis of Post-Jundallah “Baluch militancy.”652  
3. Tribalism 
At the time Harrison wrote on the Baluch, there were at least 17 major Baluch 
tribes, with as many as 400 “tribal subgroupings.”653 These heavy tribal elements of 
Baluch society and communities affect every aspect of politics, economics and other 
matters in the Sistan-Baluchistan province of Iran, and insurgency and counterinsurgency 
is by no means immune to that phenomenon. 
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In creation and coalescence of a movement to sufficiently combat, oppose, and 
possibly eventually gain concession from the Iranian government, there are significant fault 
lines within Baluch culture and society that may serve as fragmentation between that 
coalescence. Harrison notes that historically, the Iranian Baluch tribes have fiercely 
defended their independence, often refusing to cooperate with larger Baluch unification 
movements. In the 1750s, though Nasir Khan conquered large swaths of Iranian Baluch 
tribal lands, the ground truth of the matter was that “the freewheeling Iranian Baluch Tribes 
were a law unto themselves.”654 Furthermore, Harrison’s analysis is that the tribalism 
inside of Iran is particularly resistant to any unification efforts, with Iranian Baluch to date 
having never been “able to produce a unified political or military grouping on their own,” 
and instead movements which have sought a unified front have often at best had a “shaky” 
and tenuous grip on the tribes of Iranian Baluchistan.655 
In the last century, this tribalism has contributed to divisions where the tribes and 
regional Baluch concentrations diverge in the degree and way they are opposed to the 
Iranian government, and this has given way to intra-Baluch conflict. Audun Kolstad Wiig 
mentions that the Baluch tribes went to war with each other in 1916; while the Gamshadzais 
and Ismailzais formed an alliance to repel British invasion against Britain, the Rigi tribe 
sided with the British against them.656 Previously mentioned in Chapter IV, Stéphane 
Dudoignon’s analysis is that the Rigi tribe have by and large cooperated with the Iranian 
government since 1979.657 Harrison mentions that since the 1979 Islamic Revolution some 
tribes have sought to independently come to arrangements with the Iranian government 
independent of larger Baluch nationalist or autonomy groups, with “limited success,” while 
other tribes have pursued “autonomy or independence through military struggle.”658 In the 
1990s and early 2000s, there was frequent Baluch on Baluch violence in Iran based on 
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tribal rivalry and grievance.659 According to Dudoignon, between 1993 and 2001, at least 
four feuds broke out along tribal lines, resulting in significant hostility and at times all out-
armed inter-tribal conflict.660 Settling these rivalries drained insurgency efforts, since 
fighting one another leaves less room to oppose the Iranian government. These inter-tribal 
rivalries have continued into the contemporary era and it is likely that they have been 
realities that Jundallah, Jaish ul-Adl and other insurgent groups have been forced to 
contend with. For example, Zambelis’ research on Jundallah indicates that “tribal 
dynamics” created significant tension internal to the organization which affected the 
organization “on multiple levels.”661 
B. THE GROWING INVOLVEMENT OF THE IRGC 
The Iranian government’s single most impactful change between 2003 and the 
present to their COIN approach against insurgency in Sistan-Baluchistan has been the 
ascription of the IRGC as the absolute final authority for all COIN against the Baluch. 
Following a series of Jundallah attacks, the IRGC lobbied, and successfully gained 
complete control over Sistan-Baluchistan in 2009. Initially, IRGC general Noor-Ali 
Shushtari possessed power over Sistan-Baluchistan to the extent that Saira Basit called him 
a “de-facto czar” of the province.662 The IRGC’s level of control and involvement in 
Sistan-Baluchistan security matters only grew after Shushtari and others were killed during 
a planning meeting in Pishin in late 2009.663 From Pishin onward, the IRGC has kept and 
maintained effective authoritative control over all of Sistan-Baluchistan into the present at 
the time this thesis is being written. This assumption of IRGC control and absolute 
involvement in COIN has also coincided with the decline of Iranian Baluch insurgency, to 
include the significantly improved COIN approach Iran has adopted, as discussed in 
Chapter IV.  
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The IRGC has successfully led the implementation of improved COIN operations 
against Baluch insurgents because it possesses a formidable and unique set of resources, 
experience, and expertise, which will be discussed in detail in this section. The IRGC’s 
assumption of control in Sistan-Baluchistan coincided with heightened levels of unrest 
nationwide, which likely influenced Iranian decision-makers toward a lower level of 
tolerance with respect to Baluch insurgency. Additionally, by declaring the IRGC as the 
absolute authority over all COIN matters, inter-service rivalry between government 
organizations was greatly reduced as an impediment of previous COIN efforts. The IRGC, 
as a unique, unconventional organization is well-suited to handle COIN, and its history and 
experience against other insurgency and unrest inside of Iran before 2003 demonstrates 
that it is well-equipped to combat the Baluch insurgency. The IRGC also possesses 
significant financial and political advantages which make it well-suited to combat the 
Baluch insurgency, and has unique industrial and telecommunications influences which 
have proven salutary to COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan. Finally, in reviewing the demise of 
Jundallah and subsequent developments in Baluch insurgency, it is argued that IRGC 
involvement has had a significant influence on these events, specifically toward obtaining 
outcomes which have been positive to Iranian COIN. 
1. Assumption of IRGC Command and Political Considerations 
The IRGC’s assumption of absolute, dominant command over Sistan-Baluchistan, 
especially pertaining to Jundallah and other Baluch insurgent groups, did not occur in a 
vacuum. The IRGC’s movements to assume wider degrees of autonomy and control in 
Sistan-Baluchistan coincided with a nationwide expansion of their power, capabilities and 
overall authorities. As Udit Banerjea details, Ayatollah Khamenei “consolidated” a 
multitude of intelligence and security agency functions under the IRGC in response to the 
2009 Green Movement, a nationwide protest against presidential election results perceived 
to be fraudulent and illegitimate.664 Concerned over a widespread opposition movement 
which potentially could “threaten the legitimacy of the clerical regime,” Khamenei granted 
the IRGC expanded, sweeping powers which effectively allowed the IRGC to assume 
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dominance over the MOIS and other security organizations.665 Simultaneously, the IRGC 
was expanding its leverage and grip on power. While the IRGC and Basij were tasked with 
suppressing and dismantling election backlash, they also were expanding their own power 
in ways relevant to COIN. For example, Iran purchased the controlling stake of the national 
telecommunications company, which is discussed in Section B.5 of this chapter, in 
November 2009.666 
To ascribe the IRGC’s assumption of command exclusively as a function of 
nationwide unrest would be flawed. To begin with, the decision for the IRGC to assume 
command of COIN operations in Sistan-Baluchistan predates the unrest resultant of the 
election. According to Basit, the order for the IRGC to assume absolute control of Sistan-
Baluchistan occurred in April 2009.667 The presidential elections, and subsequent 
nationwide protests which the IRGC was tasked with suppressing were in June 2009.668 
By that time, according to Basit, IRGC Deputy Ground Force Commander Noor-Ali 
Shushtari was already well on his way to becoming the “de facto tsar of Sistan-
Baluchistan.”669 Second, the April mobilization of the IRGC into Sistan-Baluchistan 
reflects an Iranian assessment that Baluch insurgency in its own right provided a significant 
threat to Iranian national security interests. According to Basit, the flooding of forces into 
Sistan-Baluchistan in April 2009 reflected the IRGC being “put on the defensive,” to an 
extent unprecedented since the Iran-Iraq War.670  
However, to discount or downplay the interconnectedness of an increased degree 
to which national unrest and dissent groups have become a focal point for IRGC following 
the 2009 election and their expanded involvement in COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan would 
be flawed; instead, it is likely that more resources, attention, and personnel have been 
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allocated toward Jundallah and other Baluch insurgencies because the increased unrest 
inside of Iran has caused the state to take the threat of these groups more seriously. As M. 
Mahtab Alam Rizvi notes, the IRGC’s primary, immediately urgent task in 2009 was 
“silencing” The protests and opposition movements which exploded and flourished in the 
wake of the election.671 In the midst of this suppression of opposition, Jundallah carried 
out the Pishin bombing, which at the time, was their worst attack to date, killing almost 50 
people.672 The attack directly impacted the state as well as the IRGC’s reputation, since at 
least five IRGC generals, including Shushtari, were killed.673 In the midst of national 
unrest, the IRGC thus suffered a significant blow to its top leadership, as well as its 
reputation. Following the attack, and amidst repeated national protests over the election, 
the IRGC announced and implemented further expansion of its power and authority in 
Sistan-Baluchistan.674 The growing nationwide unrest since 2009 has likely driven the 
IRGC to take a more aggressive and comprehensive approach to COIN in Sistan-
Baluchistan precisely because it is concurrent with elevated levels of internal dissent 
against the clerical regime which the IRGC supports above all else. Another series of mass 
protests occurred from 2011-2012.675 Amidst widespread unrest, the efficacy of the IRGC 
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as a security organization has become more important, and thus their performance in 
Sistan-Baluchistan toward quelling insurgency has become more reflective on their 
performance and reputation as a security organization overall. 
2. Unity and Cohesion of Command 
Iranian COIN in the Jundallah era was tactically and operationally incoherent, 
caused by endemic differences in agenda, political alliance, capability and operational 
behavior among the Iranian security apparatuses. Within Iranian security services, 
counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism apparatuses, there are a multitude of 
organizations, each with their own specific focus, political machinations, and approaches 
to COIN. As discussed in Chapter II, there are four security institutions which combat 
insurgents and terrorists in Iran: The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), the law 
enforcement element, referred to as NAJA, the conventional military (Artesh) and the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).676 As Tabatabai notes, there is no default, 
clear-cut division of labor between these organizations at a national nor local level; with 
“overlapping agendas and mandates,” The four elements of the security organization often 
respond to threats in uncoordinated, and counterproductive ways.677 This “disorder and 
lack of effective communication” often gives way to an undermining, if not unraveling of 
internal strategies and counteroffensives.678  
Organizational overlap and competition created discord which undercut the 
effectiveness of Iranian COIN toward Baluch insurgents. In the early years of Jundallah, 
Iranian security groups and their proponents fought among one another, and sought to 
blame each other for the string of Baluch insurgent attacks. Following the May 2006 
Tasooki massacre, the Attorney General of Iran criticized MOIS and local NAJA forces 
for their inability to forestall Jundallah’s consecutive attacks.679 The deputy speaker of the 
Iranian Parliament went further, calling MOIS and NAJA incompetent, and suggesting that 
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the IRGC and Basij take over the responsibility of Jundallah’s pursuit.680 Similar rhetoric 
emerged after the February 2007 Zahedan bombing; the Parliamentary representative from 
Zahedan faulted poor performance of the Artesh and NAJA for permitting Jundallah to 
strike.681  
Following the 2009 IRGC takeover of Sistan-Baluchistan, relevant security force 
outlooks, and public statements carry a heavier tone of inter-agency cooperation. For 
example, a 2017 seizure of a Jaish ul Adl arms cache stressed that “coordinated efforts” 
between agencies led to operational success.682 Similarly, reporting on the aftermath of 
the February 2019 Jaish ul-Adl bus bombing clearly demonstrates that local police forces 
were conducting investigations alongside MOIS, and the information these investigations 
obtained was acted upon by the IRGC Qods force.683 This same spirit of cohesion is 
stressed as one of the critical underpinnings which contributed to the successful return of 
the 2014 Jaish ul-Adl hostages, evinced by comments of NAJA head Brigadier General 
Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam that “cooperation among the Islamic Revolution Guards 
Corps, the Police Force, the Intelligence Ministry and the diplomatic apparatus,” remained 
the critical element to securing Border Guards’ release.”684 
3. Unconventional Organization: The IRGC’s COIN Pedigree 
The U.S. DoD COIN Manual states that insurgency, by its nature, requires a highly 
tailored response, “often requiring specialized training and development of new 
capabilities or modifications to existing ones.”685 Therefore, military, security, and police 
forces often experience shortfalls in formulating COIN approaches. Military arms often 
struggle to adjust to COIN paradigms because COIN consists of a “different set of tasks 
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and capabilities than those required in traditional warfare.”686 Similarly, conventional 
police and security organizations often find their COIN expertise incomplete because 
effective COIN requires both “interagency initiatives” and tailored operations which fall 
outside their “traditional” areas of expertise.687  
When the IRGC was designated by Khamenei as the supreme authority for Sistan-
Baluchistan toward defeating Baluch insurgency, it placed a definitively unorthodox 
organization at the COIN helm. As Anthony Cordesman and Martin Kleiber describe, the 
IRGC is a definitively “unconventional” organization.688 Rather than a traditional police, 
military, or security organization, Ariane Tabatabai notes the IRGC’s primary function is 
specifically tailored to function as a “mosaic defense” to counter internal threats to the 
regime, which she argues is why they are Iran’s best institution for COIN.689 Afshon 
Ostovar describes the IRGC as organizationally “multifaceted,” at once functioning as a 
“security service ... intelligence organization, a social and cultural force, and a complex 
industrial and economic conglomerate.”690 Additionally, per Tabatabai, the IRGC has an 
unparalleled level of “firsthand experience with guerilla tactics” that Iranian forces 
frequently encounter in Baluchistan and other insurgent border areas; there are IRGC units 
dedicated to “irregular, asymmetric, unconventional, and guerrilla warfare tactics,” 
specifically designed to “ counter technologically and conventionally superior 
adversaries.”691 
The IRGC is at once both an insurgent and a counterinsurgent organization, which 
makes it uniquely poised compared to other organizations when executing COIN missions. 
While the IRGC in modernity is best known for its involvement in foreign affairs, as 
Wehrey et al. note, the IRGC’s founding charter “accorded primacy to an internal role,” 
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countering those who opposed the Islamic Republic.692 Reviewing the purview of the 
IRGC as originally specified by the Revolutionary Council, the first two tasks listed, as 
well as at least four of the eight overall categories of IRGC authority pertain to countering 
insurgency and opposition inside of Iran.693 The IRGC’s expertise and effectiveness at 
security is also bolstered further through its experience from the insurgent perspective. Per 
Afshon Ostovar, the IRGC also has a deep history of supporting, training, equipping, and 
cooperating a multitude of foreign “terrorists, nonstate actors, militias, insurgents,” and 
other dissent groups.694  
The IRGC is the organization among Iranian security apparatuses with the longest, 
most diverse history with internal COIN, both inside Baluchistan, as well as throughout 
the entire country. In addition to being the force which is most organizationally oriented 
toward COIN, Ariane Tabatabai argues that the IRGC is by far the most “effective.”695 
Operating outside “the sphere and jurisdiction of the regular police and army forces,” early 
IRGC operations effectively countered and eliminated insurgencies with trans-nationalist 
ideologies, such as the MEK, Monarchy restorationists, and the Tudeh Party.696 The 
IRGC’s pedigree also involves COIN experience with ethnic insurgencies. Per Ostovar, 
soon after its establishment in 1979 the IRGC had established COIN units in regions of 
Iran where ethnic militancy and insurgency were present, to include Khuzestan, 
Kermanshah, and areas with higher levels of Turkmen and Kurdish populations.697 
Pertaining to the Baluch, the IRGC has also been the functional organization which put 
down insurgent and nationalist movements that preceded Jundallah. Ostovar, Dudoignon, 
and Harrison all confirm that the IRGC since 1979 has had COIN and anti-nationalist units 
in Sistan-Baluchistan which have attempted to neutralize, oftentimes violently ethnically 
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Baluch opposition movements.698 Per Dudoignon, in late 1979 and early 1980, the IRGC 
also conducted COIN operations against a resurgent Baluch Liberation Front, eventually 
killing their leader.699 
4. Funding and Influence 
Over time, the IRGC has become the most authoritative and powerful organization 
in Iran when concerned with security and COIN matters. As Roozbeh Safshekan and 
Farzan Sabet note, the IRGC, since 1997 has executed the exact same missions as the 
MOIS, Artesh, and NAJA, having “arrayed itself” as an organization which “paralleled” 
The other security organizations largely as defense and countermeasure to reform-minded 
politics that were swept in with the election of President Khatami in 1995.700 Over time, 
the IRGC has “usurped” The primacy in authority as well as expertise of the other security 
organizations, and can be considered from 2003 to the present as Iran’s unparalleled 
“premier security institution.”701 Moreover, as Ali Afoneh notes, the IRGC compared with 
other military and security organizations has an unapparelled “commanding influence over 
political decision-making,” and this influence has only expanded further since 2009.702 
In terms of political, financial, and personnel considerations, the IRGC stands 
above its security apparatus counterparts in Iran. The IRGC, compared to other Iranian 
security organizations, possesses a degree of autonomy and independence that the other 
security organizations simply cannot compete with. While the IRGC was established, and 
for all intents and purposes remains “an independent security force, reporting directly to 
the Supreme Leader,” The MOIS, NAJA, and Artesh are more entrenched and accountable 
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to governmental bureaucracy, ultimately accountable through their ministry heads to “the 
president of Iran, who is elected by the people.”703 Financially, the IRGC has larger coffers 
than the other organizations involved in security. In 2019, for example, the IRGC’s 
operating budget was larger than the combined budgets of the NAJA and the Artesh.704 
This disparity in funding is understated, because the IRGC also has access to additional 
funding through its connections to large sectors of the economy, as well as IRGC’s 
purported de facto control of “Iran’s Shadow Economy.”705 Considering personnel, the 
IRGC in general stands above its counterparts. As detailed by Ali Afoneh, the IRGC 
generally “has the first pick of potential recruits,” which combined with the IRGC’s 
superior prospects of compensation and careers, generally has skewed the talent pool in the 
direction of IRGC center of gravity.706 
5. Industrial Factors 
The IRGC internally possesses a multitude of industrial connections useful as 
support to COIN. Since the IRGC either “directly or indirectly” controls significant 
companies and conglomerates in “most sectors of the economy,” it can utilize its resources 
effectively toward achieving short and long-term COIN objectives almost without 
coordination. It is likely that the IRGC’s connections with industry played a significant 
part in the sped, efficacy, and exhaustive comprehensiveness with which the state was able 
to produce increased physical security measures on the Ian-Pakistan border. As mentioned 
in Chapter IV, plans to construct an enhanced border between Iran and Pakistan wall have 
been discussed and in progress since at least the year 2000. Moreover, reports by Al Jazeera 
indicate that the physical wall in its current from began construction as early as 2007.707 
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However, as of 2008 the border wall project remained largely stalled out, according to Al 
Jazeera reports, with the majority of the border “having no defense at all.”708 However, 
following the IRGC’s assumption of COIN and Sistan-Baluchistan command and control 
in general in 2009, the Iranian construction and engineering conglomerate Khatam-al 
Anbiya was awarded the exclusive contract to construct, and enhance the physical security 
barriers at Iran’s Eastern Borders.709 Khatam-al Anbiya is in fact controlled and run by the 
IRGC.710 Functioning as a hand-in-hand military industrial complex, the IRGC has thus 
leveraged the construction and consistent border upkeep of the physical barriers at the 
border. 
6. Narrative Resources  
One of the underpinnings of successful COIN David Kilcullen discussed in his 
2010 book Counterinsurgency was the need to “get the press onside” with COIN efforts, 
specifically because of the fact that such a relationship allows “dramatically” increases a 
COIN operation’s capacity to convey its narrative and messaging to both “global and local 
audience.”711 In addition to having a network of sympathetic and cooperative media 
outlets who can produce news and information that create effective COIN messaging, 
sufficiently comprehensive, and dominant means of delivery that reach relevant audiences 
is also critical for COIN messaging to be effective. As William Mackinlay discusses in the 
Insurgent Archipelago, previous arrangements between the counterinsurgent and friendly 
media sources may no longer be sufficient to control and dominated the narrative aspects 
of the insurgent-counterinsurgent struggle for population support.712 In part, this 
insufficiency is due to the fact that the press, and subsequently information operations 
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designed to win over a population, is no longer dominated by the purview of journalism. 
“Open source networks” with “user-generated content” have produced a “flood of 
information, pouring into the new consumer-generated pool.”713 Mackinlay calls this 
phenomenon “information anarchy,” and believes that in open-source media this “favours” 
The insurgent over the counterinsurgent because it is nigh impossible for the COIN “single 
strategic narrative” to resonate.714 Unless a COIN narrative has a means for successfully 
applying “information controls” to user-generated content and “mass communications,” it 
seems Mackinlay believes that this dynamic is something most contemporary COIN efforts 
will be forced to contend with.715 
The IRGC’s capacity to produce media in a manner which is both horizontally and 
vertically integrated is unparalleled inside of Iran, making it ideal to not only produce, but 
consistently and comprehensively disseminate unified messages for effect, and is uniquely 
poised to craft, disseminate, and control the flow of information relevant to COIN inside 
of Iran. The IRGC has significant media connection and influence, and as a result is able 
to keep the media “on side.”716 As Frederic Wehrey et al., as well as Afshon Ostovar both 
note, the IRGC has a high level of horizontal integration when it comes to press and media 
production inside of Iran. The IRGC directly controls several press and media sources, to 
include the website and weekly magazine Sobh-E-Sadegh, The Basij News Agency, and 
Sepah News.717 The IRGC maintains additional informal networks of press ties through 
major Iranian media companies either owned or headed by former IRGC officials, 
including the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting news conglomerate, Keyhan 
newspapers and their subsidiaries, Fars News Agency, Tasnim News Agency, Sepah News, 
and web-based news services such as Tabnak.718 The IRGC also is insulated against the 
“torrent of blogs and imagery” which makes up Mackinlay’s “information anarchy,” 
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precisely because the IRGC is the one controlling the floodgates and the subsequent flow 
of that information.719 Until October 2018, the IRGC held majority ownership in Iran’s 
largest telecommunications conglomerate, Iranian Telecommunications Company (TCI), 
as well as Iran’s largest cell phone provider, Hamrah Avval.720 As of 2015, TCI was the 
primary internet service provider to 40.1 million Iranians, more than half of the entire 79.5 
million Iranian population at the time.721 At that time, ITC had more than 63 million 
mobile phone subscriptions, accounting for more than 75 percent of the Iranian 
population.722 Especially as the company integrates, by some estimates TCI and MCI, as 
Mohammed Reza Azali puts it, will all but “control the data and the fixed and wireless 
communications” across all of Iran, if they do not do so already.723 
7. The Demise of Jundallah, Revisited  
As discussed in Chapter IV, Jundallah’s ultimate end as an official organization 
began in 2010 with arrest and subsequent execution of Abdolmalek Rigi. Rigi’s arrest and 
execution, as well as Jundallah’s eventual disbandment comes after the IRGC assumes 
absolute control in Sistan-Baluchistan.  
The actual ground truth of how Rigi was apprehended is debated, with the IRGC 
and the Iranian state recounting one version of events, while Pakistan, the United States, 
and the majority of the international community claiming a different sequence of events as 
to the pathway by which Abdolmalek Rigi wound up in IRGC custody. According to the 
Iranian version of events, the IRGC and other Iranian intelligence organizations had been 
tracking Abdolmalek Rigi’s movements for months, and when a private plane that Rigi, 
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with a forged Afghan passport was traveling on from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan crossed into 
Iranian airspace, Iranian forces forced the plane to land, boarded it, and apprehended 
Rigi.724 The second version, which the majority of international experts endorse, is that 
Pakistani intelligence services apprehended and then covertly handed Rigi over to Iranian 
authorities.  
Regardless of what version corresponds to the ground truth of the arrest, the arrest 
of Abdolmalek Rigi is in fact one of the early successes of the IRGC-led COIN operations 
against Baluch militants. If the Iranian version corresponds to the actual truth of events, 
then it reflects effective intelligence garnered by a synergy between organizations which 
can be attributed to Iranian assumption of absolute authority in Sistan-Baluchistan. If 
Pakistani entities were the ones who apprehended and extradited Rigi, it reflects an 
opening, initial progress of Iran’s post-Jundallah approach of leveraging Pakistani action 
to attack Baluch insurgents. Either way, the IRGC-led COIN approaches at least partial 
credit for Rigi winding up in Iranian custody. 
Though the arrest and execution of Rigi cannot be considered a death blow for 
Baluch insurgent groups, it certainly helped create the environment of fragmentation and 
competition between insurgent groups described above, and if such tactics were 
successfully incorporated into the Post-Jundallah approach they may prove beneficial to 
the IRGC-led COIN of Sistan-Baluchistan. As described in Section B of this chapter, since 
Rigi’s death and Jundallah’s disbandment, there has been competition between splinter 
groups for succession of the insurgency. These parallel, competing, and noncooperative 
Baluch insurgent groups operating in Iran all contain key leadership from Jundallah’s inner 
circle, and multiple groups seek to stress their relationship with Rigi as their justification 
as the rightful successor to Jundallah. Moreover, an argument can be made that the 
decapitation approach Iran used against Jundallah was ineffective simply because it did not 
correctly or comprehensively remove Jundallah’s critical core. Indeed, the remnant leaders 
of Jundallah which survived the IRGC purges remain the driving forces behind the major 
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Baluch insurgent groups still operating in the region today. Mullah Omar, Jaish ul-Adl’s 
second in command, had a critical relationship with Jundallah’s Abdolamlek Rigi. Rigi’s 
brother, Abdul Rauf Rigi, played a critical role in Jaish ul-Adl’s leadership, as well as his 
own splinter insurgent group, while Rigi’s cousin, Abdol Sattar Rigi also is a critical leader 
of Jaish ul-Adl. Were these personnel remnants of the Jundallah organization more 
aggressively pursued after Rigi’s death, it may have proven to be a death blow for the 
overall insurgency. Moreover, removal of critical leadership from Jaish ul-Adl and other 
organizations in the current era could provide additional fragmentation which would divide 
insurgent groups even further to the Iranian state’s benefit. 
The IRGC-led operations against Baluch insurgent movements have capitalized on 
increasing sectarian elements of their own narratives. As discussed above, since the 
disbandment of Jundallah, sectarianism has taken the dominant, central role of identity 
politics and narrative for the Baluch insurgent groups inside Iran, absent any form of 
temperance. As Sectarianism has become the central thematic theme for Baluch insurgent 
groups, it has allowed Iran to more effectively cement insurgent groups such as Jaish ul-
Adl as associated with groups they identify as “takfiri” terrorist organizations.725 As 
Mehdi Khalaji describes, “takfir” is a negative epithet used to describe Muslim groups or 
ideologies that label Muslims who do not ascribe to their way of thinking as “apostates,” 
and believe that this apostasy justifies “harming or killing them.”726 Two prominent 
groups that Iran identifies as “takfiri” are the Islamic State and Al Qaeda.727 As Jaish ul-
Adl and other groups have increased the weight and frequency of their emphasis on 
sectarian divides, the now IRGC-led counter-narrative has capitalized on this development 
by using that emphasis to discredit the group further by associating it with widely 
unpopular transnational terrorist networks, such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. 
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Repeatedly, since 2012, Iranian state media has used the word “takfiri” to describe Jaish 
ul-Adl activity, and through that association, have been able to discredit the organization 
as “anti-Islamic” representing a line of ideology consistent with Al Qaeda and the Islamic 
State.728 
There is inherent windfall for Iranian COIN in framing Baluch insurgents as more 
strongly “takfiri” precisely because that association carries with it an implication that 
Baluch militants are terrorists, vice insurgents, which further discredits and downplays the 
degree to which they represent the will of the people. Per David Kilcullen, terrorism is 
“politically motivated violence ... conducted with the intention to coerce through fear.”729 
By contrast, Insurgency is a “popular movement that seeks to overthrow the status quo 
through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict and terrorism.”730 It is 
important to note that Kilcullen identifies terrorism as a “component” of insurgency. In so 
doing, it is implied that terrorism is somehow a narrower, less expansive problem to combat 
than insurgency. Moreover, per Kilcullen’s definition, terrorism does not include support 
of the population as a prerequisite and indicates interests which are designed to influence 
the population through negative reinforcement. Application of the “takfiri” label, enhanced 
by Baluch insurgents’ own identification toward sectarian narrative elements, thus adds 
credence to the long-held assertion that Baluch militant are “terrorists” vice insurgents. The 
more convincing this argument is, the easier it is for Iran to marginalize and downplay the 
degree to which Jaish ul-Adl and other Baluch insurgent groups are perceived as being 
popular and formidable. 
C. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has discussed that two primary factors have been at the root of the 
improvement in Iran’s COIN approach in Sistan-Baluchistan from 2003 to the present. 
 
728 “Iran Foiled 30 Bombings in Past Year: Intelligence Minister,” Tehran Times, April 22, 2017, 
NewsBank; “No Ground For Daesh Activities in Iran: IRGC Commander,” Iran Daily, July 20, 2016, 
NewsBank; “Iran: Saudi Arabia True ‘Godfather’ of Takfiri Terrorism,” Iran Daily, February 19, 2019, 
NewsBank. 
729 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 184.  
730 Kilcullen, 184. 
163 
First, since Jundallah’s disbandment, the Baluch insurgency has weakened significantly, 
adopting tactics, narratives, and policy which has been self-destructive, and resulted in 
fragmentation between insurgent groups, and isolation from the populations of Sistan-
Baluchistan. Second, the IRGC effectively took over all COIN efforts, as well as overall 
control of Sistan-Baluchistan, and in so doing has utilized its unique influence, resources, 
and experience to create and realize an improved COIN approach which appears to be 
containing, if not diminishing Baluch insurgent activity.  
The IRGC’s involvement in Sistan-Baluchistan is thus indicative of Iran’s greatest 
COIN advantages. It is the IRGC’s growing involvement in Sistan-Baluchistan which 
turned an ineffective, incoherent COIN approach into one which has reduced insurgent’s 
influence, effectiveness and operational capacity over time. The implications of the IRGC 
involvement in Iranian COIN, and how it pertains to overall Iranian security apparatuses 
will be discussed in the following, concluding chapter. 
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VI. THESIS CONCLUSION 
This thesis aimed to serve as an inquiry into the specific methods and strategy Iran 
has used in counterinsurgency against ethnic Baluch insurgents in Sistan-Baluchistan and 
assess the degree to which the Iranian COIN strategy has been successful against Baluch 
insurgent groups. This thesis found that Iran has developed default strategic responses 
which it has historically used to respond to all significant internal threats, insurgent and 
otherwise. Iran’s initial COIN approach to Baluch insurgents was mainly consistent with 
and derived from this default approach. However, Iran’s initial COIN approach was not 
compatible to the particular dynamics of the Baluch insurgency and the environments in 
which both Iranian COIN and the insurgency operated in, and as a result the initial Iranian 
COIN approach against Jundallah was ineffective, if not counterproductive. This thesis 
also found that Iran’s COIN approach in Sistan-Baluchistan has not been static, but has 
evolved over time. Iran’s COIN approach began to diverge from the largely default COIN 
response and became a fully tailored COIN strategy in the aftermath of Jundallah’s demise. 
This overhauled and remodeled strategy, based on an optimistic narrative and fundamental 
alterations to border security and Pakistani policy which had previously enabled the 
insurgency, has ultimately resulted in a successful Iranian COIN approach, which to date 
has contained, if not diminished the threat, growth, and future capacity for Baluch 
insurgency inside of Iran. Baluch insurgent groups represent an imperfect manifestation of 
insurgency, which ultimately has helped Iran’s prospects of successful COIN. Ultimately, 
the Iranian continued success in COIN against Baluch insurgent groups has been the result 
of the IRGC’s involvement in COIN efforts. 
The final chapter of this thesis will discuss the findings of this thesis research in 
detail. Next, the propositions, discussed in the introductory chapter, shall be evaluated. The 
implications, and relevant policy considerations related to the results of this thesis will be 
evaluated. Finally, this thesis will provide recommendations relevant to the IRGC and 
American COIN operations based on the findings of this research. 
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A. FINDINGS 
There have been many Baluch insurgencies and rebellions, and most of them have 
failed. History shows that there have been far more periods that the Baluch have been 
governed by outsiders than periods where they have governed themselves. Discussed in 
Chapter II, the efforts for Baluch autonomy over history have been categorized as failure, 
with few, short-lived aberrations of increased self-determination and autonomy for the 
Baluch. With this consideration, to date, the modern Baluch insurgency in Iran from 2003 
until the present represents the most recent manifestation of struggles for Baluch autonomy. 
To date, modern Baluch insurgent groups have failed to meet or achieve high-water marks 
of their predecessors, and the Iranian state, despite armed conflict and struggle, remains 
firmly in control of Sistan-Baluchistan. 
This thesis found that the Iranian COIN approach in Sistan-Baluchistan was 
initially ineffective at combatting the Baluch insurgent group Jundallah from 2003 to 2012. 
Iran’s overall COIN response to a to Jundallah had three critical failures which ultimately 
backfired, leading to a perpetuation, if not outright strengthening of the insurgency. First, 
Iran’s offensive COIN operations were centered around capturing or killing Jundallah’s 
leader, Abdolmalek Rigi. However, the removal of Rigi in the short term made Jundallah 
more violent and resulted in attacks by the organization that were far more devastating 
when compared with attacks during Rigi’s leadership. In the longer term, the remnants of 
the organization coalesced into significant insurgent groups which continued the 
insurgency. Iran’s attempt to decapitate Jundallah was executed too late, and failed to 
sufficiently capture the core leadership, which would prevent organizational survival. 
Though Jundallah initially consisted mainly of Rigi’s immediate family and close 
associates, the organization eventually grew to contain significant roots outside of Rigi’s 
familial, clan, and criminal ties. By Rigi’s capture in 2010 these roots were strong enough 
for Jundallah to continue in Rigi’s absence. The second critical error Iran made in response 
to Jundallah was a heavy-handed, comprehensive swift justice approach in Sistan-
Baluchistan, designed to emphasize the strength of Iranian state authority. Instead of 
reinforcing the state’s authority, Iran’s mass arrests, execution, and raids of alleged 
insurgent and terrorist targets failed to forestall Jundallah operationally, and resulted in 
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greater sources of grievance and unrest within the Baluch populations. The third critical 
error of Iran’s response to Jundallah was the emphatic, repetitive accusations of alleged 
U.S. support and assistance to Jundallah. Though they were intended to undermine 
Jundallah’s legitimacy, these accusations ultimately resulted in greater attention and 
prospects of support for Jundallah internationally, and domestically served to enhance 
Jundallah’s reputation and strengthen its appeal and prospects for growth and support. 
These actions, as outlined in Chapter II, were largely a failure because they were 
the default Iranian response, and not tailored specifically to the environment of Sistan-
Baluchistan nor the Baluch insurgent. Iran’s response to Jundallah perfectly fits Iran’s 
general patterns of behavior in responding to internal security threats. Chapter II outlines 
three distinct patterns of behavior with Iran’s responses to internal threats: labeling 
opposition groups as terrorists, heavy use of arrest, repression and law enforcement action, 
and blaming foreign powers for the overall unrest. Reviewing Iran’s response to Jundallah, 
all three of Iran’s critical errors correlate with these default actions. As discussed in detail 
in Chapter III, these responses did not consider, nor match well with the particular 
circumstances of the Sistan-Baluchistan environment, the particular properties and makeup 
of the insurgent groups, or the Baluch populations among whom insurgents and Iran 
compete for support in the counterinsurgent-insurgent struggle. 
As Chapter IV outlines, toward the end of Jundallah’s tenure Iran began to re-
evaluate, and remodel its COIN approach in Sistan-Baluchistan, with the result being a 
significantly improved COIN approach. Since Jundallah’s demise, attacks in Sistan-
Baluchistan have been far less deadly, and all but limited to the area within the immediate 
vicinity of the border. This improved COIN performance has correlated with a complete 
reconstitution of Iran’s COIN strategy in Sistan-Baluchistan. First, Iran has severely 
restricted insurgent’s cross-border access through overlapping layers of border security. 
Through the physical construction of a border wall, massive physical security and 
surveillance efforts along the border, increased deportation of Pakistanis, and border 
closures, Iran significantly restricted its vulnerability to insurgent attacks, reducing the 
means and opportunities by which insurgents could conduct meaningful, or significant 
operations against the Iranian state. Second, Iran has increased pressure on insurgents 
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beyond Iranian jurisdiction, using diplomatic, military, and economic leverage to persuade 
Pakistan to more aggressively pursue Iranian Baluch insurgents using Pakistani territory as 
refuge. Finally, Iran’s COIN narrative post-Jundallah has also improved drastically. Since 
2012, Iran has woven a narrative which above all else, consistently presents an optimistic 
outlook on Iranian control of Sistan-Baluchistan. This optimistic narrative stresses 
continuous improvements of security in Sistan-Baluchistan, framing both Iranian state and 
insurgent action as Iran security apparatus success. 
This thesis also found that the modern Baluch insurgent groups do not represent a 
particularly strong or formidable insurgency when compared with the power of the Iranian 
state; Iran’s capacity in the last 20 years to maintain absolute control of Sistan-Baluchistan 
despite virulent, violent insurgency was aided by the fact that modern Iranian Baluch 
insurgencies have flaws which significantly reduce their own resonance, capabilities, and 
potential popularity. As was demonstrated in Chapter V, the modern Baluch insurgencies, 
especially since the demise of Jundallah seem suffer from the same problems which have 
historically prevented Baluch nationalist movements from creating an enduring, sovereign 
state. First, the absence of a strong, unifying leader has created redundancy and competition 
which has been counterproductive to the insurgency. Second, modern Baluch insurgents, 
like some of their predecessors, have reduced their own appeal by emphasizing sectarian 
and transnational issues which likely do not resonate with a significant portion of the 
Iranian Baluch. Finally, longstanding tribal and clan rivalries have further unraveled 
potential insurgent cohesion.  
This thesis found that the Iranian improvement, and continued success at containing 
and defeating Baluch insurgency inside Sistan-Baluchistan province has been because of 
the IRGC. Since 2009, the IRGC’s wholesale assumption of control and responsibility for 
defeating insurgents has been at the core of Iran’s COIN improvement in Sistan-
Baluchistan. Succinctly, the IRGC’s vast economic, industrial, financing, political, 
military, and narrative resources, combined with the IRGC’s deep experiences and 
expertise at both insurgency and COIN present an enemy which Baluch insurgent groups 
have failed to effectively compete with in a consistent manner. More than any other factor 
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or phenomenon, the IRGC’s sweeping, pervasive involvement in countering Baluch 
insurgent groups explains the reduction of effectiveness in the Iranian Baluch insurgency.  
B. EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis 1, which is that Iran utilized a largely default response to dissent, rather 
than a COIN approach that was specifically tailored to the Baluch insurgency, proved 
partially correct in its characterization of the Iranian State behavior, but false in terms of a 
relationship of causation between Iran’s retention of power and employment of such an 
approach. Discussed in Chapter II, in Iran’s behavior toward internal opposition and 
insurgency, several patterns emerge in review of Iran’s tactical, narrative, and operational 
responses which combined form Iran’s apparent default approach to insurgency and 
internal threat: The abstention of distinguishing between insurgent and terrorist, 
widespread attempts to discredit insurgents by association with United States or other 
perceived foreign threats, and mass arrests, law enforcement, and offensive action in 
response to successful insurgent attacks. As discussed in Chapter III, these tactical, 
narrative, and operational patterns of behavior initially comprised the majority of Iran’s 
response to Baluch insurgency throughout the era of Jundallah. However, Chapter III 
demonstrated that these approaches did more harm than good to Iranian COIN efforts. 
Hypothesis 1’s prospects of accuracy in relation is further diminished by the experience of 
Iranian COIN following Jundallah’s demise, as discussed in Chapter IV. Higher levels of 
COIN success correlated with a strategy which distanced itself from the default Iranian 
responses, established in Chapter II. Rather than blaming foreign powers for the Baluch 
insurgency, the Post-Jundallah strategy represented a more muted association between 
Baluch insurgents and the United States. Rather than an outright admonishment and 
condemnation of Pakistan, Iran’s narrative elements stressed bilateral cooperation. Rather 
than using the default approach of mass arrest and law enforcement operations, Iran 
concentrated COIN operations on proactively denying insurgents access to targets of 
opportunity through increased border security.  
Hypothesis 2, which postulated that a combination of co-opting key Baluch leaders 
and targeting of specific high-level insurgents reduced insurgent groups’ capacity to act 
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and gain ground among the population, proved partially valid. This thesis produced no 
significant evidence that confirmed or denied that the Islamic Republic of Iran 
revolutionized the strength of positive relationships with Sunni or Baluch tribal elites as 
response to the rise of Jundallah, Jaish ul-Adl, and or other ethnic Baluch insurgencies 
active from 2003 to 2020. It could be argued that the positive relationships Iran cultivated 
with tribal and religious elites across Sistan-Baluchistan served as a bulwark to rises in 
insurgent support among Baluch populations. However, as Dudoignon describes, the 
relationships between the Iranian state and these elites significantly predate the rising threat 
of Jundallah and other Baluch groups. Per Dudoignon, Iran has cultivated these 
relationships for decades, and as such they cannot fully be considered a COIN approach or 
response to the Present Baluch insurgency.731 Moreover, the second half of the proposition 
proved false. As outlined in Chapter III, the removal of Abdolmalek Rigi and other critical 
Jundallah leadership may have contributed to Jundallah’s eventual demise, but it did not 
stop the insurgency because remnants of Jundallah quickly coalesced into other groups and 
continued the insurgency. In five years, from Jundallah’s 2005 attack to Rigi’s capture in 
2010, the center of gravity of Baluch insurgency evolved outside of the critical inner circle 
of leadership. An argument could be made that effective removal of key insurgent leaders, 
if done earlier in Jundallah’s life cycle may have proven more significant, but the highly 
hypothetical nature of this prospect dictates that its exploration lies well outside of the 
scope of this thesis. In addition, with the rise of Jaish ul-Adl’s Salahuddin Farooqi, a 
purported Jundallah member with no significant rank, a Baluch insurgent leader has 
emerged which in effect has replaced the critical leadership of Abdolmalek Rigi’s inner 
circle. 
Hypothesis 3, that the restrictive environment in Sistan-Baluchistan prevented or 
constrained insurgents from mounting offensives which could undermine or erode Iranian 
State control, proved false. First, rather than being a hindrance, insurgent groups used 
elements of the environment to their advantage. Discussed in Chapters III and IV, Jundallah 
and early post-Jundallah insurgent groups specifically used the barren, vast terrain to slip 
 
731 Dudoignon, The Baluch, Sunnism and the State in Iran, 30, 269. 
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into Iranian territory, conduct attacks, and then retreat back across the border into Pakistani. 
In addition, the implied irrelevance of Iranian COIN with respect to the environmental 
effects on the insurgency also proved false. As discussed in Chapter IV, a major pillar of 
Iran’s successful COIN approach after Jundallah’s demise was that it physically altered the 
border terrain between Iran and Pakistan, constructing overlapping measures of physical 
security, to constrict cross-border access. The successful execution of altering the physical 
terrain as a means of COIN renders proposition 3 false.  
Hypothesis 4 proved holds significant, albeit tangential weight. As Chapter V 
presented, the Baluch insurgent groups which succeeded Jundallah have suffered self-
inflicted wounds that undercut their own efficacy as an insurgency by causing 
fragmentation of insurgent groups and erosion potential bases of insurgent support among 
Baluch populations. In Jundallah’s wake, Jaish ul-Adl and other groups have competed, 
rather than cooperated with one another. The prominent insurgent groups which succeeded 
Jundallah have increasingly staked their identity along sectarian divides and transnational 
issues, creating potential distances and cleavages between the insurgency narrative and its 
resonance among Baluch populations. Finally, tribalism has further augmented 
fragmentation between insurgent groups, with tribal rivalry a source of division and tension 
that both Jundallah and current Baluch insurgent organizations have had to contend with.  
Of the five propositions presented at the inception of this thesis, the fifth 
proposition, that Iran’s continued control in Sistan-Baluchistan relative to insurgency is the 
result of an Iranian COIN approach in that has improved over time, and that the scale and 
pace of this improvement has outpaced that of insurgent development is the proposition 
which holds the most weight. As chapters IV and V demonstrate, Iranian COIN within 
Sistan-Baluchistan province began to drastically evolve, becoming a complete, coherent, 
and comprehensive strategy that targeted vulnerabilities of the Baluch insurgency. As 
Chapter V discussed, the IRGC’s growing involvement was overwhelmingly the root cause 
behind the evolution in Iranian COIN, and the IRGC’s unparalleled mix of expertise, 
experience, and resources have been leveraged at a rate and scale which Baluch 
insurgencies to date have categorically failed to respond to with their own adaptations.  
172 
C. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
This thesis adds to an already significant body of evidence which demonstrates that 
the Iranian state is capable of withstanding significant levels of insurgent threat and 
violence without losing its control or authority over its territory. Against Jundallah, Iran 
employed a COIN strategy which was ineffective, if not wholly counterproductive for 
nearly a decade. Iran endured both self-inflicted wounds from its COIN approach as well 
as repeated, violent attacks from Jundallah while retaining provincial control, and by 2012 
had managed to reconstitute its COIN approach and turn previous failure into overall COIN 
success. As discussed as contextual background to this thesis, there are other ethnic and 
religious minority-based insurgencies in Iran’s outermost territories. Given that the first 
half of the temporal scope of this thesis consisted of a deeply flawed, arguably self-
destructive COIN approach, the Iranian state’s current containment and overall success 
against Baluch insurgency reflects the strength, versatility, and overall vitality of the 
Islamic Republic’s grip on power.  
For the immediate future, it is apparent that ethnic insurgent organizations inside 
Iran, whether or not they have significant foreign support, present minimal, if any actual 
threat Khamenei regime interests. The findings of this thesis imply that the Iranian 
government, even at the periphery of its jurisdiction, is more than capable of defeating 
internal threats, to include violent insurgencies. Even with alleged foreign government 
support, Jundallah’s efforts never truly escalated to where they actually threatened Iran’s 
control over Sistan-Baluchistan. In the future, nations, to include the United States, which 
may find themselves exploring prospects of either covert or overt supporting to Iranian 
insurgencies should be realistic about the prospective gains of such endeavors. So long as 
the IRGC stands as Iran’s preeminent security organization, the findings of this thesis 
imply that foreign support of insurgent organizations will produce little, if any significant 
effects on undermining or diminishing Khomeini regime’s control over Iranian territory.  
The IRGC’s COIN prowess is exportable and may be used as a tool of Iranian 
foreign policy. Iran, in particular the IRGC, has long been accused by the international 
community, to include the United States of “export” of terrorism and insurgency to further 
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its own foreign policy objectives.732 However, as the findings of this thesis imply, the 
IRGC is at the very least capable and proficient at COIN, and this capability also needs to 
be considered a possible export Iran can use to advance its own international agenda. In 
particular, the findings of this thesis imply that further research could be conducted to 
evaluate the role the IRGC can play had in helping Iran’s allies stay in power. This applies 
to the Syrian Civil War, where Iranian support of Bashar Al-Assad has played a critical 
role in the Assad’s regime victory against insurrection. Of note, Assad’s IRGC-supported 
successful retention of control also has included the defeat of insurgents and rebel forces 
that had significant U.S. support.733 This dynamic also applies to Iraq. At the very least, 
since the rise of ISIS in 2014, the IRGC has been actively involved in ensuring that the 
Iraqi government remains “shia-dominated” and friendly to Iranian interests.734 If 
significant unrest, insurgencies, or insurrection reemerges in the Iraqi political landscape, 
it is well within the realm of possibility that the IRGC will employ their COIN expertise, 
evinced by COIN in Sistan-Baluchistan, to maximize the probability that a Shia- controlled 
Iraqi government retains power.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis recommends that the Iranian and IRGC involvement with support of 
government and regimes throughout the Middle East be re-evaluated from a more critical 
and comprehensive perspective. The successful strategy which the IRGC created and 
executed to contain Baluch insurgency in Sistan-Baluchistan can be cloned to help Iran’s 
allies successfully contain or defeat insurgency. Given the IRGC’s success in Sistan-
Baluchistan, the United States and partner nations need to carefully consider the costs and 
overall prospects of success in supporting insurgency or other armed opposition groups in 
nations whose governments have strong ties to Iran, specifically because potential IRGC 
 
732 Michael Wigginton et al., “Al-Qods Force: Iran’s Weapon of Choice to Export Terrorism.” 
Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 10, no. 2 (July 3, 2015): 154–155, https://doi.org/
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733 Bethan McKernan, “Trump Signals End of U.S. Support for Syrian Rebels,” The Independent, 
November 13, 2016, ProQuest. 
734 Munqith Dagher, “Polling Insights on Iraq’s Shia Revolt,” The Washington Institute, November 8, 
2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/polling-insights-on-iraqs-shia-revolt. 
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involvement in these conflicts may drastically alter the conflict dynamics away from a 
reasonable expectation of success for U.S. backed insurgencies when faced with Iranian-
backed counterinsurgency.  
This thesis also recommends that U.S. COIN strategists and decisionmakers expand 
and re-evaluate lessons learned from insurgencies so that they are more inclusive of the 
experiences of U.S. adversaries. This thesis argued that Iran should be considered an 
exporter of COIN given Iran’s involvement in Syria and Iraq. Considering U.S. 
involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, the United States may also be considered 
an exporter of COIN. Therefore, the United States should mine the experiences of its 
competitors in the realm of COIN export toward refinement of its own process and 
strategies. In general, the security and COIN policies of authoritarian regimes are 
incompatible with the U.S. COIN approach. Iran and other authoritarian states employ 
human rights abuses, civil rights abuses, and other atrocities which are simply intolerable 
to American political values. However, the presence of these tactics, however 
reprehensible, does not wholly invalidate every single COIN tactic or strategy Iran has 
used. There are successful aspects of Iran’s COIN approach to Baluch insurgency which 
may be executed without violating human rights or standards of morality. The United 
States could selectively apply successful aspects of Iran’s COIN to American-backed 
counterinsurgencies. Would a border security plan implemented along the border between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas yield similar 
improvements in COIN which Iran experienced after it applied greater border security to 
Sistan-Baluchistan? Could the effectiveness of Iran’s optimistic narrative, employed 
against Jaish ul-Adl, be replicated toward increasing public confidence in security forces 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere? With the United States continuing to engage in COIN 
operations throughout the Middle East, there needs to be constant re-evaluation of 
experience, both from an American-allied perspective, as well as from the perspectives of 
adversaries. The Iranian approach to Sistan-Baluchistan should be included for 
consideration in how the United States can provide more successful COIN performance to 
its allies in the Middle East.  
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APPENDIX A.  REFERENCES TO JUNDALLAH USE OF  
RIGI EPITHETS 2007–2009 
Date Specific Labeling Secondary 
Labeling 
Source 
August 21, 2007 “Rigi’s Group”  Tehran Times735 
June 21, 2008 “Rigi’s Terrorist Group”  ISNA736 
June 27, 2008 “Rigi Terrorist Group”  Qods737 
September 9, 2008 “Rigi Terrorist Group” “Rigi Group” IRNA738 
December 14, 2008 “Rigi’s Terrorist Ring”  Tehran Times739 
December 24, 2008 “Rigi Group”  Qods740 
February 22, 2009 “Rigi’s Terrorist Group”  Tehran Times741 
May 30, 2009 “Rigi Terrorist Group”  Iran News742 
June 1, 2009 “Rigi terrorist group”  Iran News743 
August 13, 2009 “Rigi Group”  Tehran Times744 
August 23, 2009 “Rigi Terrorist Group”  Iran News745 
October 21, 2009 “Rigi Group”  Tehran Times746 
October 23, 2009 “Rigi group”  Iran News747 
 
735 “Bandits Kidnap 21 in Southeastern Iran,” Tehran Times, August 20, 2007, NewsBank. 
736 “Iran Whistle-Blower Arrested For Receiving 6.5m Dollars State Funds—Judiciary,” ISNA, June 
21, 2008, NewsBank. 
737 “Iran Diplomat Denies Remarks Attributed to Interior Minister on US-Iraq Pact,” Qods, June 27, 
2008, NewsBank. 
738 “Iran Says Baluch Separatist Group Released One Hostage,” IRNA, September 9, 2008, 
NewsBank. 
739 “UK, U.S. Aided Jundullah Kidnapping: Iranian Official,” Tehran Times, December 14, 2008, 
NewsBank. 
740 “Iran Paper Slams Pakistan Inaction in Dealing With Criminal Group in Southeast,” Qods, 
December 24, 2008, NewsBank. 
741 “Police Chief: Iran Ready to Hunt Terrorists in Pakistan,” Tehran Times, February 22, 2009, 
NewsBank. 
742 “Pakistani Ambassador Summoned,” Iran News, May 30, 2009, NewsBank. 
743 “Mottaki: Rigi Terrorist Group Supported By Aliens in Afghanistan,” Iran News, June 1, 2009, 
NewsBank. 
744 “Iran Arrests 4 Jundullah Terrorists,” Tehran Times, August 13, 2009, NewsBank. 
745 “Four Rigi Linked Agents Arrested,” Iran News, August 13, 2009, NewsBank. 
746 “CIA, Regional Spy Agencies Set Goals For Terrorists: General,” Tehran Times, October 21, 
2009, NewsBank. 
747 “Iran Urges U.S. to Take Action Against Terrorist Rigi Group,” Iran News, October 23, 2009, 
NewsBank. 
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Date Specific Labeling Secondary 
Labeling 
Source 
October 24, 2009 “Rigi Group”  Tehran Times748 
October 25, 2009 “Rigi Group”  Tehran Times749 
October 27, 2009 “Rigi Terrorist Group”  Iran News750 
October 27, 2009 “Rigi terrorist group” “Rigi Group” Tehran Times751 
October 28, 2009 “Rigi Terrorist Group” “Rigi Group” Iran News752 
November 3, 2009 “Rigi’s Terrorist Group”  Tehran Times753 
November 24, 2009 “Rigi’s Terrorist Group”  Tehran Times754 
 
 
748 “Iran Calls For Extradition of Jundullah Terror Suspects,” Tehran Times, October 24, 2009, 
NewsBank. 
749 “Regional Terrorism Inspired By Wahhabi Seminaries: Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi,” Tehran 
Times, October 25, 2009, NewsBank. 
750 “Pakistan Vows to Uproot Rigi Group,” Iran News, October 27, 2009, NewsBank. 
751 “‘Pakistan Pledges to Capture Jundullah Terrorists And Extradite Them to Iran,’” Tehran Times, 
October 27, 2009, NewsBank. 
752 “Envoy: Iran-Pakistan Cooperation Beyond Rigi Group Issue,” Iran News, October 28, 2009, 
NewsBank. 
753 “Jundallah Terrorist Executed in Iran,” Tehran Times, November 4, 2009, NewsBank. 
754 “Iran Commander Talks of U.S. Contact With Jundullah,” Tehran Times, November 24, 2009, 
NewsBank. 
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APPENDIX B.  MAJOR JUNDALLAH ATTACKS AND  
INITIAL IRANIAN RESPONSIVE ACTIONS 
March 2006 Jundallah Tasooki Massacre 
Date Perpetrators Arrested/Killed Source 
April 12, 2006 [1 month later] None, but MPs called for firing of police 
chief over inaction 
Iran News755 
May 14, 2006 Kermanshah Roadside Killings—[12 dead] 
Date Perpetrators Arrested/Killed Source 
May 15, 2006 [1 day after] 6 killed, unspecified number arrested Iran News/Tehran 
Times756 
February 14, 2007 Zahedan Bombings—[18 Dead] 
Date Perpetrators Arrested/Killed Source 
February 15, 2007 [1 day after] At least 1 killed, 5 arrested Iran News757 
February 18, 2007 [3 days 
after] 
“3 main agents” and 65 others arrested Tehran Times758 
June 12, 2008 Hostage Abduction [15 Hostages killed between June and December] 
Date Perpetrators Arrested/Killed Source 
June 19, 2008 [5 days after] 3 arrested Iran News759 
January 2009 Saravan Ambush [12 killed] 
Date Perpetrators Arrested/Killed Source 
January 27, 2009 [Same Day] 17 Jundallah operatives killed as they 
fled back across the border 
Iran News760 
May 28, 2009 Zahedan Bombings [ 25 killed] 
Date Perpetrators Arrested/Killed Source 
May 30, 2009 [3 days later] “Entire Team” arrested Tehran Times761 
  
 
755 “MPs Urge Punitive Measures Against Negligent Sistan-Baluchestan Officials,” Iran News, April 
12, 2006, NewsBank. 
756 “Sunni Group Claims Kerman Roadside Killings,” Iran News, May 15, 2006, NewsBank; Tehran 
Times, “Bandits in Kerman Must Be Tracked Down: Officials.” 
757 Iran News, “Bomb Attack Kills 11 in Zahedan.” 
758 “Zahedan Bombings Intended to Foment Sunni-Shia Conflict: Governor,” Tehran Times, February 
18, 2007, NewsBank. 
759 Iran News, “Jundallah Kill 2 Hostages in Iran.” 
760 “Rebels Kill Cops,” Iran News, January 27, 2009, NewsBank. 
761 “Suspects in Zahedan Terror Attack Arrested,” Tehran Times, May 30, 2009, NewsBank. 
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October 18, 2009 Pishin Bombing [42 killed] 
Date Perpetrators Arrested/Killed Source 
October 21, 2009 [3 days later] 3 arrested San Diego Union 
Tribune762 
July 16, 2010 Zahedan Bombings [27 dead] 
Date Perpetrators Arrested/Killed Source 
July 18, 2010 [2 days later] 40 arrested Philadelphia 
Inquirer763 
December 15, 2010 Chabahar Bombing [39 dead] 
Date Perpetrators Arrested/Killed Source 
December 15, 2010 [same day] 1 arrested, 1 killed Guardian764 
December 19, 2010 [4 days 
later] 
9 arrested Tehran Times765 
 
 
762 Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran Arrests Suspects in Attack on Military Chiefs,” San Diego Union 
Tribune, October 21, 2009, https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-ml-iran-bombing-102109-
2009oct21-story.html. 
763 “Iran Arrests 40 Following Bombing At Mosque,” Philadelphia Enquirer, July 18, 2010, 
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/
20100718_Iran_arrests_40_following_bombing_at_mosque.html 
764 Mark Tran and Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Iran Mosque Bombing Kills Dozens,” Guardian, 
December 15, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/15/iran-chahbahar-suicide-bombing-
mosque. 
765 “Sunnis Hold Rally Protesting Terrorist Attack In Chabahar,” Tehran Times, December 19, 2010, 
NewsBank. 
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APPENDIX C.  ARRESTS, EXECUTIONS AND KILLINGS 
RELATED TO JUNDALLAH 2006–2008 





14 0 0 N/A Associated Press766 
April 6, 
2006 















































766 “Iran Detains 14 Suspected Extremists,” Associated Press Online, January 9, 2006, Nexis Uni. 
767 “Rebels Murder, Shoot Officials in Southeastern Iran: Report,” Agence France Presse, April 9, 
2006, Nexis Uni. 
768 “Iran Arrests Rebels in Restive Border Regions,” Agence France Presse, May 4, 2006, Nexis Uni. 
769 Tehran Times, “Bandits in Kerman Must Be Tracked Down: Officials.”. 
770 “Iran Security Forces Kill Five Militants,” Agence France Presse, May 25, 2006, Nexis Uni. 
771 Ali Akbar Dareini, “Blast Kills 11 Members of Iran’s Elite Guard: Jundallah, A Sunni Militant 
Brigade, Takes Responsibility,” Ottawa Citizen, February 15, 2007, Nexis Uni. 
772 Karimi, “Iran Executes Bomber.” 
773 Nazila Fathi, “Insurgents Were Trained in Pakistan, Iran Charges; 65 Arrested For Attacks in 
Sunni Border Area,” The International Herald Tribune, Nexis Uni. 
774 “Iran Hangs Sunni Militant in Restive Province,” Agence France Presse, March 14, 2007, Nexis 
Uni. 
775 David Monetero, “Ethnic Spat Heats Up Pakistan-Iran Border,” Christian Science Monitor, April 
18, 2007, Nexis Uni. 
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6 12 0 N/A Agence France 
Presse778 
TOTALS 184 Arrested, 27 Killed, 8 Executed 
 
 
776 Amnesty International, Further Information on UA 76/07 (MDE 13/034/2007, 22 March 2007) 
Fear of Imminent Execution/Torture, MDE 13/066/2007 (London: Amnesty International, June 5 2007), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/64000/mde130662007en.pdf. 
777 “Revolutionary Guard Clashes With Bandits In Southeastern Iran, Kills Four, Suffers Casualties,” 
Associated Press International, July 20, 2007, Nexis Uni. 
778 “Iran Kills Sunni Rebels Planning Attacks: Police,” Agence France Presse, December 13, 2007, 
Nexis Uni. 
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October 28, 2013, 
[Saravan], 






16 people executed in 
response, none of 
whom carried out the 
attack. 
Iran Sent a letter to the UN 
demanding their help. 




Assassination of a 
city prosecutor by 
Jaish ul-Adl 
2/0 No No Assassinated a prosecutor and 
his driver; but the IRGC 
announced they would close off 
parts of the border at this point 
Iran Daily780  
12/1/2013 
[Saravan Region] 











No N/A Iran Daily781  
 
779 “Iran Protests to Pakistan Over Border Attack,” Tehran Times, October 28, 2013, NewsBank. 
780 “Police Will Confront Terrorists in Border Regions,” Iran Daily, November 17, 2013, NewsBank 


















3,0 No No IED, victims were physically 
constructing border wall/
physical deterrents 








Yes:  No IRGC commander questions 
why this keeps happening, asks 
foreign ministry to investigate 
Tehran Times783  
8/23/2014 
[N/A] 
Iranian Update on 
Border Guard 
Hostages 






N/A No No Iranian officials denied that 
Jaish ul-Adl had mounted any 
recent attacks.  
ISNA785 
 
782 “Three IRGC Personnel Killed in Southeast,” Iran Daily, December 18, 2013,NewsBank. 
783 “Iran Complains to Pakistan on Abduction of Five Border Guards,” Tehran Times, February 10, 2014, NewsBank. 
784 Iran Daily, “Cmdr. Rejects Reports on Death of Kidnapped Border Guard.” 

















thwarted an attack 





No Iranian news claimed the attack 
was thwarted. Jaish ul-Adl 
didn’t claim responsibility, but 
Iran’s narrative implied heavily 
they were involved. 
Iran Daily786 
October 12, 2014 
[Saravan Border 
Area] 
Jaish ul-Adl Border 
Outpost Attack 
4/3 Yes No Car bomb on the ninth, shooting 
on the tenth, on a border base 
per an article in November. 
Tehran Times787  
11/26/2014 
[Zahak] 
Attack on NAJA 
forces 
 
3/0 No No Deeper inside Iranian territory 
than most Jaish ul-Adl attacks. 
Jaish ul-Adl has yet to claim 
this attack. 
Tehran Times, 
Iran Daily788  
4/2/2015 
[unknown] 
Jaish ul-Adl attack 
on border outpost 
8/0 Yes N/A N/A Tehran Times789  
 
786 Iran Daily. “IRGC Foils Terrorist Attack in Southeastern Province.” 
787 Tehran Times, “Pakistan’s Failure to Guard Its Borders Is Unacceptable.” 
788 “Three Police Forces Martyred in Southeastern Iran,” Tehran Times, November 28, 2014, NewsBank; “Three Security Forces Killed in Sistan-
Baluchistan,” Iran Daily, November 26, 2014, NewsBank. 
















NAJA raid on Jaish 
ul-Adl hideout 
1/0 Yes Killed 5 Also claimed to confiscate “a 
huge amount” of munitions. 
Iran Daily790  
7/6/2016 
[Unknown] 
Jaish ul-Adl Border 
Guard Ambush 
4/0 Yes N/A N/A Iran Daily791 
7/21/2016 
[Unknown] 
IRGC destroyed an 
underground tunnel 
0/0 Yes No Article contains similar 
phraseology about recent 
clashes between Iranian and 
Jaish ul-Adl forces, where Iran 





Jaish ul-Adl border 
attack 
11/3 Yes N/A Government commentary 
framed the attack as successful 
defense of the border. 
Iran Daily793  
4/29/2017 
[Mirjaveh] 
10/2 Yes N/A Article presents that this is an 
improvement ... Jaish ul-Adl 
Iran Daily794  
 
790 Iran Daily “Iranian Forces Kill 10 Terrorists in East, West.” 
791 Iran Daily, “Iran Busts Terror Cell in East.” 
792 Iran Daily. 
793 Iran Daily, “Pakistan Accountable For Deaths of Iranian Border Guards.” 














Jaish ul-Adl Border 
Outpost Attack 
they can barely get through the 
border ... Iran is a “safe island 




announcement of a 
foiled terrorist 
operation 
0/0 Yes Claims to have foiled 
30 terrorist operations 
in the last year. 
Does not specifically ascribe 
any of the foiled plots to Jaish 
ul-Adl. Article likely designed 
to highlight the positive 





Iranian seizure of 
Jaish ul-Adl 
weapons stockpile 
0/0 Yes. No Article claimed that Iranian 
forces seized an anti-aircraft 
weapon, and dozens of rifles 
and submachine guns. Also re-
emphasized the repeated 
success of the state at 





Jaish ul-Adl assault 






Yes Killed at least five. 
The rest retreated 
over the border. 
This clash is framed as an 
Iranian success; claims that 
Jaish ul-Adl was intending to 
seize the border outpost, but 
they were stopped by the 
resistance of the guards on duty, 
Iran Daily797 
 
795 Tehran Times, “Iran Foils Terrorist Operation.” 
796 Iran Daily, “Arms Cache of Jaish ul-Adl Terror Group Seized in SE Iran.” 


















Jaish ul-Adl attack 
on police 
2/0 Yes No Despite these attacks and the 
massive border, Iran framed its 




Clash with Jaish ul-
Adl 
3/1 Yes Killed 3 Jaish ul-Adl 
members in the attack 
Police and IRGC reports framed 
the attack as a foiled plot; 
forces intercepted militants as 
they were trying to cross the 
border. 
Iran Daily799  
9/29/2018 
[Saravan] 
IRGC attack on 
Jaish ul-Adl 
0 Yes Killed 4, injured 2 
Jaish ul-Adl 
members. 
Killed Jaish ul-Adl’s second in 
command 









Yes No Iran Claimed that Jaish ul-Adl 
had insiders who betrayed the 
guards, also claimed the insider 
threat had poisoned or 
otherwise incapacitated the 




798 Iran Daily, “Three Terrorists, Three Iranian Forces Killed in Border Clash.” 
799 Iran Daily. 
800 Tehran Times, “IRGC Forces Kill Jaish-Ul-Adl’s Second-In-Command.” 


















0,0 Yes No 5 Hostages were released; 
Iranian statement claims this 
was done without capitulating 





IRGC public update 
on border Guard 
hostages 
0 Yes No Message appears designed to 
reaffirm that the IRGC is still 















No Summarized recent progress 
and successful Iranian raids and 







Bombing of an 
IRGC bus 
27/13 Yes No “Accused Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates of 
supporting terror groups.” 
Iran Daily805 
 
802 Tehran Times “Five of Iran’s Abducted Border Guards Freed.” 
803 Iran Daily, “Commander: Iran Pursuing Fate of Kidnapped Border Guard.” 
804 Iran Daily, “Terrorist Attack Kills IRGC Member in Southeastern Iran.” 

















to the IRGC bus 
bombing 
0 Yes 3 arrested N/A Tehran Times806 
2/21/2019 
[Unknown] 
Iran Arrests in 
connection with 
IRGC bus bombing 
0/0 No 8 arrested. Claimed one of those arrested 
owned the car used in the 







Guards are Alive 











806 “Three Linked to Terror Act in Southeast Iran Arrested,” Tehran Times, February 18, 2019, NewsBank. 
807 “8 Arrested For Terror Attacks Martyring 27 IRGC in SE Iran,” Iran Daily, February 21, 2019, NewsBank. 
808 “Video Claims Abducted Iranian Border Guards Call Families After Five Months,” Iran Daily, March 17, 2019, NewsBank. 
809 “Iran Says 5 Abducted Border Guards Freed in Pakistan,” Tehran Times, March 21, 2019, NewsBank. 
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APPENDIX E.  IRAN-PAKISTAN BORDER CLOSINGS 
Date How long? Reaction to attack? Pre-emptive? 
June 10, 2014 Indefinite period Taftan hotel bombing 
(occurred in Pakistan, 
Shia pilgrims headed for 
Iran) 
No810 
April 2018 At least since 
January, ended 
April 19, 2018811 
uncertain In January Iran 
promised to reopen 
the border once 
fencing was 
complete ... possible 
reaction to Pakistan 
falling behind on 
fencing timeline.812 
June 2018 Unknown Unknown, this might be 
related to the four-month 
border closure or more 
that ended in April 19, 
2018] 
Unknown, but 
relevant A Pakistani 
Minister publicly 
expressed concern 




1 month NO (unclear if Pakistan 
or Iran initiated) 
Muharram “Security 
has been tightened 
around the country 
to ensure the 
security of 
 
810 “Iran Closes Border For An Indefinite Period,” Express Tribune, June 10, 2014, 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/719719/iran-closes-border-for-an-indefinite-period/. 
811 Muhammad Zafar, “Raahdari Comes Back to Life, Express Tribune, April 19, 2018, 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1689327/1-raahdari-comes-back-life/. 
812 Muhammad Zafar, “PPP Demands Reopening Of Zero-Point Trade Gate,” Express Tribune, April 
15, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1685850/1-ppp-demands-reopening-zero-point-trade-gate/. 
813 Pakistan, Iran Agree to Further Boost Bilateral Ties,” Global Village Space, June 2, 2018, 
“https://www.globalvillagespace.com/pakistan-iran-agree-to-further-boost-bilateral-ties/. 
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Date How long? Reaction to attack? Pre-emptive? 
Muharram 
processions.”814 
11/6/2018 At least three 
weeks (as of 11/
16) 
NO (gate closed longer 
than they should have 
been ... possible border 
guard abduction relation). 
Originally closed 











9/9/2019 2 days, at least NO Ashura817 
10/4/2019 2 weeks (16 days) NO Abareen (Shia 













815Muhammad Zafar, “Pak-Iran: Trade and Travel Suspended For Three Weeks,” Express Tribune, 
November 6, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1841347/1-pak-iran-trade-travel-suspended-three-weeks/. 
816 “Iran Opens Corridor At Taftan Border,” Nation, April 15, 2019, https://nation.com.pk/15-Apr-
2019/iran-opens-corridor-at-taftan-border. 
817 “Taftan Border Closed For Ashura,” Dawn, September 10, 2019, https://www.dawn.com/news/
1504515. 
818 Ali Raza Rind, “Travel Resumes At Pak-Iran Border Near Chagai,” Dawn, October 21, 2019, 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1512059/travel-resumes-at-pak-iran-border-near-chagai. 
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APPENDIX F.  IRANIAN DEPORTATIONS OF PAKISTANIS  
IN SISTAN-BALUCHISTAN 
Date Number of personnel Other facts 
2012 10,346 Estimated Deportation for the 
Entire Year 819 
2014 5618 Article date 11/20/2016 
11/20/2016 28,684 This is the number of 
estimated Pakistanis deported 
from Iran from 2013-2015820 
8/3/2016 20,000-26,000 (Year to 
date) 
This is almost daily they are 
deporting scores of people; 
they get 5-100 people a day. 
Border guards also allegedly 
shooting immigrants on 
sight.821 
1/1/2017 29,000 Total number of Pakistanis 
deported from Iran through 
Taftan in 2016822 
1/12/2017 128 NSTR823 
7/30/2017 128 NSTR824 
9/30/2017 20+ Article claims by Pakistan’s 
count the numbers in recent 
 
819 “Over 500,000 Pakistanis Deported in Last 5 Years,” Economic Times of India, September 5, 
2017, https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/world-news/over-500000-pakistanis-deported-in-
last-5-years/articleshow/60375931.cms. 
820 “Nearly 250,000 Pakistanis Deported From 2012-2015: Report,” Dawn, November 20, 2016, 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1297540. 
821 Qaiser Butt, “Iran Deports Over 20,000 Illegal Pakistani Immigrants Every Year,” Express 
Tribune, August 3, 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1155188/iran-deports-20000-illegal-pakistani-
immigrants-every-year/. 
822 Syed Ali Shah, “Nearly 29,000 Pakistanis Seeking Illegal Passage to Europe Deported by Iran in 
2016,” Dawn, May 16, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1333502  
823 Sumaira Hussain, “Irani Forces Extradited 72 Pakistani on Taftan Border to Levies ,” Urdu Point, 
January 12, 2017, https://www.urdupoint.com/en/pakistan/irani-forces-extradited-72-pakistani-on-tafta-
87128.html. 




Date Number of personnel Other facts 
years have been between 
20,000-26,000.825 
3/19/2017 61/35 61 that week, 35 the week 
before, also claimed that those 
in Pakistan trying to cross the 
border had been discovered 
with weapons.826 
10/1/2018 13626 as of end of 
September 
NSTR827 
11/23/2018 253 NSTR828 
11/26/2018 118 NSTR829 
11/5/2019 29 Arrested throughout Iran830 
4/29/2019 107 A day after a new agreement 
signed831 
6/11/2019 144 NSTR832 
 
 
825 “Iran Deports Over 20 Pakistani Immigrants,” Express Tribune, September 10, 2017, 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1502633/iran-deports-20-pakistani-immigrants/. 
826 “Iran Hands Over 61 Pakistan Immigrants to FIA at Taftan border,” Express Tribune, March 19, 
2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1359601/iran-hands-61-pakistan-immigrants-fia-taftan-border/.  
827 Syed Ali Shah, “FIA Stops 19 Prospective Illegal Immigrants From Entering Iran,” Dawn, 
September 17, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1433492. 
828 “Iran Hands Over 253 Illegal Immigrants to Pakistan,” The Iran Project (blog), November 20, 
2018, https://theiranproject.com/blog/2018/11/20/iran-hands-over-253-illegal-immigrants-to-pakistan/.  
829 “Iran Deports 116 Pakistani Nationals,” Pakistan Today, November 27, 2018, 
https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/11/27/iran-deports-116-pakistani-nationals/. 
830 “Iran Hands Over 29 Pakistani Nationals to Islamabad Government,” The Iran Project (blog), 
November 5, 2019, https://theiranproject.com/blog/2019/11/05/iran-hands-over-29-pakistani-nationals-to-
islamabad-government/. 
831 “Iran Sets Free 107 Pakistani Nationals,” The Iran Project (blog), April 29, 2019, 
https://theiranproject.com/blog/2019/04/29/iran-sets-free-107-pakistani-nationals/. 
832 “Iran Hands Over 144 Pakistanis at Taftan Border Crossing,” ShiiteNews, June 11, 2019, 
https://shiitenews.org/featured/item/98463-iran-hands-144-pakistanis-taftan-border-crossing/. 
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APPENDIX G.  IRAN-PAKISTAN BILATERAL ACTION TAKEN TO CONVINCE PAKISTAN  














Iranian Government lodged an 
official complaint to the Islamabad 
government/summoned the Pakistani 
Charge D’affairs in Iran: “the 
Pakistani government has failed to 
deal seriously with the terrorists 
operating near the country’s border 
with Iran ... urged Islamabad to take 
serious measures under the security 
agreements between the two 
countries to deal with and arrest the 
terrorists.” 
Pakistan response: “expressed 
regret over the incident and said 
that it would convey Iran’s protest 
to the Pakistani government.” 






“Iranian ambassador to Islamabad 
demanded Pakistan to immediately 
identify and extradite the terrorists ... 
in a meeting with a Pakistani deputy 
foreign minister in Islamabad.” 
“Pakistani official condemned the 
terrorist incident and expressed 
condolence to the government and 
people of Iran ... would make every 
effort to deal with the issue.” 
Yes Iran Daily834 
 
833 “Tehran Times, Iran Protests to Pakistan Over Border Attack.” 















“Talks have been held with Pakistani 
authorities on arresting the 
perpetrators of the terror attack ... the 
two sides have agreed to seriously 
follow up the case until the terrorists 
are apprehended.” 









“Criticized the performance of 
Pakistani government ... border 
police ... asked how it was possible 
that rebels ambush the Iranian guards, 
kidnap them, take them to Pakistan 
and release some photos of them.” 
“Iran and Pakistan border security 
officers started their search for 
abductees after the incident 
occurred.”  








“Iran will dispatch a delegation to 
Pakistan to pursue the case ... Iranian 
border guards have already met their 
Pakistani counterparts to investigate 
the issue ... Pakistani officials 
shoulder a responsibility in this 
regard which they should honor.” 
“Iran’s Foreign Ministry on Sunday 
summoned the Pakistani 
Ambassador to Tehran Noor 
Mohammad Jadmani to protest the 
transferring of the abductees.” 







“‘The diplomatic apparatus must also 
put pressure on Pakistan through 
serious negotiations to swiftly 
 No Iran Daily838 
 
835 “Pakistan Cooperating on Border Raid Probe,” Iran Daily, November 11, 2013, NewsBank. 
836 “Iran Police to Follow Up Guards Kidnap,” Iran Daily, February 9, 2014, NewsBank. 
837 Iran Daily, “Iran Team Due in Pakistan Over Abductions.” 












determine the fate of ... border 
guards, return them [to Iran] and 
prevent the repetition of incidents’ ... 
Deputy Chairman of Iran’s Majlis ... 








“Iran’s deputy foreign minister for 
consular, parliamentary and Iranian 
expatriate affairs, said ... that 
necessary consultations for the 
release of the abducted Iranian border 
guards are underway ... also stated 
that the results of the consultations 
will not be publicized until the issue 
is finalized.” 










“Tehran’s interior minister has 
warned Pakistan that Iranian forces 
may enter Pakistani and Afghan 
territory to release border guards 
seized by a rebel group ... The official 
asked Pakistan to treat the case 
‘strongly and seriously’ or allow Iran 
to secure the remote region ‘deep on 
Afghanistan and Pakistan soil ... we 
do consider it our own right to 
N/A No Al-Arabiya840 
 
839 “Iran Optimistic About Freedom Of Abducted Guards,” Iran Daily, February 15, 2014, NewsBank. 







Relevant Diplomatic Action 1 Relevant Diplomatic Action 2 Diplomatic 
Meeting? 
Source 
intervene and create a new security 








“Hassan Rouhani has called on 
Pakistan to counter terrorism and 
extremism in the country to improve 
security alongside its border with Iran 
... ’Our borders should remain 
safe...we call on the Pakistani 
government to do its utmost to 
resolve these problems’ ... made the 
remarks in a meeting with Sardar 
Ayaz Sadiq, speaker of the National 
Assembly of Pakistan ... ’the 
transformation of religious and 
sectarian differences into terrorism is 
by no means acceptable.”  
“Sadiq ... commended the ‘positive 
and growing’ relations between 
Tehran and Islamabad and 
expressed Pakistani officials’ 
determination to expand ties with 
Iran in all fields ... underlined that 
Islamabad would seriously follow 
up ways to improve economic 
cooperation with Iran, particularly 
on the implementation of Iran-
Pakistan gas pipeline ... said 
Pakistan is a victim of terrorism ... 
added that his country’s 
government and nation are 
determined to fight terrorism and 
would not allow such acts of terror 
to negatively impact ties with Iran.” 









“Pakistan said on Tuesday that Iran 
should not send troops across the two 
countries’ shared border ... ‘Iranian 
forces have no authority to cross our 
borders in violation of the 
 No Tehran 
Times842 
 
841 Iran Daily, “Pakistan Again Urged to Improve Security.” 







Relevant Diplomatic Action 1 Relevant Diplomatic Action 2 Diplomatic 
Meeting? 
Source 
international law. We must respect 
each other’s borders ... The 
government of Pakistan regrets the 
suggestions of negligence on its part 
over the incident, especially when 
Pakistan’s active support against 










“Iran and Pakistan have set up a joint 
border committee to secure the 
release of five Iranian border guards 
abducted by the Jaish-ul-Adl ... 
decision was made at the 17th 
meeting of the Iran-Pakistan Joint 
Border Commission in Quetta ... the 
third meeting between Iranian and 
Pakistani officials since the five 
border guards were abducted.” 
“Iranian and Pakistani officials 
discussed the enhancement of 
border commerce, the restoration of 
border barriers, opening a new 
terminal in Makran region, power 
transmission, the extradition of 
nationals, visa issuance and joint 
border patrols ... head of the 
Pakistani delegation Baber Yaqoub 
Mohammad expressed deep 
concern over the abduction ... 
underlined Pakistan’s resolve to 
work together with Iran over the 
issue ... Deputy governor of Iran’s 
Sistan-Baluchestan province, ... 
expressed gratitude over Pakistan’s 
cooperation in pursuing the fate of 
Yes Iran Daily843 
 







Relevant Diplomatic Action 1 Relevant Diplomatic Action 2 Diplomatic 
Meeting? 
Source 
the abducted guards and 
underscored the need for closer 
mutual cooperation to prevent 








A member of the Majlis National 
Security and Foreign Policy 
Committee has called for a 
diplomatic solution for the release of 
abducted Iranian border guards ... 
Hojjatollah Khoda’isuri, said that: 
‘Country’s diplomatic apparatus, 
Foreign Ministry as well as the 
Ministry Of Intelligence are making 
efforts to resolve the issue ... all the 
five border guards ... are alive and 
efforts are been made for their 
release.’” 








“The Iranian interior minister says 
Islamabad has vowed to seriously 
pursue the fate of the five abducted 
Iranian border guards ... ‘we have 
conducted a number of meetings with 
Pakistani officials in this regard and 
they have vowed to positively 
 NO Tehran 
Times845 
 
844 ISNA, “MP Calls For Diplomatic Solution to Free Iran Abducted Border Guards.” 







Relevant Diplomatic Action 1 Relevant Diplomatic Action 2 Diplomatic 
Meeting? 
Source 
cooperate with Iran ... Since Pakistan 
is a friendly and neighboring country 
of us, and we have good cooperation 
with them, we should settle our issues 









Pakistan Capitulation to Iranian 
demand: “The head of the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry’s Department of 
Social Affairs said on Tuesday that 
Pakistani authorities have managed to 
locate the hideout of the terrorist 
group and the location where the 
kidnapped Iranian border guards are 
being held.” 








“Ali Larijani warned that 
unconstrained acts of sabotage by 
criminals along the Iran-Pakistan 
border can affect relations between 
the two countries ... In a Sunday 
meeting with Speaker of Pakistan’s 
Provincial Assembly of Baluchistan 
Mir Jan Muhammad Jamali ... 
Larijani said acts of sabotage along 
Iran and Pakistan border will lead to 
 Yes Iran Daily847 
 
846 Iran Daily, “Pakistan Locates Jaish-Ul-Adl Hideout.” 







Relevant Diplomatic Action 1 Relevant Diplomatic Action 2 Diplomatic 
Meeting? 
Source 
‘misunderstandings in the relations 
between the two countries ... It is 
necessary that Pakistani security 
bodies seriously and speedily resolve 
the issue of Iranian nationals being 
taken hostage ... ’ added that Iran and 
Pakistan have always enjoyed 
amicable ties ... crucial for expanding 
political, economic and cultural 
relations between the two countries ... 
came as officials in Pakistan said on 
Saturday that security forces have 
freed 11 foreign hostages ... near the 
Iranian border ... did not include the 
five Iranian border guards kidnapped 








“Iranian Interior Minister Abdolreza 
Rahmani Fazli held a meeting with ... 
the speaker of the assembly of the 
Pakistani province of Balochistan ... 
Fazli told Jamali that Pakistan should 
control illegal movements in the 
areas on the border with Iran ... The 
Pakistani government is expected to 
crack down on illegal movements in 
“The two countries should make 
efforts to prevent foreign 
interventions through enhancing 
their cooperation ... should 
continuously exchange information 
in order to make proper decisions ... 
hold more meetings and should 
establish a permanent commission 











Relevant Diplomatic Action 1 Relevant Diplomatic Action 2 Diplomatic 
Meeting? 
Source 
the area of the border with Iran, and 
Iran is ready to cooperate in this 
matter.” 
decision making and purposeful 
action ... increasing business and 
commerce in border areas is 
essential for improving the situation 
in the region ... also stated that the 
Iran-Pakistan joint commercial 
commission should become more 
active ... the commission will hold a 









“Iranian Foreign Minister 
Mohammad Javad Zarif has had a 
telephone conversation with his 
Pakistani counterpart to pursue the 
case of five kidnapped Iranian border 
guards,” 








“Thousands of Iranian actors, 
directors, producers and screenwriters 
have issued a statement asking the 
United Nations, international leaders, 
and the government of Pakistan to 
take action to return five Iranian 
border guards who were kidnapped ... 
’We Iranian cineastes respectfully 
N/A NO Tehran 
Times850 
 
849 “Iran Foreign Minister Discusses Border Guards With Pakistani Counterpart,” ISNA, March 4, 2014, NewsBank. 







Relevant Diplomatic Action 1 Relevant Diplomatic Action 2 Diplomatic 
Meeting? 
Source 
request that all influential 
international officials, the UN, and 
the friendly neighboring government 
of Pakistan to do their utmost in a 
humanitarian effort to return the 
innocent guards to their families’ ... 
Groups of cultural figures and 
university professors have also asked 









“Governor-General of Iran’s Sistan-
Baluchestan province Ali Owsat 
Hashemi and Governor of Pakistan’s 
Balochistan State Mohammad Khan 
Achek Zehi met behind the closed 
doors in Zahedan ... Border 
exchanges, security issues, specially 
the freedom of the abducted guards 
were among the most important 
issues discussed during the 
meeting...Speaker of Pakistan’s 
Balochistan Parliament ... vowed to 
free the guards by the end of the 
current Iranian year.” 
“Last week, Tehran and Islamabad 
held a joint border commission 
meeting in the Pakistani city of 
Quetta to discuss the kidnapping.” 
Yes [2] Iran Daily851 
 

















“Pakistani Ambassador in Tehran 
Noor Mohammad Jadmani will meet 
Iranian members of the parliamentary 
friendship group this week to inform 
them on the latest measures to release 
Iranian abducted border guards ... 
expansion of cooperation between 
Tehran and Islamabad in all fields 
including the fight against terrorism 
will also be discussed in the 
meeting.” 








Highlights the diplomatic, economic, 
and military aspects of engagement 
have all been used: “‘We have taken 
measures in all diplomatic, security ... 
and military spheres to secure the 
release of the abducted border 
guards,’ Rahmani Fazli told a press 
conference ... ‘Also, we have 
conducted official and unofficial 
negotiations through the Foreign 
Ministry, and we hope that all these 
measures would lead to the release 
Iranian border guards.’” 
N/A No Tehran 
Times853 
 
852 Iran Daily, “Pakistan Ambassador to Brief MPs on Abducted Guards.” 


















Threat to violate Pakistani Territory 
if Pakistan loses hostages: “Minister 
Abdolreza Rahmani-Fazli has said 
that his country will use its power 
and abilities if a border guard 
abducted by Pakistani rebel group is 
killed ... ‘We hope that the news of 
killing our child ... is not true. 
Otherwise ... We will definitely use 
our power and abilities. We expect 
Pakistan to lead the issue in a more 
methodical manner ... they have to 
order their forces to resolve the issue 
in the region ... Otherwise, we 
consider our right to apply all our 
abilities in our border areas.’”  










Border guards released: “‘The 
abducted Iranian border guards have 
been handed over to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s liaison in Pakistan, 
but they have not entered the country 
yet.”  
“Owsat-Hashemi cautioned that 
‘they [Iranians] should wait about 
the issue ... we hope to bring good 
news to the Iranian people ... 
’Owsat-Hashemi confirmed that 
Iran was holding talks with Jaish 
ul-Adl ... On 4 April Jaish ul-Adl 




854 IRNA, “Iran to Use Its Power If Abducted Border Guard Killed By “Rebel” Group—Minister.” 
855 “MP: Iran Border Guards Freed,” Iran Daily, April 4, 2014, NewsBank; “Iran Official Lowers Expectations For Quick Release Of Border Guards,” 







Relevant Diplomatic Action 1 Relevant Diplomatic Action 2 Diplomatic 
Meeting? 
Source 
issued a statement saying that the 
group had handed over the 
abducted Iranian soldiers to a 








“cooperation between Tehran and 
Islamabad will continue to establish 
the fate of an abducted Iranian border 
guard ... the two states are making 
serious efforts for the safe recovery 
of kidnapped border guard ... Interior 
Ministry said on Wednesday it will 
step up diplomatic efforts ... ‘By no 
means do we accept that Jamshid 
Danaeifar, the last kidnapped Iranian 
border guard, has been martyred and 
we will intensify diplomatic efforts in 
that regard ... The Pakistani 
government and those tasked with 
following up on the fate of the last 
abducted border guard are 
responsible.’” 






“Commenting on the remarks by 
some MPs who had said that 
Dana’ifar might be alive, Rahmani-
 No ISNA857 
 
856 Iran Daily, “Tehran, Islamabad Cooperating Over Border Guard’s Fate.” 












Fazli said: ‘We are pursuing the issue 
through Pakistan and other regional 
channels to find out; however, we 
have not reached a conclusion yet.’” 
5/6/2014 
[Meeting] 
N/A “Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif met Iranian Interior Minister 
Abdolreza Rahmani-Fazli ... 
underlined the need for promoting 
ties with Iran. Sharif added forging 
comprehensive and bilateral ties with 
stable neighboring and regional 
countries remains a priority... 
described Pakistan as a friendly and 
brotherly country.” 
 
“both officials said that grounds 
must be prepared for further 
enhancement of cooperation and 
interaction between the two 
countries ... Sharif and Rahmani-
Fazli also discussed border issues 
and security cooperation between 
Iran and Pakistan ... visit is aimed 
at improving security cooperation 
between the two countries 
following the kidnapping of Iranian 
border guards.” 
Yes Iran Daily858 
3/25/2016 
[Meeting] 
N/A President Rouhani Pakistan Visit: 
Discussion on cooperation in defense, 
commerce, development  







“Close coordination” of Pakistani and 
Iranian forces: search and rescue, air 
surveillance, troop deployments 
N/A No Iran Daily860 
 
858 “Iran Reaching Out to Neighbors,” Iran Daily, May 6, 2014, NewsBank. 
859 Sarah Sajid, “Issue of Pakistan-Iran Cross Border Terrorism, and its Future Remedies,” Iran Review, April 5, 2016, http://www.iranreview.org/content/
Documents/Issue-of-Pakistan-Iran-Cross-Border-Terrorism-and-its-Future-Remedies.htm. 



















IRGC Ground Force Commander 
visited Pakistan to follow up and get 
further cooperation on abduction of 
guards. 








Meeting between foreign minister 
Zarif and Pakistani PM Khan, in 
Islamabad 
“The security of Iran equals 
security of Pakistan; no effort will 
be spared to help assuage Iranian 
concerns.” Pakistan foreign 
minister Quereshi 









Pakistan gave Iran confirmation that 
the border guards were all alive and 
in good health 








Minister of the Interior: “Iran is ready 
to conduct joint operations inside 
Pakistani territory, with their 
permission and cooperation.” 
Credits the success thus far in 
released hostages to Pakistani-
Iranian cooperation. 
No Iran Daily864 
 
861 “Zarif: Pakistan Vows to Increase Military Presence On Common Border,” Iran Daily, October 22, 2018, NewsBank. 
862 “Pakistan’s Imran Khan, Zarif Discuss Bilateral Ties, Border Guards,” Iran Daily, October 31, 2018, NewsBank 
863 Iran Daily, “Iran Says Ready to Fight Terror on Pakistani Soil.” 















Iranian Parliament representative 
from Sistan-Baluchistan: released a 
statement that the hostages would be 
returned home safe, and that in large 
part this was due to the cooperation 
between Pakistan and Iranian forces.  







Iranian parliament speaker Ali 
Larijani: terrorist groups have done 
damage to all countries in the region, 
they need to be stopped.  
Comments were made at a meeting 
with Larijani’s Pakistani 
counterpart. Said that Pakistani 
cooperation was critical for the safe 
return of the remaining abductees 
Yes Iran Daily866 
12/10/2018 
[Meeting] 
N/A 22nd Iran-Pakistan joint border 
meetings. In attendance: high-ranking 
officials from both states’ security 
apparatuses, foreign affairs 
department, border control, and local 
governance. 
 
Tied Pakistan’s performance in 
security to economic improvement:  
“The two Muslim neighboring 
countries have cultural, historical 
and religious commonalities as well 
as many common economic 
interests. Expansion of bilateral 
relations can lead to an economic 
boom and improved security.” 
Yes Iran Daily867 
12/16/2018 
[Statement] 
BLA attack Iran foreign ministry offers 
condolences, said Iran stood ready to 
After the BLA attack, Iran’s foreign 
emissary had been summoned to a 
Yes Iran Daily868 
 
865 “MP: Remaining Seven Abducted Border Guards to Be Released Soon,” Iran Daily, November 25, 2018, NewsBank. 
866 “Parliament Speaker Urges Pakistan to Help Release Iranian Border Guards,” Iran Daily, December 8, 2018, NewsBank. 
867 “Iran-Pakistan Joint Border Meetings Begin in Zahedan,” Iran Daily, December 10, 2018, NewsBank. 
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participate in any joint campaign 
against Baluch insurgents. 




 Meeting between Pakistan’s joint 
staff HQ and an Iranian envoy, 
specifically for border issues  
Two sides agreed to heavier border 
security in an MOU on the 26th of 
December. 







Head of the IRGC Maj General 
Jafari: “Pakistan, from this moment 
forward, will suffer the consequences 
of tolerating Jaish ul-Adl’s existence 
and activities on their soil.” 
Jafari: “Pakistan-do a better job of 
security, Counterterror, and border 
control; follow Iran’s lead and 
preemptively confront them” 







IRGC MAJ General Jafari: Held 
Pakistan responsible for acting 
against Jaish ul-Adl. Said that Iran 
would step in if Pakistan failed to act. 
Also claimed that Pakistan knew 
where Jaish ul-Adl’s bases of 
operations were but were either 
tolerating or supporting them. Said if 
safe haven of Jaish ul-Adl was 
allowed to continue, Pakistan would 
suffer severe consequences. 
N/A No Iran Daily871 
 
869 “Iran’s Envoy Meets Top Pakistani Commander,” Iran Daily, December 29, 2018, NewsBank. 
870 Iran Daily, “Pakistan Must Beef Up Security Along Iran Border: IRGC.” 
















Pakistan’s Ambassador to Iran was 
summoned for his government’s 
failure to prevent the car bombing. 
The Iranian foreign Ministry 
conveyed their expectation for 
Pakistani forces to attack the 
locations, movements, and 
fortifications of Jaish ul-Adl. Stressed 
once again that their continued 
presence put a heavy strain on Iran-
Pakistani relations 
Pakistani foreign minister said his 
country was willing to conduct joint 
counterterror operations, offered 
sympathy for those lost, stated that 
he was sending a delegation to Iran 
to address the issue 







“Iran’s Deputy Interior Minister ... 
said Islamabad has taken steps 
against militant groups over the years 
but ‘given the type of threats and our 
level of expectations,’ Pakistan’s 
moves have not yielded results.  
Deputy Interior Minister: “no signs 
that the Pakistani government had 
done ‘anything special’ against the 








“Soleimani said Iran does not want 
mere condolences, but concrete 
action from neighboring Pakistan, 
asking, ‘Can’t you, as a nuclear-
armed state, deal with a hundreds-
strong terrorist group in the region?’” 
N/A No Tehran 
Times874 
 
872 “Thousands Attend Funeral for IRGC Members Killed in Terror Bombing,” Iran Daily, February 16, 2019, NewsBank. 
873 “Iran Not Satisfied With Pakistani Measures Against Militants,” ISNA, February 20, 2019, NewsBank. 


















“Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah 
Mehmood Qureshi immediately sent 
a high-level delegation to Tehran to 
assure ... a thorough investigation and 
all-out cooperation in hunting down 
the culprits.” 
“Pakistan Army spokesperson 
Major General Asif Ghafoor ... said 
... ‘We both are considering fencing 
the border so that no third party ... 
could sabotage the brotherly and 
friendly relations through any 
nefarious act,’” 








Pakistani Foreign Minister, Shah 
Qureshi: “Relations between Iran and 
Pakistan are growing stronger ... 
security cooperation between Iran 
and Pakistan continues to grow.” 








Senior Advisor to Khamenei: 
“Relations between Iran and Pakistan 
are brotherly, good and 
constructive… promotion of 
economic cooperation and 
establishment of a railroad linking 
Iran, Pakistan and China could 
further strengthen ties ... incidents 
like a recent attack on Iranian forces 
by terrorists who entered Iran’s 
Sistan-Baluchistan province from 
N/A No Tehran 
Times877 
 
875 “Pakistan to fence 950km of common border with Iran,” Iran Daily, February 24, 2019, NewsBank. 
876 “Negative elements fail to harm Tehran-Islamabad ties: Pakistan FM,” Tehran Times, March 2, 2019, NewsBank. 
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Pakistan do harm to the relations ... 
called on Pakistan to make more 
efforts to ensure the security in 
common borders and put an end to 
terrorist attacks against Iran by 








Pakistan announces “crackdown” 
against terrorists-182 madrassas shut 
down, 120 people arrested. 
Rouhani: “We are awaiting your 
decisive operations against these 
terrorists.” “The news agency 
quoted Rouhani as telling Khan ... 
We should not allow decades of 
friendship and fraternity between 
the two countries to be undermined 
by the actions of small terrorist 
groups, the source of whose 











Direct Pakistani Military Action 
against Jaish ul-Adl: “military 
rescued the soldiers in Chaghi district 
of Balochistan province, near the 
Afghan border.” 
N/A No Iran Daily879 
 
878 “Pakistan Won’t Allow Its Soil to Be Used For Terrorist Activities,” Tehran Times, March 10, 2019, NewsBank; “Pakistan Promises ‘Good News’ For 
Iran Over Border Attack,” Tehran Times, March 10, 2019, NewsBank. 
879 “Freed Iranian Soldiers Receive Hero’s Welcome in Tehran,” Iran Daily, March 23, 2019, NewsBank; “Pakistan Hands Over 4 Abducted Border 












N/A Bilateral head of state meeting: Iran 
was pleased with Pakistan’s recent 
performance against terrorism, cross 
border security among highest 
priority issues 
“The issue of security at borders 
was another issue we discussed ... 
We are happy that the Pakistani 
side has called groups which take 
inhuman actions ‘terrorist’ and 






N/A Construction has begun, will be done 
in 3-4 years; building a fence on the 
Pakistani side of the border. 







“IRGC Brigadier General Qassem 
Rezaei pointed to “satisfactory” 
negotiations with Pakistani officials 
to secure the release of the three 
border guards held in Pakistan.” 
“‘One of the priorities of border 
guards is enhancing border 
diplomacy with all neighboring 
countries ... Widening such 
relations has not only resulted in a 
remarkable cut in borders’ expenses 
but also has increased competence 
of border guards,’ the commander 
remarked ... went on to say that Iran 
and Pakistan are to stage a maritime 
military exercise in common waters 
in Esfand.” 
No Iran Daily882 
 
880 Tehran Times, “No Third Country Can Affect Iran-Pakistan Ties: Rouhani.” 
881 Iran Daily, “Pakistan Begins Fencing Border with Iran.” 













N/A 23rd session of the Joint Border 
Commission: Meeting covered 
“border issues, counterterrorism 
measures, illegal trade, drug 
smuggling, illegal border crossing 
and human trafficking.” 
 
“Mir Ziaullah Lango ... the 
provincial home minister of 
Pakistani Balochestan, addressed 
the session on Wednesday and said 
that focus on the two neighbors’ 
joint economic and security 
interests was Islamabad’s top 
priority ... called for the elimination 
of terrorism, weapons and narcotics 
smuggling ... through effective 
measures ... added that terrorist 
elements are putting the peace and 
stability of the two countries’ 
common border at risk” 
Yes Iran Daily883 
 
 
883 Iran Daily, “Iran-Pakistan Hold 23rd Session of Joint Border Commission.” 
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APPENDIX H:  CROSS REFERENCES FOR INSURGENT 
ORGANIZATIONS AND UNITED STATES ASSOCIATION 
The research presented in this appendix is in reference to Chapter IV, subsection 
D, concerning the comparative narrative nexuses between press and media stories produced 
the Jundallah and the United States, and Jaish ul-Adl stories which mention the United 
States. Focused on domestically produced news sources, NewsBank’s news databases 
show that there is a far higher occurrence overall of Iran-produced news media which 
contains mention of both Jundallah and the United States than there are occurrences of 
Iran-produced media which contains mention of both Jaish ul-Adl and the United States. 
Nexis Uni, which has a more internationally focused database, also contains less stories 
which mention both Jaish ul-Adl and the United States when compared with stories which 
mention Jundallah and the United States.  
 
NEXIS UNI SEARCH RESULTS 






Insurgent/ U.S. Cross References 
“Jundullah” and “U.S.” 3469 7115 48% 
“Jundallah” and “U.S.”  2315 5183 45% 
“Jundollah” and “U.S.” 914 1635 55% 
“Jondullah” and “U.S.”  31 65 47% 
“Jondallah” and “US” 31 57 54% 
“Jondollah” and “US” 478 853 56% 
“Jandullah” and “US”  387 791 48% 
“Jandallah” and “US”  18 41 44% 
“Jandollah” and “US”  19 41 46% 
Total Jundullah/U.S. Cross Reference: 7662/15781, 48% 
“Jaish Adl” “U.S.” cross reference  1440 3505 41% 
Insurgent/ America Cross References 
“Jundallah” and “America”  1332 5183 25.6% 
“Jundollah” and “America”  388 1635 23.5% 
“Jondullah” and “America”  10 65 15% 
“Jondollah” and “America”  284 853 33.2% 
“Jondallah” and “America”  23 57 40% 
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NEXIS UNI SEARCH RESULTS 






“Jandullah” and “America”  129 791 16.3% 
“Jandallah” and “America” 8 41 19.5% 
“Jandollah” and “America”  7 41 17% 
Total Jundullah/America Cross Reference 1694 7115 23.8% 
Total Jaish Adl/America Cross Reference 330 3505 9.4% 
NEWSBANK SEARCH RESULTS 
Insurgent/“U.S.” Cross References 
“Jundullah” and “U.S.”  32 219 14.6% 
“Jundallah” and “U.S.” 29 127 22.8% 
“Jundollah” and “U.S.”  19 85 22% 
“Jondullah” and “U.S.” 0 7 0 
“Jondallah” and “U.S.” 0 0 0 
“Jondollah” and “U.S.” 15 56 26.7% 
“Jandullah” and “U.S.” 0 0 0 
“Jandallah” and “U.S.” 0 0 0 
“Jandollah” and “U.S.” 0 0 0 
Total Jundullah/ “U.S.” Cross Reference 95 494 19.3% 
Jaish Adl/ “U.S.” Cross Reference 34 224 15.1% 
Insurgent/ “America” Cross References 
“Jundullah” and “America”  5 219 2.2% 
“Jundallah” and “America” 4 127 3.1% 
“Jundollah” and “America”  4 85 4.7% 
“Jondullah” and “America” 0 7 0% 
“Jondallah” and “America” 0 0 N/A 
“Jondollah” and “America”  10 56 17.8% 
“Jandullah” and “America”  0 1 0% 
“Jandallah” and “America” 0 0 N/A 
“Jandollah” and “America” 0 0 N/A 
Total Jundallah/ “America” Cross Reference 23 495 4.6% 
Jaish Adl and America  7 224 3.1% 
a These cross references were constructed utilizing the Nexis Uni and NewsBank subscription 
databases. With respect to NewsBank, these searches focused on NewsBank’s Iranian Domestic News 
Sources. According to NewsBank, the domestic Iranian news sources contained in its database are: 
Tehran Times, Iran News, Iran Daily, IRNA, ISNA, Moj News Agency, Qods, and articles selected 
and republished by BBC. 
b “Jundullah” is spelled multiple ways. This variance appears both in Iranian domestic news 
sources, as well as in international media. For that reason, each individual spelling of Jundullah was 
cross referenced. 
217 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Agence France Presse. “Iran Arrests Rebels in Restive Border Regions.” May 4, 2006. 
Nexis Uni. 
———. “Iran Hangs Sunni Militant in Restive Province.” March 14, 2007. Nexis Uni. 
———. “Iran Hangs Two Convicted Rebels in Restive Southeast: Report.” June 6, 2009. 
Nexis Uni. 
———. “Iran Kills Sunni Rebels Planning Attacks: Police.” December 13, 2007. Nexis 
Uni. 
———. “Iran Security Forces Kill Five Militants.” May 25, 2006. Nexis Uni. 
———. “Rebels Murder, Shoot Officials in Southeastern Iran: Report.” April 9, 2006. 
Nexis Uni. 
Ahlubayt News Agency. “Execution, Fate of All Criminals: Head of Rigi Tribe.” 
December 2, 2010. https://en.abna24.com/service/iran/archive/0000/00/00/
192742/story.html. 
Ahmed, Manzoor, and Gulawar Khan. “The History of Baloch and Balochistan: A 
Critical Appraisal.” South Asian Studies 32, no. 1 (June 2017): 39-52. 
http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/3_v32_1_17.pdf. 
Ahmed, Kaamil. “Iran’s Opposition and Foreign Links: What’s the Reality?” Middle East 
Eye. September 25, 2018. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/irans-opposition-
and-foreign-links-whats-reality. 
Ahwaz Human Rights Organization. “Iranian Security Committed Field Executions 
Against Ahwazi Protesters.” November 27, 2019. https://ahwazhumanrights.org/
en/sections/12/iranian-security-committed-field-executions-against-ahwazi-
protesters.  
———. “Iran Arrests 150 Ahwazi Arab Volunteer Relief Workers.” May 1, 2019. 
https://ahwazhumanrights.org/en/sections/12/iran-arrests-150-ahwazi-arab-
volunteer-relief-workers. 
Akbar, Malik Siraj. “Selig Harrison: The American Reporter Who Introduced 
Balochistan to the World.” The Huffington Post. January 9, 2017. 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/selig-harrison-the-american-reporter-who-
introduced_b_587314c0e4b0a5e600a78c78. 
Alderson, Alexander. “Iraq and Its Borders: The Role of Barriers in Counter-Insurgency.” 
RUSI Journal 153, no. 2 (April 2008): 18-22. ProQuest. 
218 
Alfoneh, Ali. “Eternal Rivals? The Artesh and the IRGC.” Middle East Institute. 
November 15, 2011. https://www.mei.edu/publications/eternal-rivals-artesh-and-
irgc. 
———. “The Revolutionary Guards’ Role in Iranian Politics.” Middle East Quarterly 15, 
no.4 (September 2008): 3-14. https://www.meforum.org/1979/the-revolutionary-
guards-role-in-iranian-politics. 
Ali, Mohammed Reza. “The Biggest Telecommunication Merger in Iran Is Happening.” 
TechRASA. September 14, 2016. http://techrasa.com/2016/09/14/biggest-
telecommunication-merger-iran-happening/. 
Ali, Sangar. “Updated: Armed Group Kills over 20 at Military Parade in Iran’s Ahvaz.” 
Kurdistan24. September 22, 2018. http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/132fc59a-
20fe-4854-b2fc-6b415c54c47c. 
Ali, Syed Shah. “FIA Stops 19 Prospective Illegal Immigrants from Entering Iran.” The 
Dawn. September 17, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/news/1433492. 
———. “Nearly 29,000 Pakistanis Seeking Illegal Passage to Europe Deported by Iran in 
2016.” Dawn. May 16, 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1333502. 
Al Jazeera. “In Depth: Sistan-Baluchestan,” October 19, 2009, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2009/10/20091018135453355456.html. 
———. “Timeline: Iran After the Election.” February 11, 2010. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/focus/iran/2009/11/200911411259869709.html. 
Amend, Kurt. “Counterinsurgency Principles for the Diplomat.” Orbis 54, no. 2 (2010): 
215-31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2010.01.002. 
Amir, Samir S., and Salik Saeed. Pakistan’s Trade with Its Regional Partners. Karachi, 
Pakistan: The Pakistan Business Council, May 2019. https://www.pbc.org.pk/wp-
content/uploads/Regional-Trade-digital.pdf. 
Amnesty International. Further Information on UA 76/07. MDE 13/034/2007, 22 March 
2007. Fear of Imminent Execution/Torture. London: Amnesty International, June 
5, 2007. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/64000/
mde130662007en.pdf. 
———. Iran: Ethnic Minorities Facing New Wave of Human Rights Violations, MDE 
13/020/2007 (London: Amnesty International, February 26, 2007): 1, 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/64000/mde130202007en.pdf. 
219 
———. Iran: Fear of Reprisal Against Baluch Population Following Suicide Attack in 
Pishin by Armed Group, MDE 13/112/2009 (London: Amnesty International, 
October 20, 2009): 1-2, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/48000/
mde131122009en.pdf. 
———. Iran: Human Rights Abuses against the Baluchi Minority. MDE 13/104/2007. 
London: Amnesty International 2007. https://www.amnesty.org/download/
Documents/68000/mde131042007en.pdf. 
Al Arabiya News Network. “Iran Says May Send Forces into Pakistan Territory.” 
February 17, 2014. Nexis Uni. 
———. “Suicide Bombers Kills 38 Near Iran Shiite Mosque.” December 15, 2010, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20101217051840/http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/
2010/12/15/129680.html. 
Arab News Pakistan. “Pakistan Army Denies Reports of Joint Border Patrols with Iran.” 
Arab News. December 9, 2019. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1596296/
pakistan. 
Armee de Terre. Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level. Paris, France: 
French Defense Ministry, April 2010 https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/
frenchcoindoctrine.pdf. 
Army of the United Kingdom, The. Countering Insurgency. BAFM 71876. London, UK: 
British Ministry of Defence, October 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/
pdfs/16_11_09_army_manual.pdf. 
Arraf, Jane. “The Aftermath of Iran’s Missile Attack on an Iraqi Base Housing U.S. 
Troops.” NPR. January 14, 2020. https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2020/
01/14/796219386/the-aftermath-of-irans-missile-attack-on-an-iraqi-base-housing-
u-s-troops. 
Aryan, Hossein. “Blaming Outsiders Won’t Solve Iran’s Baluchistan Problem.” 
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, July 20, 2010. https://www.rferl.org/
a/Blaming_Outsiders_Wont_Solve_Irans_Baluchistan_Problem/2104613.html. 
———. “The Artesh: Iran’s Marginalized and Under-Armed Conventional Military.” 
Middle East Institute. November 15, 2011. https://www.mei.edu/publications/
artesh-irans-marginalized-and-under-armed-conventional-military. 
Asharq al-Awsat. “Jaish-ul-Adl’ Publishes Images of Abducted Iranian Soldiers.” 
October 23, 2018. https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1435501/jaish-ul-adl-
publishes-images-abducted-iranian-soldiers. 
220 
Aslan, Reza. “Is the U.S. Still Funding Jundallah?” Daily Beast. December 15, 2010. 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/iran-suicide-bombing-is-the-us-still-funding-
jundallah. 
Associated Foreign Press. “Iran to Seal Eastern Borders by 2015.” Dawn. July 2, 2011. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/641120. 
———. “Jaish al-Adl: Shadowy Sunni Extremists on Iran-Pakistan border.” 
Yahoo!News. February 14, 2019. https://www.yahoo.com/news/jaish-al-adl-
shadowy-sunni-extremists-iran-pakistan-110545784.html. 
———. “Pakistan Ready To Act On Credible, Actionable Intel To Recover Missing 
Iranian Soldiers.” Express Tribune. March 26, 2014. https://tribune.com.pk/story/
687627/iran-blames-pakistan-for-abduction-execution-of-soldier/. 
Associated Press International. “Revolutionary Guard Clashes with Bandits in 
Southeastern Iran, Kills Four, Suffers Casualties.” July 20, 2007. Nexis Uni. 
Associated Press. “Iran Detains 14 Suspected Extremists.” January 9, 2006. Nexis Uni. 
Australian Army. Counterinsurgency. Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 3-01-1. Sydney: 
Commonwealth of Australia, December 2009. https://www.army.gov.au/sites/
g/files/net1846/f/lwd_3-0-1_counterinsurgency_full_0.pdf. 
Azimi, Amir. “Why Iran Plane Disasters Protests Mark Most Serious Test Yet.” BBC 
News. January 18, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
51147191. 
Alsalmi, Adil. “Liberation of Ahwaz Movement Leader: The Deceive Storm Restored 
Faith to our Hearts.” Asharq Al Awsat. March 20, 2016. https://eng-
archive.aawsat.com/adil-alsalmi/news-middle-east/liberation-of-ahwaz-
movement-leader-the-deceive-strom-restored-faith-to-our-hearts. 
Bairstow, Timothy M. “Border Interdiction in Counterinsurgency: A Look at Algeria, 
Rhodesia, and Iraq.” Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, June 2016. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a471103.pdf. 
Baloch, Bari. “39 Training Camps in Afghanistan Fueling Balochistan Unrest: FC IG.” 
The Nation. June 2, 2012. https://nation.com.pk/03-Jun-2012/39-training-camps-
in-afghanistan-fuelling-balochistan-unrest-fc-ig. 
Baloch, Muhammad Umar Farooq. “Pakistan-Iran Pipeline Project- A Liberal 
Perspective.” Institute for Strategic Studies Research and Analysis Papers 4, no. 2 




Baloch, Sajid Hussain. “The Other Jihadis.” Sajid H. Baloch Blog. November 28, 2013. 
https://sajidhbaloch.wordpress.com/2013/11/28/the-other-jihadis/. 
Banerjea, Udit. “Revolutionary Intelligence: The Expanding Intelligence Role of the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.” Journal of Strategic Security 8, no.3 (Fall 
2015): 93-106. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=
1449&context=jss. 
Baloch, Shezad. “A Tale of Two Rigis: Iran Seeks Extradition of Jaish al-Nasr Chief.” 
Express Tribune. March 9, 2015. https://tribune.com.pk/story/850172/a-tale-of-
two-rigis-iran-seeks-extradition-of-jaish-al-nasr-chief/. 
——— “Jailed Abroad: Jundullah Commander Arrested in Quetta.” Express Tribune. 
March 1, 2015. https://tribune.com.pk/story/845999/jailed-abroad-jundullah-
commander-arrested-in-quetta/. 
Balochistan Post, The. “Chabahar: 4 Killed and Several Injured in a Bomb Blast.” 
December 6, 2018. http://thebalochistanpost.net/2018/12/chabahar-4-killed-and-
several-injured-in-a-bomb-blast/. 
Basit, Saira. “Explaining the Impact of Militancy on Iran-Pakistan Relations.” Small 
Wars & Insurgencies 29, no. 5-6 (June 2018): 1040-64. https://doi.org/10.1080/
09592318.2018.1546362. 
BBC. “Iran Hangs 16 Rebels in Reprisal for Border Deaths.” October 26, 2013. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24682729. 
———. “Iranian Police Killed by Rebels.” December 4, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/7765474.stm. 
———. “Iran Sunni Group Jaish al-Adl Claims Border Attack.” October 27, 2013. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24690883. 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia. “Over 70m Dollars Allocated to Iranian Border Guard 
Command.” July 27, 2011. ProQuest. 
BBC Monitoring Middle East. “Iran to Modernize Border Surveillance Technology.” 
April 16, 2014. ProQuest. 
BBC News. “Iran Jundallah Leader Claims U.S. Military Support.” February 26, 2010. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8537567.stm. 
Boedeker, Just. “Baloch Identities: A Matter of Descent or Mentality?” Journal of the 
Middle East and Africa 4, no. 2 (October 2013): 225-43. https://doi.org/10.1080/
21520844.2013.831715. 
222 
Booz-Allen Persia House. “Jundullah/Iranian Press Round.” Politico. 
https://www.politico.com/pdf/PPM136_microsoft_word_-
_boozallenpesiahousejundallahanalysis__2_.pdf, September 2019. 
Boot, Max. “An Iraq To-Do list: How We Can Help the Surge Succeed.” The Weekly 
Standard 12, no. 34 (May 2007). 
Breseeg, Taj Mohammed. “Baloch Nationalism: Its Origins and Development.” PhD 
diss., University of London, 2004. https://www.scribd.com/doc/99421/Baloch-
Nationalism-Its-origin-and-development. 
Bruno, Greg. “The Media Landscape in Iran.” Council on Foreign Relations. July 22, 
2009. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-landscape-iran. 
Bucala, Paul, and Shayan Enferadi. “Iran’s Kurdish Insurgency.” Critical Threats. 
September 26, 2016. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/irans-kurdish-
insurgency. 
Burton, Fred, and Scott Stewart. “Tablighi Jamaat: An Indirect Line to Terrorism.” 
Stratfor. January 23, 2008, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/tablighi-jamaat-
indirect-line-terrorism. 
Butt, Qaiser. “Iran Deports Over 20,000 Illegal Pakistani Immigrants Every Year.” 
Express Tribune. August 3, 2016. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1155188/iran-
deports-20000-illegal-pakistani-immigrants-every-year/. 
Byman, Daniel L. “‘Death Solves All Problems’: The Authoritarian Model of 
Counterinsurgency.” Journal of Strategic Studies, 39, no.1 (January 2016): 62-93. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1068166. 
———. “Iran’s Terrorism Problem.” The Brookings Institution. 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2013/11/21/irans-terrorism-problem/. 
Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan. 
Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. MR-1405-OTI. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2001. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/
MR1405.html. 
Calabrese, John. “Iran’s War on Drugs: Holding the Line?” Middle East Institute. 
December 1st, 2007. https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-war-drugs-holding-
line. 
Cappuccino, Nicholas. “Baluch Insurgents in Iran.” The Iran Primer: United States 
Institute of Peace. April 27, 2017. https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2017/apr/05/
baluch-insurgents-iran. 
223 
Center for Human Rights in Iran. “Social Activist Yaghoub Mehrnehad Executed.” 
August 4, 2008. https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2008/08/social-activist-
yaghoub-mehrnehad-executed/. 
Choksy, Jamsheed K. “Iran’s Enemy Is Not America’s Friend.” Foreign Policy. October 
20, 2009. https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/20/irans-enemy-is-not-americas-
friend/. 
CNN. “Iran to Execute 14 Convicted in 2006 Terror Attack.” July 13, 2009. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/07/13/iran.execution/index.html. 
———. “Iranians Mourn 27 Killed in Suicide Attacks.” July 18, 2010. 
https://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/07/17/iran.blasts/index.html. 
Cohen, Ariel, Lisa Curtis, and Owen Graham. The Proposed Iran-Pakistan-India Gas 
Pipeline: An Unacceptable Risk to Regional Security. No. 2139. Washington, DC: 
The Heritage Foundation, 2008. https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-
proposed-iran-pakistan-india-gas-pipeline-unacceptable-risk-regional-
security#_ftn1. 
CommandEleven. “Pakistan-Iran Relations: Complex Dynamics.” May 3, 2017. 
https://www.commandeleven.com/pakistan/pakistan-iran-relations-complex-
dynamics/. 
Conan, Neal. “Insurgent Group Jundallah Worries Iranians.” Produced by NPR. In Talk 
of the Nation. October 26, 2009. Podcast, transcript. https://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=114178606. 
Cordesman, Anthony, and Martin Kleiber. Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting 
Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf. Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2007. 
Dagher, Munqith. “Polling Insights on Iraq’s Shia Revolt.” The Washington Institute. 
November 8, 2019. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/polling-
insights-on-iraqs-shia-revolt. 
Dames, Mansej Longworth. A Text Book of the Balochi Language. Lahore: Punjab 
Provincial Government, 1922. https://archive.org/details/
textbookofbaloch00damerich/page/n11/mode/2up. 
D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation. “Pakistan, Iran Ink Eight Agreements and 
MoUs.” May 12, 2014. http://developing8.org/news/pakistan-iran-ink-eight-
agreements-and-mous/. 
Daragahi, Borzou. “Days after Bombing, Iran Executes Three.” The Star-Ledger. May 
31, 2009. Nexis Uni. 
224 
Dareini, Ali Akbar. “Blast Kills 11 Members of Iran’s Elite Guard: Jundallah, A Sunni 
Militant Brigade, Takes responsibility.” Ottawa Citizen. February 15, 2007. Nexis 
Uni. 
———. “Iran Arrests Suspects in Attack on Military Chiefs.” San Diego Union Tribune. 
October 21, 2009. https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-ml-iran-bombing-
102109-2009oct21-story.html. 
———. “Iran Hangs 13 Members of Rebel Sunni Muslim Group.” Associated Press 
International. July 14, 2009. Nexis Uni. 
Dashti, Naseer. The Baloch Conflict with Iran and Pakistan: Aspects of a National 
Liberation Struggle. Bloomington, IN: Trafford Publishing 2017. 
Dawn. “Baloch Diaspora To Form HR Body in London.” August 22, 2008. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/317684. 
———. “Iranian Terrorist in Pakistan’s Custody.” May 2, 2015. https://www.dawn.com/
news/1179449. 
———. “Iran Vows to Support Anti-Terror Efforts.” December 20, 2013. Nexis Uni. 
———. “Nearly 250,000 Pakistanis Deported From 2012-2015: Report.” November 20, 
2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/1297540. 
———. “Taftan Border Closed for Ashura.” September 10, 2019. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1504515. 
Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power. Washington, DC: Defense 
Intelligence Agency, August 2019. https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/
News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf. 
Dehghan, Saeed Kamali. “Iran Opposition Green Movement Calls for Renewed Street 
Protests.” Guardian. February 8, 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/
feb/08/iran-opposition-green-movement-tehran-protest. 
Derakhsi, Reza. “US, UK behind attack on Guards, Claims Iran,” Independent, October 
19, 2009, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/us-uk-behind-
attack-on-guards-claims-iran-1805242.html. 
Diplomat, The. “Inside Iran’s Most Secretive Region.” May 16, 2011. 
https://thediplomat.com/2011/05/inside-irans-most-secretive-region/. 
Dixon, Paul. The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern 
Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. 
225 
Dudoignon, Stéphane A. Baluch, Sunnism and the State in Iran. NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2016. 
Dunn, David Hastings. “‘Real Men Want to Go to Tehran:’ Bush, Pre-emption, and the 
Iranian Nuclear Challenge.” International Affairs, 83, no.1 (January 2007): 19-38. 
DW. “Iran, Pakistan Agree to Joint Border ‘Reaction Force.’” April 22, 2019. 
https://www.dw.com/en/iran-pakistan-agree-to-joint-border-reaction-force/a-
48434184. 
———. “Pakistan Blames Iran-Based Separatists for Deadly Baluchistan Attack,” April 
20, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-blames-iran-based-separatists-for-
deadly-baluchistan-attack/a-48416436. 
Economic Times of India. “Over 500,000 Pakistanis Deported in Last 5 Years.” 
September 5, 2017. https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/world-news/
over-500000-pakistanis-deported-in-last-5-years/articleshow/60375931.cms 
Elmi-Sarabi, Somaz. “Congressman Urges U.S. to Foment Ethnic Tension in Iran.” 
National Iranian American Council. Last modified April 6, 2013. 
https://www.niacouncil.org/congressman-urges-u-s-to-foment-ethnic-tension-in-
iran/. 
Esfandiary, Dina, and Ariane M. Tabatabai. “A Comparative Study of U.S. and Iranian 
Counter-ISIS Strategies.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 6 (October 
2016): 455-469. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1221265. 









———. “Iran Deports Over 20 Pakistani Immigrants.” September 10, 2017. 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1502633/iran-deports-20-pakistani-immigrants/. 
———. “Iran Hands Over 61 Pakistan Immigrants to FIA at Taftan border.” March 19, 
2017. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1359601/iran-hands-61-pakistan-immigrants-
fia-taftan-border/. 
———. “Iran Closes Border for An Indefinite Period.” June 10, 2014. 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/719719/iran-closes-border-for-an-indefinite-period/. 
226 
Fathi, Nazila. “Car Bomb in Iran Destroys a Bus Carrying Revolutionary Guards.” New 
York Times. February 15, 2007. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/15/world/
middleeast/15tehran.html?_r=2&oref=slogin. 
———. “Insurgents Were Trained in Pakistan, Iran Charges; 65 Arrested for Attacks in 
Sunni Border Area.” The International Herald Tribune, Nexis Uni. 
———. “Rare Suicide Bombing in Iran Kills 4.” New York Times. December 30, 2008. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/30/world/middleeast/30iran.html. 
Finel, Bernard. “A Substitute for Victory.” Foreign Affairs. April 7, 2010. Accessed May 
15, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2010-04-08/
substitute-victory. 
Fiske, Philip. “Border Patrol with Iran’s Drugbusters.” BBC. May 19, 2000. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/
755532.stm. 
Flock, Elizabeth. “Iran Gets Back E-Mail Access, but Other Sites Remain Blacked Out 




Fulton, Will, Joseph Holiday, and Sam Wyer. “Iranian Strategy in Syria.” Institute for the 
Study of War. May 2013. http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-
strategy-syria. 
Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger 
Security International, 2006. 
Gambrell, John. “Iran Lawmaker Says some 3,700 Arrested Amid Protests, Unrest.” 
KSL. January 9, 2018. https://www.ksl.com/article/46233237/iran-lawmaker-
says-3700-arrested-in-days-of-protest-unrest. 
Glenn, Russel W. “No More Principles of War?” Parameters 28, no. 1 (April 1, 1998): 
48-66.  
Godfrey, F.A. “The Latin American Experience: The Tuparamos, Campaign in Uruguay, 
1963-1973.” in Counter Insurgency: Lessons From History. Edited by Ian F.W. 
Beckett, 112-136. Bernsley, South Yokshire, England: Pen & Sword, 1998. 
Golkar, Saied. “The Evolution of Iran’s Police Forces and Social Control in the Islamic 
Republic.” Middle East Briefs, no. 120 (July 2018): https://www.brandeis.edu/
crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/101-200/meb120.pdf. 
227 
———. The Supreme Leader and the Guard: Civil-Military Relations and Regime 
Survival in Iran, PN58. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near-East 
Policy, 2019. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/
PolicyNote58-Golkar.pdf. 
Goodenough, Patrick. “Iran Executes Insurgent Leader, Accused of Ties with American 
Intelligence.” CNSMonitor. June 20, 2010. https://web.archive.org/web/
20141119160033/http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/iran-executes-insurgent-
leader-accused-ties-american-intelligence. 
Guevara, Che, and Van-Hieu Nguyen. Guerilla Warfare; a Method. Forest Grove, OR: 
Normount Armament, 1966. 
Gulf News. “Leader and 11 Members of Militant Group Killed.” April 7, 2006. 
https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/leader-and-11-members-of-militant-group-
killed-1.232015. 
Greenhill, Kelly M., and Paul Staniland. “Ten Ways to Lose at Counterinsurgency.” Civil 
Wars 9, no. 4, 411 (December 2007): 402-419. https://doi.org/10.1080/
13698240701699623. 
Gruber, Barbara, and Jan Pospisil. “‘Ser Eleno’: Insurgent Identity Formation in the 
ELN.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 26, no. 2 (March 2015): 226-247. 
https://doi.org10.1080/09592318.2015.1007562. 
Hafezi, Pariza. “Iran Attackers Fought for Islamic State in Syria, Iraq: Ministry.” Reuters. 
June 8, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-security-idUSKBN18Z1H2 
Harrison, Selig S. “Free Baluchistan.” The National Interest. February 1, 2011. 
https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/free-baluchistan-4799. 
———. In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations. New 
York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981. 
Hashim, Ahmed S. “The Iranian Military in Politics, Revolution, and War, Part Two.” 
Middle East Policy 19, no. 3 (Fall, 2012): 65-83. https://doi.org.10.1111/j.1475-
4967.2012.00548.x 
Held, Amy. “Nearly 2 Dozen Iranian Revolutionary Guards Reportedly Killed in Bomb 
Attack.” NPR. February 13, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/02/13/694352657/
nearly-two-dozen-iranian-revolutionary-guards-reportedly-killed-in-bomb-attack. 
Hersh, Seymour M. “The Iran Plans.” The New Yorker. April 10, 2006. 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/04/17/the-iran-plans. 
228 
———. “Preparing the Battlefield: The Bush Administration Steps Up Its Secret Moves 
Against Iran.” The New Yorker. June 29, 2008. https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2008/07/07/preparing-the-battlefield. 
Hosseini, Seyed Hamid. “Jaish ul-Adl Was Forced to Free 4 Iranian Border Guards.” Iran 
Review. April 10, 2014. http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Jaish-ul-
Adl-Was-Forced-to-Free-4-Iranian-Border-Guards.htm 
Housnell, Blake. “A Word of Caution about Seymour Hersh’s Latest.” Foreign Policy. 
June 30, 2008. https://foreignpolicy.com/2008/06/30/a-word-of-caution-about-
seymour-hershs-latest/. 
Human Rights Watch. “Iran: Dozens Unlawfully Held in City’s Prisons.” January 27, 
2015. https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/18/iran-dozens-unlawfully-held-citys-
prisons. 
Hussain, Sumaira. “Iran Forces Extradited 72 Pakistani on Taftan Border to Levies.” 
Urdu Point. January 12, 2017. https://www.urdupoint.com/en/pakistan/irani-
forces-extradited-72-pakistani-on-tafta-87128.html. 
Hyder, Kamal. “Exclusive Report on Baluch Wall.” June 11 2007. Al Jazeera. Video. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KV1ENB8t_jg. 
Iran Chamber Society. “Iranian Provinces: Sistan and Baluchistan.” 2017. 
http://www.iranchamber.com/provinces/21_sistan_baluchistan/
21_sistan_baluchistan.php. 
Iran Daily. “8 Arrested for Terror Attacks Martyring 27 IRGC in SE Iran.” February 21, 
2019. NewsBank. 
———. “Abducted Iranian Border Guards to Return from Pakistan: Commander.” 
December 25, 2019. NewsBank. 
———. “Armed Bandits Kill Four Border Guards in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan” July 
6, 2016. NewsBank. 
———. “Arms Cache of Jaish Ul-Adl Terror Group Seized in SE Iran.” July 8, 2017. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Cmdr. Rejects Reports on Death of Kidnapped Border Guard.” August 23, 
2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Commander: Iran Pursuing Fate of Kidnapped Border Guard.” January 1, 2019. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Efforts Ongoing to Free Border Guards.” February 28, 2014. NewsBank. 
229 
———. “Evicting Terrorists Not Limited to Iran’s Borders: IRGC Commander.” July 20, 
2017. NewsBank. 
———. “Freed Iranian Soldiers Receive Hero’s Welcome in Tehran.” March 23, 2019. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Gunmen Kill Two Policemen in Southwest Iran.” May 15, 2017. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Arrests Key Member of Terrorist Group in Southeast.” June 26, 2016. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Border Guards Targeted from Outside Country: IRGC Commander.” April 
29, 2017. Nexis Uni. 
———. “Iran Busts Terror Cell in East, Detains 40: Interior Minister.” July 21, 2016. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Iran FM Due in Pakistan To Follow Up on Terror Attack on Border Guards.” 
May 2, 2017. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Must Press Pakistan Over Abductions.” February 14, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Optimistic About Freedom of Abducted Guards.” February 15, 2014. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Police to Follow Up Guards Kidnap.” February 9, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Reaching Out to Neighbors.” May 6, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Says Ready for Joint Anti-Terror Operation After Deadly Attack in 
Pakistan.” December 16, 2018. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Says Ready to Fight Terror on Pakistani Soil.” November 17, 2018. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Summons Pakistan Ambassador Over Terrorist Attack.” February 17, 
2019. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Team Due in Pakistan Over Abductions.” February 12, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran, Pakistan Discuss Abducted Border Guards.” March 9, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran, Pakistan Form Committee on Abducted Guards.” February 22, 2014. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Iran: Saudi Arabia True ‘Godfather’ of Takfiri Terrorism,” February 19, 2019, 
NewsBank. 
230 
———. “Iran’s Envoy Meets Top Pakistani Commander.” December 29, 2018. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Iranian Forces Foil Terrorist Attack in Border Town.” April 17, 2018. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Iranian Forces Kill 10 Terrorists in East, West.” June 13, 2016. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran-Pakistan Hold 23rd Session of Joint Border Commission.” January 1, 
2020, NewsBank. 
———. “Iran-Pakistan Joint Border Meetings Begin in Zahedan.” December 10, 2018. 
NewsBank. 
———. “IRGC: Bomber, Two Other Terrorists in Iran Attack Identified as Pakistani 
Nationals.” February 19, 2019. NewsBank. 
———. “IRGC Commander: Pakistan Has Promised Full Cooperation on Release of 
Iranian Guards.” October 23, 2018. NewsBank. 
———. “IRGC Foils Terrorist Attack in Southeastern Province.” September 10, 2014. 
NewsBank. 
———. “IRGC: Iran Border Guards Targeted from Outside Country.” April 29, 2017. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Leader: Enemies Cannot Hurt Iranian Nation.” February 18, 2019. NewsBank. 
———. “MP: Iran Border Guards Freed.” April 4, 2014. NewsBank.  
———. “MP: Remaining Seven Abducted Border Guards to Be Released Soon.” 
November 25, 2018. NewsBank. 
———. “No Ground for Daesh Activities in Iran: IRGC Commander,” July 20, 2016, 
NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan Accountable for Deaths of Iranian Border Guards: Ministry.” April 27, 
2017. NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan Again Urged to Improve Security.” February 19, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan Ambassador to Brief MPs on Abducted Guards.” March 16, 2014. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan Assures Iran of Cooperation in Iranian Guards’ Abduction.” October 
18, 2018, NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan Begins Fencing Border with Iran.” May 11, 2019. NewsBank. 
231 
———. “Pakistan Cooperating on Border Raid Probe.” November 11, 2013. NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan Hands Over 4 Abducted Border Guards to Iran.” March 21, 2019. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan Locates Jaish-Ul-Adl Hideout.” February 25, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan Must Beef Up Security Along Iran Border: IRGC.” February 14, 2019. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan To Fence 950km of Common Border with Iran.” February 24, 2019. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan’s Imran Khan, Zarif Discuss Bilateral Ties, Border Guards.” October 
31, 2018. NewsBank 
———. “Parliament Speaker Urges Pakistan To Help Release Iranian Border Guards.” 
December 8, 2018. NewsBank. 
———. “Police Kill Suicide Bomber.” July 9, 2013. NewsBank. 
———. “Police Will Confront Terrorists in Border Regions,” November 17, 2013, 
NewsBank. 
———. “President Underscores Iran-Pakistan Security Ties.” May 11, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Speaker: Border Insecurity Affects Iran-Pakistan Ties.” March 3, 2014. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Tehran, Islamabad Cooperating Over Border Guard’s Fate.” April 11, 2014. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Terrorist Attack Kills IRGC Member in Southeastern Iran.” February 2, 2019. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Terrorists Abduct Iranian Forces Near Pakistani Border.” October 16, 2018. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Terrorists Kill Border Guard in SE.” December 4, 2013. NewsBank. 
———. “Thousands Attend Funeral for IRGC Members Killed in Terror Bombing.” 
February 16, 2019. NewsBank. 
———. “Three IRGC Personnel Killed in Southeast.” December 18, 2013. NewsBank. 
———. “Three Security Forces Killed in Sistan-Baluchistan.” November 26, 2014. 
NewsBank. 
232 
———. “Three Terrorists, Three Iranian Forces Killed in Border Clash.” June 26, 2018. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Video Claims Abducted Iranian Border Guards Call Families After Five 
Months.” March 17, 2019. NewsBank. 
———. “Zarif: Pakistan Vows to Increase Military Presence on Common Border.” 
October 22, 2018. NewsBank. 
———.” Two Abducted Iranians Freed.” August 17, 2014. NewsBank. 
Iranian Government News. “Jaish-ul-Adl Terrorists Behind Iran Guards Deaths.” October 
31, 2013. Nexis Uni. 
Iran News. “Bomb Attack Kills 11 in Zahedan.” February 15, 2007. NewsBank. 
———. “Envoy: Iran-Pakistan Cooperation Beyond Rigi Group Issue.” October 28, 2009. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Four Rigi Linked Agents Arrested.” August 13, 2009. NewsBank. 
———. “Full Security in Sistan-Baluchistan.” February 24, 2010. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Urges U.S. to Take Action Against Terrorist Rigi Group.” October 23, 
2009. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Will Not Negotiate With Criminals.” June 30, 2008, NewsBank. 
———. “IRGC Chief: U.S., Britain, Pakistan Behind Sunday’s Terrorist Act.” October 
20, 2009. NewsBank. 
———. “IRGC Commander Blames U.S., Israel for Zahedan Blasts.” July 17, 2010. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Jundallah Defectors Granted immunity.” April 25, 2010. NewsBank. 
———. “Jundallah Kill 2 Hostages in Iran.” June 19, 2008. NewsBank. 
———. “Jundollah Claims It Killed Two More Policemen.” July 29, 2008, NewsBank. 
———. “Jundollah: Four Remaining Iranian Hostages Executed.” October 8, 2008. 
NewsBank 
———. “Kidnapped Soldiers Held by Sunni Militants.” January 8, 2006. NewsBank. 
———. “Mottaki: Rigi Terrorist Group Supported by Aliens in Afghanistan.” June 1, 
2009. NewsBank. 
233 
———. “MPs Urge Punitive Measures Against Negligent Sistan-Baluchestan Officials.” 
April 12, 2006. NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistani Ambassador Summoned.” May 30, 2009. NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan Urged to Counter Terrorists.” June 28, 2008. NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan Vows to Uproot Rigi Group.” October 27, 2009. NewsBank. 
———. “Police Chief: No Further Information on Kidnapped Cops.” July 10, 2008, 
NewsBank. 
———. “Rebels Kill Cops.” January 27, 2009. NewsBank. 
———. “Sunni Group Claims Kerman Roadside Killings.” May 15, 2006. NewsBank 
———. “Three Policemen Abducted, Jundollah Claims.” August 13, 2008. NewsBank. 
———. “U.S. Terrorism.” February 19, 2007. NewsBank. 
The Iran Project (blog). “Anti-Iran Terrorist Group Executes Ringleader’s Killer.” 
September 3, 2014. https://theiranproject.com/blog/2014/09/03/anti-iran-terrorist-
group-executes-ringleaders-killer/. 
———. “Iran Hands Over 253 Illegal Immigrants to Pakistan.” November 20, 2018. 
https://theiranproject.com/blog/2018/11/20/iran-hands-over-253-illegal-
immigrants-to-pakistan/. 
———. The. “Iran Hands Over 29 Pakistani Nationals to Islamabad Government.” 
November 5, 2019. https://theiranproject.com/blog/2019/11/05/iran-hands-over-
29-pakistani-nationals-to-islamabad-government/. 
———. “Iran Sets Free 107 Pakistani nationals.” April 29, 2019. 
https://theiranproject.com/blog/2019/04/29/iran-sets-free-107-pakistani-nationals/. 
Iran Times International. “Rebels Execute Border Guard.” April 4, 2014. Nexis Uni. 
Islam Times. “Iran and Pakistan Sign Border Agreement.” January 3, 2020. 
https://www.islamtimes.org/en/news/836265/iran-and-pakistan-sign-border-
agreement. 
Iran Watch. “Khatam-al Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA).” June 1, 2012. 
https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/khatam-al-anbiya-construction-
headquarters-kaa. 
IRNA. “Iran To Use Its Power If Abducted Border Guard Killed By ‘Rebel’ Group -
Minister.” March 26, 2014. NewsBank. 
234 
———. “Iran Commander Says People ‘Celebrate’ Execution of Rebel Leader.” June 20, 
2010. NewsBank. 
———.” Iran Says Baluch Separatist Group Released One Hostage.” September 9, 2008. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan to Hand Over Members of Rebel Group to Iran—TV.” May 31, 2008, 
NewsBank 
ISNA. “Corps Commander Announces: Adopts New Structural Model for Army and 
Mobilization by Supreme Leader” [ اطالعاتي ھايسازمان  حمایت ـ داد: خبر سپاه كل فرمانده  
مقام سوي از بسیج و سپاه براي جدید  ساختاري الگوي تصویب ریگـ گروه از پاكستان و انگلیس آمریكا،  
گروه از پاكستان و انگلیس آمریكا، اطالعاتي ھايسازمان حمایت ـ داد: خبر سپاه كل فرمانده معظم  
  .October 27, 2008.[ریگي ـ تصویب الگوي ساختاري جدید  براي سپاه و بسیج از سوي مقام معظم
———. “Iran Whistle-Blower Arrested for Receiving 6.5m Dollars State Funds—
Judiciary.” June 21, 2008. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Denies Attack on Southeastern Province.” August 31, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Foreign Minister Discusses Border Guards with Pakistani Counterpart.” 
March 4, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Not Satisfied with Pakistani Measures Against Militants.” February 20, 
2019. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Official Lowers Expectations for Quick Release of Border Guards.” April 
4, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Police Say Four Jondollah Rebels Killed in 4 June Operation.” June 7, 
2012. NewsBank.  
———. “Iran Pursues Case of Abducted Guard Through Pakistan—Minister.” April 21, 
2014. NewsBank. 
———. “MP Calls for Diplomatic Solution to Free Iran Abducted Border Guards.” 
NewsBank. February 22, 2014. NewsBank. 
Jahani, Carina. “The Balochi Language and Languages in Iranian Balochistan.” Journal 
of the Middle East and Africa 4, no. 2 (May 2013): 153-67. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2013.831333. 
Jaish ul-Adl. “ ی تھایجنا بھ ی،پاسخ العدل شیج سازمان مبارزان توسط سراوان کوھک ینظام گاهیپا بھ حملھ  
ھیسور مظلوم مردم ھیعل سمینی خم سفاک میرژ ” [Attack on Jawad al-Adl militants attacked 
Kuhak Saravan Military Base, a response to the atrocities of the Khomeini regime 
against the oppressed Syrian people]. Edaalat News (blog). July 18’th 2013. 
http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2013/07/blog-post_18.html. 
235 
———. “ فطر د یسع د یع مناسبت بھ یفاروق نیالد  صالح العدل شیج  رھبر کیتبر ام یپ ” [Congratulatory 
Message by Jaish al-Adl leader Salahuddin Faruqi on the occasion of Eid Saeed 
Fitr]. Edaalat News (blog). August 19, 2012. http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/
2012/08/blog-post_7900.html. 
———. “ العدل جیش سازمان وجود  اعالم  [Declaration of existence for Jaish al-Adl],” Edaalat 
News (blog), April 19, 2012, http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2012/04/blog-
post.html. 
———. “ قربان د یسع د یع مناسبت بھ سازمان ھیاعالم ” [Declaration on the occasion of Eid al-
Adha]. Edaalat News (blog). September 23, 2015, 
http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2015/09/blog-post_86.html. 
———. “ مبارک نیمسلم عموم بر فطر د یسع د یع ” [Eid Saeed Fitr to the public of Mubarak 
Muslims]. Edaalat News, July 27, 2014, http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2014/
07/blog-post_27.html. 
———. “ مبارک فطر د یسع د یع ” [Happy Eid Saeed Fitr]. Edaalat News (blog). July 5, 2016. 
http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2016/07/blog-post_38.html. 
———. “ وزین ماف با سازمان دوم یسخنگو مصاحبھ ” [Interview with Maf News, The Second 
Spokesman for the Organization].” Edaalat News (blog), July 30, 2016. 
http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2016/07/blog-post_49.html. 
———. “ د ینما یم محکوم شدت بھ را برمھ مسلمانان ھیعل انیبودائ اتیجنا العدل شیج سازمان ” [Jaish al-
Adl condemns Buddhist crimes against Burma Muslims]. Edaalat News (blog). 
August 8, 2012. http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2012/08/blog-post_1649.html. 
———. “ کنید  آزاد  را اھلسنت :زندانیان العدل جیش سازمان جدید  اطالعیھ ” [Jaish al-Adl Organization 
News Release: Release Ahlensat Prisoners]. Edaalat News (blog). February 16, 
2014. http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2014/02/blog-post_16.html 
———. “ فطر د یسع د یع مناسبت بھ یفاروق نیالد  صالح حاج ام یپ ” [Message from Haj Salahuddin 
Faruqi on the occasion of Eid Saeed Fitr]. Edaalat News (blog). August 9, 2013. 
http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2013/08/blog-post_5697.html.  
———. “ امروز کھ بلوچ و کرد،عرب سنت اھل فرزندان از حمایت در العدل جیش سازمان پیام متن  
بھ االحواز نضال حرکت توسط کنندگان تظاھر جمع در کوپنھاگ در اعدام اعتراضی درتظاھرات  
شد  قرأت سازمان از نمایندگی ” [Message from Jaish al-Adl’s organization in support of 
Sunni, Arab and Baluchi children who came to represent the organization today at 
a demonstration in Copenhagen to protest the execution]. Edaalat News (blog). 
November 9, 2013. http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2013/11/blog-
post_4480.html. 
236 
———. “ جھاد  بھ دعوت یراستا در یفاروق نیالد  صالح العدل شیج  سازمان ریام ام یپ ” [Message from 
Jaish al-Adl Salahuddin Faruqi, the Emir of the Organization to call for Jihad]. 
Edaalat News (blog). September 13, 2013. http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2013/
09/blog-post_13.html. 
———. “ العدل شیج سازمان رھبر یفاروق نیالد  صالح ام یپ ” [Message from Salahuddin Farouqi, 
leader of the Jaish al-Adl organization]. Edaalat News (blog). November 7, 2013. 
http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2013/11/blog-post_7880.html. 
———. “ جانیآذربا زده زلزلھ مردم بھ العدل شی ج سازمان یھمدرد و تیتسل امی ” [Message of 
Condolences and Condolences from Jaish al-Adl Organization]. Edaalat News 
(blog). August 16, 2012. http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2012/08/blog-
post_2253.html.  
———. “ العدل جیش بھ نصر ادغام و النصر جیش انحالل سازمان: اعالمیھ ” [Organization 
Declaration: Dissolution of Jaish al-Nasr and merger of Nasr with Jaish al-Adl]. 
Edaalat News (blog). November 15, 2016. http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2016/
11/blog-post_45.html. 
———. “ است ستودنی کردستان دمکرات حزب پیشمرگان مقاومت ” [The resistance of the Peshmarga 
of the Kurdistan Democratic Party is commendable]. Edaalat News (blog). June 
27, 2016. http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2016/06/blog-post_98.html 
———. “ سپاه در بلوچ انیبوم استخدام از میرژِ  استیس و برنامھ : :موضوع یفاروق نیالد  صالح یسخران  
 Speech by Salahuddin Farouki: Subject: Regime’s Plan and Policy of] ”پاسداران
Employing Baluch Natives in the Revolutionary Guards]. Edaalat News (blog). 
December 15, 2016. http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2016/12/blog-post_15.html 
———. “ کردند آغاز را خود تیفعال العدل شیج سازمان ینظام یگردانھا ” [The military battalions of 
the Jaish al-Adl organization began their activity]. Edaalat News (blog). August 7, 
2012. http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/2012/08/blog-post_8.html. 
Jalilov, Orkhan. “Pakistan Army Chief Visits Tehran, Looking to Cooperate on Border 
Security.” Caspian News. November 9, 2017. https://caspiannews.com/news-
detail/pakistan-army-chief-visits-tehran-looking-to-cooperate-on-border-security-
2017-11-8-40/. 
Jane’s. “Iran’s Shia Policy Keeps Pakistan on side.” November 13, 2009. https://janes-
ihs-com/Janes/Display/jiaa5242-jiaa-2009. 
Jardine, Eric. “Population-Centric Counterinsurgency and the Movement of Peoples.” 
Small Wars & Insurgencies 23, no. 2 (May 1, 2012): 264-294. 




Johnson, Thomas. Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan 
Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. 
Johnston, Nicholas. “Legitimacy as Political Capital in Insurgency.” Small Wars Journal. 
January 12, 2018. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/legitimacy-political-
capital-insurgency. 
Johnston, Patrick B. “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of 
Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns.” International Security 
36, no. 4 (March 2012): 47-79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00076. 
Jones, Seth G. The Insurgent Sanctuary in Pakistan. Report No. 180911. Washington, 
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2018. https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
180911_Insurgent_Sanctuary_0.pdf?Di93wTOJ_ZpqMO38OTutzRXqaub.4.Dw. 
Karimi, Nasser. “Iran Executes Bomber At Site Of Attack Where 11 Revolutionary 
Guards Were Killed.” Associated Press International. February 19, 2007. Nexis 
Uni. 
Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. “Baluchistan: Nature, Ethnicity, and Empire in Iran’s 
Borderlands.” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 4, no. 2 (May 1, 2013): 
187-204. 
Khalaji, Mehdi. “Takfiris in Tehran: The Sectarian Face of Iranian Counterterrorism.” 
The Washington Institute. June 24, 2016. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/takfiris-in-tehran-the-sectarian-face-of-iranian-
counterterrorism. 
———. U.S. Support for the Iranian Opposition. Policy #1258. Washington, DC: The 
Washington Institute, July 9, 2007. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/u.s.-support-for-the-iranian-opposition. 
Khan, Adeel. “Baloch Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: From Guerrilla War to Nowhere?” 
Asian Ethnicity 4, no. 2 (June 1, 2003): 281-293. 
Khan, Mahrukh. “Balochistan: The Forgotten Frontier.” Strategic Studies XXXII-
XXXIII, no. 4-1 (Mar 31, 2013): 200-223. 
Khan, Zahid Ali. “Balochistan Factor in Pak-Iran Relations: Opportunities and 
Constraints.” South Asian Studies 27, no. 1 (January 2012): 121-140. ProQuest. 
Khatib, Said. “New Hamas Leader Says It Is Getting Aid Again from Iran.” CNBC. 
August 29, 2017. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/29/new-hamas-leader-says-it-is-
getting-aid-again-from-iran.html. 
Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
238 
———. “Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency.” Small Wars Journal. December 
1, 2007. Accessed May 18, 2019. https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-schools-
of-classical-counterinsurgency. 
Kitson, Frank. Low Intensity Operations; Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping. 
Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1971. 
Knoema. “Population Statistics of Iran.” January 24, 2018. https://knoema.com/
IRPS2014/population-statistics-of-iran?region=1000160-sistan-and-baluchestan. 
Kokaislova, Paula. “Ethnic Identity of the Baloch People.” Central Asia and the 
Caucasus 13, no. 3 (March 2012): 45-55. https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/280233271_Ethnic_Identity_of_the_Baloch_People. 
Kugelman, Michael. “Easing an Energy Crisis That Won’t End.” in Pakistan’s 
Interminable Energy Crisis: Is There Any Way Out? Washington, D.C.: The 
Wilson Center 2015. 1-22. https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-proposed-
iran-pakistan-india-gas-pipeline-unacceptable-risk-regional-security#_ftn1. 
Larsdotter, Kersti. “Regional Support for Afghan Insurgents: Challenges for 
Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine.” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 1 
(February 26, 2014): 135-162.  
Lewis, Martin W. “The Iran-Pakistan Border Barrier.” GeoCurrents. May 13, 2011. 
http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/the-iran-pakistan-border-barrier; 
Levitt, Matthew. “Hezbollah’s Procurement Channels: Leveraging Criminal Networks 
and Partnering with Iran.” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 3 (March 2019): 1-9. 
https://ctc.usma.edu/hezbollahs-procurement-channels-leveraging-criminal-
networks-partnering-iran/ 
Long, Austin. On ‘‘Other War’: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency 
Research. MG-482-OSD. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG482.html. 
Lowther, William, and Colin Freeman. “US Funds Terror Groups to Sow Chaos in Iran.” 
The Telegraph, February 25, 2007. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
1543798/US-funds-terror-groups-to-sow-chaos-in-Iran.html#. 
Luttwak, Edward. “DEAD END.” Harper’s Magazine 314, no. 1881 (February 1, 2007): 
33-40,42. ProQuest. 
Lynch, Colum. “Ahmadinejad’s letter to Ban Ki-moon.” Foreign Policy. April 23, 2010. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/13/ahmadinejads-letter-to-ban-ki-moon/. 
239 
Mackey, Robert. “Here’s John Bolton Promising Regime Change in Iran by the End of 
2018.” The Intercept. March 23, 2018. https://theintercept.com/2018/03/23/heres-
john-bolton-promising-regime-change-iran-end-2018/. 
Mackinlay, John. The Insurgent Archipelago. London: C. Hurst & Company, 2009. 
MacWillson, Alastair C. “Effective Government in Crisis Management.” In Hostage-
Taking Terrorism Incident-Response Strategy. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 
1992, 81-112. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12477-0. 
Mapping Militant Organizations. “Balochistan Liberation Front.” August 15, 2015. 
https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/457#note1. 
———. “Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan.” February 15, 2012. https://web.stanford.edu/group/
mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/147. 
Marcus, Jonathan. “Pakistan-Iran Gas Pipeline Defies US.” BBC News, March 11, 2013. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21736725. 
Martin, Rachel. “Aggressive Rhetoric Ramps Up Between U.S. and Iran.” NPR. May 15, 
2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/05/15/723466480/aggressive-rhetoric-ramps-up-
between-u-s-and-iran. 
McKernan, Bethan. “Trump Signals End of U.S. Support for Syrian Rebels.” The 
Independent (Daily Edition), Nov 13, 2016. ProQuest. 
Merari, Ariel. “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency.” Terrorism and Political Violence 
5, no. 4 (December 2007): 213-251. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546559308427227. 
Merat, Aaron. “Iran calls for return of abducted border guards held in Pakistan.” The 
Telegraph. March 28, 2014. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
middleeast/iran/10729946/Iran-calls-for-return-of-abducted-border-guards-held-
in-Pakistan.html. 
Middle East Journal. “Developments of the Quarter: Comment and Chronology.” Middle 
East Journal 11, no. 3 (Summer 1957): 282-308. www.jstor.org/stable/4322924. 
Middle East Media Research Institute TV Monitor Project. “Leader of the Jundallah 
Movement Fighting against Iran Abd Al-Malek Al-Rigi: We Plan to Carry our 
Attack into Tehran.” Middle East Media Research Institute TV Monitor Project. 
August 7, 2008. https://www.memri.org/tv/leader-junduallah-movement-fighting-
against-iran-abd-al-malek-al-rigi-we-plan-carry-our-attack/transcript 
Mirzaei, Aram. “Jundallah: the US-Backed Salafi Terrorists in Iran.” Mint Press News. 
April 8’th 2019. https://www.mintpressnews.com/the-us-backed-salafi-terrorists-
operating-in-iran/257081/. 
240 
Monetero, David. “Ethnic Spat Heats Up Pakistan-Iran Border.” Christian Science 
Monitor. April 18, 2007. Nexis Uni. 
Mueller, John and Mark Stewart. “Conflating Terrorism and Insurgency,” Lawfare, 
February 28, 2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/conflating-terrorism-and-
insurgency. 
Moshiri, Nazanine. “Iran Opium Patrol: Police Fight Drug Smugglers Along Border.” Al 
Jazeera. June 26, 2008. Video, 1:48. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Ep-
wtx6dp4. 
Mumford, Andrew, ed. The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare: Warrior-
Scholarship in Counter-Insurgency. London: Routledge, 2014. 
Myklebust, Martin and Tom Ordeman. “Six Requirements for Success in Modern 
Counterinsurgency.” Small Wars Journal. last modified July 25, 2013. 
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/six-requirements-for-success-in-modern-
counterinsurgency. 
Nation, The. “Iran Opens Corridor at Taftan Border.” April 15, 2019. 
https://nation.com.pk/15-Apr-2019/iran-opens-corridor-at-taftan-border. 
———. “Terrorist Abdul Sattar Rigi Held.” May 1, 2015. https://nation.com.pk/01-May-
2015/terrorist-abdul-sattar-rigi-held. 
National Consortium for The Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “BAAD—
Jundallah—2003.” February 2015. https://www.start.umd.edu/baad/database/
jundallah-2003. 
Naylor, Phillip C. “A History of Violence in the Early Algerian Colony,” The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies 47, no. 1 (2014): 149-51. 
JSTOR. 
Niayesh, Umid. “Leader of Iran’s Baluchi Rebels Killed in Pakistan.” Ostomaan: 
Balochistan People’s Party. August 29, 2014. http://ostomaan.se/leader-of-irans-
baluchi-rebels-killed-in-pakistan/. 
Nimmo, Kurt. “Former Pakistan General: U.S. Supports Jundallah Terrorists in Iran.” 
Infowars, last modified July 10, 2008. https://www.infowars.com/former-
pakistan-general-us-supports-jundullah-terrorists-in-iran/#. 
Notezai, Muhammad Akbar. “Can ISIS Gain a Foothold in Balochistan?” The Diplomat. 
January 7, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/can-isis-gain-a-foothold-in-
balochistan/. 
———.” Trouble at the Pakistan-Iran Border.” The Diplomat. October 30, 2018. 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/trouble-at-the-pakistan-iran-border/. 
241 
O’Carroll, Eoin. “US Backing Secret War Against Iran?” The Christian Science Monitor. 
April 5, 2007. https://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0405/p99s01-duts.html. 
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Counterinsurgency. JP 3-24. 
Washington, DC: 25 April 2018. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/
Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24.pdf. 
Ommani, Ardeshir. “U.S. Support for Terrorism Targeting Iran.” Tehran Times. April 24, 
2007. NewsBank. 
Open Net Initiative, The. “Internet Filtering in Iran.” 2009. https://opennet.net/sites/
opennet.net/files/ONI_Iran_2009.pdf. 
Orzeata, Mihail. “Mass Media—an Ally or an Enemy in The Struggle Against 
Terrorism?” International Journal of Communication Research 6, no. 2 (April 
2016): 133-142. ProQuest. 
Ostapenko, E. “EU Urges Iran to Abolish Death Penalty.” Trend News Agency. July 18, 
2009. https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/1507444.html. 
Ostovar, Afshon. “The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War.” Security 
Studies 28 no. 1 (October 2018): 159-188. https://doi.org/10.1080/
09636412.2018.1508862. 
———. Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Pakistan Today. “Iran Deports 116 Pakistani Nationals.” November 27, 2018. 
https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/11/27/iran-deports-116-pakistani-
nationals/. 
Paraszczuk, Joanna. “Iran Sunni Baloch Insurgents: “Union with Hizbul-Furqan 
Strengthens Our Front Against Safavids.” EA Worldview. December 21, 2013. 
https://eaworldview.com/2013/12/iran-sunni-baloch-insurgents-union-hezb-ul-
forqan-strengthens-front-safavids/. 
Patil, Vishwanath. “Iran Installs Locally-Made Radar Along Border with Pakistan.” 
DefenseWorld. January 21, 2019. https://www.defenseworld.net/news/24116/
Iran_Installs_Locally_made_Radar_Along_Border_with_Pakistan#.Xg0v10dKhP. 
Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill. Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: 
Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2010. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG964.html.  
Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunnigan. “Moving Beyond 
Population-Centric Vs. Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency.” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 27, no. 6 (November 1, 2016): 1019-1042. 
242 
Perry, Mark. “False Flag.” Foreign Policy, January 13, 2012. https://foreignpolicy.com/
2012/01/13/false-flag/. 
Peterson, Scott. “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Tightens Grip.” Christian Science Monitor. 
December 9, 2009. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/1209/
p10s01-wome.html. 
Philadelphia Enquirer. “Iran Arrests 40 Following Bombing at Mosque.” July 18, 2010. 
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/
20100718_Iran_arrests_40_following_bombing_at_mosque.html 
Philippine News Agency, “Iranian Forces Monitoring Border Attack ‘Terrorists’: 
Commander.” October 29, 2013. https://advance.lexis.com/api/
document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:59PD-YDV1-JDKC-R32F-
00000-00&context=1516831. 
Plakoudas, Spyridon. “Population Transfers in Counterinsurgency: A Recipe for 
Success?” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 4 (July 2016): 681-701, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2016.1189542. 
Pollack, Kenneth, Daniel L. Byman, Martin Indyk, Suzanne Maloney, Michael 
O’Hanlon, and Bruce Riedel. Which Path to Persia? Options for a New American 
Strategy Toward Iran. Analysis Paper Number 20, June 2009.  
Porch, Douglas. Counterinsurgency. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
Press Trust of India, The. “US Officials Backing Anti-Iran Pak Militant Group: Report.” 
April 4, 2007. Nexis Uni. 
PressTV. “Iran forces foil twin car bombings near Pakistan border, kill two terrorists.” 
March 12, 2018. NewsBank. 
———. “Majlis to mull deployment of forces to Pakistan: MP.” November 2, 2013. 
Nexis Uni. 
———. “West Facing Constant Defeat in Iran.” July 13, 2010. https://web.archive.org/
web/20100716221828/http://www.presstv.ir/
detail.aspx?id=134627§ionid=351020101 
Qaidaari, Abbas. “More Planes, More Missiles, More Warships: Iran Increases Its 
Military Budget by a Third.” Al-Monitor. July 13, 2015. https://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/khamenei-orders-increase-military.html. 
Qods. “Iran MP Says Pakistan PM Visit Could Help Pipeline Project.” May 10, 2014. 
NewsBank. 
243 
———. “Iran Paper Slams Pakistan Inaction in Dealing with Criminal Group in 
Southeast.” December 24, 2008. NewsBank. 
———. “Paper Says Pakistani Premier’s Visit to Iran ‘Can Pave Way for New Era’.” 
May 10, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Diplomat Denies Remarks Attributed to Interior Minister on US-Iraq 
Pact.” June 27, 2008. NewsBank. 
RadioFarda. “Iran Says Two ‘Terrorists’ Killed and Five Arrested.” June 15, 2017. 
https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-sunni-extremists-terrorists-killed-arrested/
28553308.html. 
———. “IRGC Gives up Stake in Telecommunications Possibly to Avoid Sanctions.” 
October 24, 2018. https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-irgc-gives-up-stake-in-
telecommunications/29561856.html. 
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. “Casualties Reported in Attack on Basij Base in 
Southern Iran.” February 2, 2019. https://www.rferl.org/a/casualties-reported-in-
attack-on-basij-base-in-southern-iran/29747300.html. 
———. “Iran Rebel, on Death Row, Says U.S. Supported Group.” August 25, 2009. 
https://www.rferl.org/a/Iran_Rebel_On_Death_Row_Says_US_Supported_
Group/1807468.html. 
Rashid, Ahmed. “Explosive Mix in Pakistan’s Gas Province.” BBC News. February 4, 
2005. https://web.archive.org/web/20121111122553/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south_asia/4195933.stm. 
Rather, Dan. “The Most Wanted Man in Iran.” December 23, 2008. Dan Rather Reports. 
Video, 27:00. 
Regencia, Ted. “Iran Warns Pakistan To Crack Down on Jaish al-Adl.” Al Jazeera. 
February 16, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/iran-warns-
pakistan-crack-jaish-al-adl-190216071021469.html. 
Reporters Without Borders. “Iran.” December 15, 2019. https://rsf.org/en/iran. 
Reuters. “Iran Says Rebels Killed 16 Abducted Policemen.” RadioFreeEurope/
RadioLiberty. December 5, 2008. https://www.rferl.org/
a/Iran_Rebels_Killed_16_Policemen/1356706.html. 
———. “Militants Kill 10 Iranian border Guards in Attack on Frontier with Pakistan.” 
Guardian. April 26, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/26/
militants-kill-ten-iranian-border-guards-in-attack-on-frontier-with-pakistan. 
244 




Reynolds, James. “Iran Suicide Bombing: Chabahar Mosque Hit by Attack.” BBC. 
December 15, 2010. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11997679. 
Rezaei, Farhad, and Somayeh Khodaei Moshirabad. “The Revolutionary Guards: From 
Spoiler to Accepter of the Nuclear Agreement.” British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies 45, no.2 (2018): 138-155. https://doi.org/10.1080/
13530194.2016.1214817. 
Rid, Thomas. “The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine.” 33, no. 
5 (October 1, 2010): 727-758. 
Rind, Ali Raza. “Travel Resumes at Pak-Iran Border Near Chagai.” Dawn, October 21, 
2019, https://www.dawn.com/news/1512059/travel-resumes-at-pak-iran-border-
near-chagai. 
Rizvi, M. Mahtab Alam. “Evaluating the Political and Economic Role of the IRGC.” 
Strategic Analysis 36, no. 4 (July 1, 2012): 584-96. https://doi.org/10.1080/
09700161.2012.689528. 
Roggio, Bill. “Jundallah Kills Senior Iranian Revolutionary Guards ...” Long Wars 
Journal (blog), October 18, 2019. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/
10/jundallah_kills_seni.php. 
Romijn, Peter. “Learning on ‘The Job’: Dutch War Volunteers Entering the Indonesian 
War of Independence, 1945-46.” Journal of Genocide Research 14, no. 3-4 
(2012): 317-336. 
Ronaghi, Alireza. “Iran Hangs Sunni Group Leader.” Al Jazeera. June 20, 2010. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/06/201062034410244183.html) 
Rozen, Laura. “Subject to Debat: Did ABC Know About Its Sourcing Problem?” Mother 
Jones. September 14, 2007. https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2007/09/
subject-debat-did-abc-know-about-its-experts-sourcing-problem/. 
Ryan, Maria. “Inventing the ‘Axis of Evil’: The Myth and Reality of Us Intelligence and 
Policy-Making after 9/11.” Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 4 
(December 1, 2002): 55-76. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306640. 
Safshekan, Roozbeh and Farzan Sabet. “The Ayatollah’s Praetorians: The Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps and the 2009 Election Crisis.” The Middle East 
Journal 64, no. 4. Autumn 2010: 543-558. https://doi.org/10.3751/64.4.12. 
245 
Sahimi, Muhammad. “Who Supports Jundallah?” Frontline. last modified October 30, 
2009. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/10/
jundallah.html. 
Sajid, Sarah. “Issue of Pakistan-Iran Cross Border Terrorism, and its Future Remedies.” 
Iran Review. April 5, 2016. http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Issue-
of-Pakistan-Iran-Cross-Border-Terrorism-and-its-Future-Remedies.htm. 
Salahuddin Farroqi. “ فطر د یسع د یع مناسبت بھ یفاروق نیالد  صالح العدل شیج  رھبر کیتبر ام یپ ” 
[Congratulatory Message by Leader Jaish al-Adl Salahuddin Faruqi on Eid Saeed 
Fitr]. Edaalat News (blog). August 19, 2012. http://edaalatnews.blogspot.com/
2012/08/blog-post_7900.html. 
Salzman, Philip Carl. “Book Review: Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after 
Khomeini by Rasmus Christian Elling: New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
276 Pp. $100.00 Cloth.” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 6, no. 2 (April 
3, 2015): 215-220. https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2015.1050625. 
Sanger, David E., and Edward Wong. “New Tensions with Iran Threaten Nuclear Deal 
And, White House Says, U.S. Troops.” New York Times. May 6, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/world/middleeast/us-iran-iraq-troops-.html. 
Saul, Jonathan, Parisa Hafezi, and Michael Georgy. “Exclusive: Iran Steps Up Support 
for Houthis in Yemen’s War—Sources.” Reuters. March 22, 2017. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-iran-houthis/exclusive-iran-steps-up-
support-for-houthis-in-yemens-war-sources-idUSKBN16S22R. 
Schwartzstein, Peter. “Drought Turns Part of Iran into a New Dust Bowl.” National 
Geographic. January 28, 2019. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/
environment/2019/01/drought-climate-change-turn-iran-sistan-and-baluchestan-
into-dust-bowl/. 
Shahab, Shahabuddin. “Pakistan asks Iran to act on militants behind Baluchistan 
killings.” Reuters. April 20, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-
iran/pakistan-asks-iran-to-act-on-militants-behind-baluchistan-killings-
idUSKCN1RW0EQ. 
Shahid, Saleem. “Iranian Hostages Freed After Clash with Militant.” Dawn. August 21, 
2007. https://www.dawn.com/news/262289/iranian-hostages-freed-after-clash-
with-militants. 
Sharafedin, Bozorgmehr. “In Southern Province, Arabs Report, Crackdown as Regional 




Shay, Shaul. “Iran Blames US, Israel for Suicide Attack on IRGC.” Israel Defense. 
February 17, 2019. https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/37476. 
ShiiteNews. “Iran Hands Over 144 Pakistanis at Taftan Border Crossing.” June 11, 2019. 
https://shiitenews.org/featured/item/98463-iran-hands-144-pakistanis-taftan-
border-crossing/. 
Shipman, Tim. “Bush Sanctions ‘Black Ops’ Against Iran.” Telegraph. May 27, 2007. 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1552784/Bush-sanctions-black-
ops-against-Iran.html. 
Shuster, Mike. “Mystery Surrounds Arrest of Iran’s Most Wanted Man.” NPR. March 5, 
2010. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124332362. 
Sitaraman, Ganesh. “The Rule of Law and the New Counterinsurgency Field Manual.” 
Small Wars Journal. last modified July 2, 2014. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/
art/the-rule-of-law-and-the-new-counterinsurgency-field-manual. 
Slackman, Michael. “Iran Guard Commanders are Killed in Bombings.” New York Times. 
October 18, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/world/middleeast/
19iran.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=455104A0067C0FD7BBE55D2938
438C1A&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL. 
Souri, Sadegh. “The Iranian Smugglers Trafficking Fuel into Pakistan.” Wired. 
November 9, 2017. https://www.wired.com/story/fuel-smugglers-photos/. 
Spooner, Brian. “The Baloch in Islamic Civilization, Western Ethnography, and World 
History.” Journal of the Middle East and Africa 4, no. 2 (October 2013): 135-51. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2013.831021. 
Stratfor. “Iran: An Examination of Jundallah.” July 28, 2010. 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/iran-examination-jundallah#/home/error. 
Statista. “Circulation of The Daily Telegraph in the United Kingdom (UK) from 1st half 
2003 to 2nd half 2016.” September 17, 2019. https://www.statista.com/statistics/
288275/circulation-trend-of-the-daily-telegraph-newspaper-uk/. 
Sunday Telegraph. “Iran’s Arabs want rights, not foreign might.” March 4, 2007. Nexis 
Uni. 
Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated by Samuel B. Griffin. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1963. 
Tabatabai, Ariane M. “Other Side of the Iranian Coin: Iran’s Counterterrorism 
Apparatus.” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1-2 (February 23, 2018): 181-
207. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1283613. 
247 
Taheri, Ahmad Reza. The Baloch in Post-Islamic Revolution Iran: A Political Study. The 
Sociopolitical Culture of Iranian Baloch Elites.” Sindh, Pakistan: TECODH, 
2012.  
———. “The Sociopolitical Culture of Iranian Baloch Elites.” Iranian Studies 46, no. 6 
(November 1, 2013): 973-94. https://doi.org/10.1080/00210862.2013.810079. 
Taheri, Amir. “Many Sources but No Meat.” Telegraph. September 22, 2004. 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/3624163/Many-sources-but-no-
meat.html. 
Tait, Robert. “Iran Suicide Bombing Kills Revolutionary Guards Commanders.” 
Guardian. October 18, 2009. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/18/
iran-revolutionary-guard-suicide-bomb. 
Takar, Nafees, and Noor Zahid. “VOA Explainer: Who Are Takfiri Extremists?” Voice 
of America. June 22, 2016. https://www.voanews.com/world-news/middle-east-
dont-use/voa-explainer-who-are-takfiri-extremists. 
Takeyh, Ray. “Will Khomeini’s Anti-American Vision Endure?” Council on Foreign 
Relations. February 11, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/article/will-khomeinis-anti-
american-vision-endure. 
Takhavai, Babak. “Control 2, the Backbone of the Iranian UAV.” BBC Persia. June 27, 
2017. https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-40405835. 
Tan, Zoe C.W. “The Role of Media in Insurgent Terrorism: Issues and Perspectives.” 
Gazette 44, no. 3 (December 1989): 191-215. https://doi.org/10.1177/
001654928904400303. 
Tanzeem, Ayesha. “Iran, Pakistan Agree to Boost Border Security, Trade.” Voice of 
America News. February 1, 2016, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia/iran-
pakistan-agree-boost-border-security-trade. 
Tehran Times. “8 Iranian Border Guards Killed in Terrorist Attack.” April 8, 2015. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Bandits in Kerman Must Be Tracked Down: Officials.” May 15, 2006. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Bandits Kidnap 21 in Southeastern Iran.” August 20, 2007. NewsBank. 
———. “CIA, Regional Spy Agencies Set Goals for Terrorists: General.” October 21, 
2009. NewsBank. 
———. “Five of Iran’s Abducted Border Guards Freed.” November 16, 2018. 
NewsBank. 
248 
———. “General Soleimani To Pakistanis: Saudi Arabia Is Ruining Your Country.” 
February 22, 2019. NewsBank. 
———. “Interior Minister Optimistic About Release of Iranian Border Guards.” March 
19, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Arrests 4 Jundullah Terrorists.” August 13, 2009. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Arrests Terrorist Ringleader Abdolmalek Rigi.” February 24, 2010. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Asks Pakistan To Exert More Control Over Border Areas.” March 3, 2014. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Iranian Cineastes Ask for Release of Abducted Border Guards.” March 6, 2014. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Calls for Extradition of Jundullah Terror Suspects.” October 24, 2009. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Cautions Pakistan Over Jundullah.” July 2, 2008. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Commander Talks of U.S. Contact with Jundullah.” November 24, 2009. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Complaint\s To Pakistan on Abduction of Five Border Guards.” February 
10, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Foiled 30 Bombings in Past Year: Intelligence Minister,” April 22, 2017, 
NewsBank 
———. “Iran Foils Terrorist Operation,” May 13, 2017, NewsBank. 
———. “Iran’s Military Chief: Pakistan Has Started Operations Against Terrorists.” 
February 18, 2019. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran: No Hostage Talks with Jundullah. “July 7, 2008. NewsBank, 
———. “Iran: Pakistan Has Not Met Expectations in Fighting Terrorism.” February 20, 
2019. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Protests to Pakistan Over Border Attack.” October 28, 2013. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Says Abdul Rauf Rigi Was Killed in Intergroup Conflict.” September 4, 
2014. NewsBank 
———. “Iran Says 5 Abducted Border Guards Freed in Pakistan.” March 21, 2019. 
NewsBank. 
249 
———. “Iran Says Pakistan Was Not Cooperative in Releasing Hostages.” December 10, 
2008. NewsBank. 
———. “Iran Wants Pakistan To Walk the Talk on Terror.” March 12, 2019. NewsBank. 
———. “IRGC Forces Kill Jaish-Ul-Adl’s Second-In-Command.” September 29, 2018. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Islamabad Vows to Help Free Abducted Iranian Border Guards.” February 24, 
2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Jundallah Terrorist Executed in Iran.” November 4, 200., NewsBank. 
———. “Local TV Airs Zahedan Bomber’s Confession.” February 17, 2007. NewsBank. 
———. “MP Accuses Pakistan of Being Unable to Control Border with Iran.” October 
12, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Negative Elements Fail to Harm Tehran-Islamabad Ties: Pakistan FM.” March 
2, 2019. NewsBank. 
———. “No Third Country Can Affect Iran-Pakistan Ties: Rouhani.” April 22, 2019. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan’s Failure to Guard Its Borders Is Unacceptable: Iran Police Chief.” 
October 12, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan Asks Iran Not to Send in Troops After Guards Kidnapped.” February 
19, 2014. NewsBank. 
———. “‘Pakistan Pledges to Capture Jundullah Terrorists and Extradite Them to Iran.’” 
October 27, 2009. NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan President, PM Send Letter to Ayatollah Khamenei.” March 8, 2019. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan Promises ‘Good News’ For Iran Over Border Attack.” March 10, 
2019. NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan To Identify and Hand Over Terrorists to Iran.” October 29, 2013. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Pakistan Won’t Allow Its Soil to Be Used for Terrorist Activities.” March 10, 
2019. NewsBank.  
———. “Police Chief: Iran Ready to Hunt Terrorists in Pakistan.” February 22, 2009. 
NewsBank. 
250 
———. “Police Commander Says One Jaish-Ul-Adl Terrorist Still At Large, Patrolling 
Continues.” June 14, 2016. NewsBank. 
———. “Policeman, Known as Living Martyr, Dies After 10 Years in Coma.” November 
9, 2018. NewsBank.  
———. “Police Delivers Deadly Blow to Jundallah: Security Official.” December 23, 
2008. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/185307/Police-delivers-deadly-blow-to-
Jundallah-security-official. 
———. “Regional Terrorism Inspired by Wahhabi Seminaries: Ayatollah Makarem 
Shirazi.” October 25, 2009. NewsBank. 
———. “Rigi Details Western Support for His Terror Acts.” May 23, 2010. NewsBank. 
———. “Rouhani Writes to Pakistan’s Sharif Over Dead Soldiers.” April 28, 2017, 
NewsBank. 
———. “Situation in Pakistan Has Made Release of Hostages Difficult: Minister.” 
August 24, 2008. NewsBank. 
———. “Suicide Bomber Kills Two in SE Iran.” October 19, 2012. NewsBank. 
———. “Sunnis Hold Rally Protesting Terrorist Attack in Chabahar.” December 19, 
2010. NewsBank. 
———. “Suspects in Zahedan Terror Attack Arrested.” May 30, 2009. NewsBank. 
———. “Terrorist Bombing in Zahedan.” February 15, 2007. NewsBank. 
———. “Three Linked to Terror Act in Southeast Iran Arrested.” February 18, 2019. 
NewsBank. 
———. “Three Police Forces Martyred in Southeastern Iran.” November 28, 2014. 
NewsBank. 
———. “UK, U.S. Aided Jundullah Kidnapping: Iranian Official.” December 14, 2008. 
NewsBank. 
———. “U.S.-Guided Terror Management in Iran—And Elsewhere.” January 9, 2011. 
NewsBank. 
———. “We Will Not Allow Jundallah To Use Pakistan Soil: Defense Chief.” April 21, 
2012. NewsBank. 
———. “Zahedan Bombings Intended to Foment Sunni-Shia Conflict: Governor.” 
February 18, 2007. NewsBank. 
251 
Thompson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency; the Lessons of Malaya and 
Vietnam. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966. 
Times of India, The. “President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Orders Swift Action Against 
Iran Bombers.” October 18, 2009. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/
middle-east/President-Mahmoud-Ahmadinejad-orders-swift-action-against-Iran-
bombers/articleshow/5137537.cms?referral=PM. 
Times of Islamabad. “Iranian Border Guards Arrest 100 Pakistanis On Taftan Border.” 
July 30, 2017. https://timesofislamabad.com/30-Jul-2017/iranian-border-guards-
arrest-100-pakistanis-on-taftan-border. 
Tran, Mark and Saeed Kamali Dehghan. “Iran mosque bombing kills dozens.” Guardian. 
December 15, 2010. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/15/iran-
chahbahar-suicide-bombing-mosque. 
Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Westport, CT: 
Praeger Security International, 2008. 
United States Institute of Peace. “Iran’s Military Might.” Iran Primer. July 8, 2019. 
https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/jul/03/irans-military-might. 
U.S. Department of the Army. Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2006. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=468442. 
———. Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. FM 3-24. Washington, DC: 2014. 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf. 
U.S. Department of Defense. The Dictionary of Military Terms, Joint Pub 1-02, New 
York: Department of Defense. 2009. 
———. DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, January 2020. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/
Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration. “Pakistan: Energy Analysis.” August 2016. 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=PAK. 
U.S. Library of Congress. Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile. Federal 
Research Division, Washington, D.C., December 2012). https://fas.org/irp/world/
iran/mois-loc.pdf Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. Member 
Profile: West Balochistan, Balochistan People’s Party. Brussels, Belgium: 
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, August 2017. https://unpo.org/
downloads/2341.pdf. 
252 
U.S. Department of State. U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. Washington, DC: 
Department of State, 2009. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/
119629.pdf. 
U.S. Department of the Treasury. “Counter Terrorism Designations; IRGC Foreign 
Terrorist Organization Designation.” April 15, 2019. https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20190415_33.aspx. 
U.S. State Department. “In the Matter of the Review and Amendment of the Designation 
of Jundallah (and Other Aliases) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Pursuant to 
Section 219 of the Immigration and National Act, as Amended.” The Federal 
Register. July 2, 2019. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/07/02/
2019-14115/in-the-matter-of-the-review-and-amendment-of-the-designation-of-
jundallah-and-other-aliases-as-a. 
Van Creveld, Martin L. The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne 
to Iraq. New York: Presidio Press, 2006. 
Vatanka, Alex. “Iran-Pakistan: Will Border Tensions Boil Over?” BBC. October 24, 
2014. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29752647. 
Walsh, Eddie. “Should the U.S. Support an Independent Balochistan?” Al Jazeera. March 
3, 2012. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/
201222112203196390.html. 
Wehrey, Frederic, Jerrold D. Green, Brian Nichiporuk, Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, 
Rasool Nafisi, and S. R. Bohandy. The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the 
Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. 
Welton, Benjamin. “Military Adventurer Raymond Westerling on How to Defeat an 
Insurgency.” Social Matter. March 20, 2018. https://www.socialmatter.net/2018/
03/12/military-adventurer-raymond-westerling-on-how-to-defeat-an-insurgency/. 
Wiig, Audun Kolstad. Islamist Opposition in The Islamic Republic: Jundullah and the 
Spread of Extremist Deobandism in Iran. FFI-rapport 2009/01265. Kjeller, 
Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, July 2, 2009. 
http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2009/01265.pdf. 
WorldOMeters. “Iran Population.” July 1, 2019. https://www.worldometers.info/world-
population/iran-population/ 




Yong, William, and Robert F. Worth. “Toll Rises from Twin Suicide Bombings at 
Iranian Mosque.” New York Times. July 26, 2010. https://www.nytimes.com/
2010/07/17/world/middleeast/17tehran.html. 
Yousufzai, Gul. “Alleged Leader of Chinese Consulate Attack in Pakistan Reported 
Killed.” Reuters. December 26, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
pakistan-separatists/alleged-leader-of-chinese-consulate-attack-in-pakistan-
reported-killed-idUSKCN1OP12H. 
———. “Pakistan Says Iranian Mortar Attack Kills Civilian.” Reuters. May 27, 2017. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-iran-border/pakistan-says-iranian-
mortar-attack-kills-civilian-idUSKBN18N0FM. 
Warnaar, Maaike. “So Many Similarities: Linking Domestic Dissent to Foreign Threat in 
Iran.” Working Paper, Knowledge Program Civil Society in West Asia, March 
2011. https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/32220/
WP%2020%20Warnaar.pdf?sequence=1 
Wege, Carl Anthony. “Iranian intelligence organizations.” International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no.3, (spring 1997): 288, DOI: 10.1080/
08850609708435351. 
Wigginton, Michael Robert Burton, Carl Jensen, David Mcelreath, Stephen Mallory, and 
Daniel A Doss. “Al-Qods Force: Iran’s Weapon of Choice to Export Terrorism.” 
Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 10, no. 2 (July 3, 2015): 
153-65. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2015.1090053. 
World Politics Review. “Are Foreign Powers Sponsoring Sunni Insurgents in Iran?” 
April 30, 2019. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/27803/are-
foreign-powers-sponsoring-sunni-insurgents-in-iran. 
Worth, Robert F. “Iran Says Capture of Rebel Is Blow to U.S.” New York Times. 
February 23, 2010. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/world/middleeast/
24insurgent.html. 
Zafar, Muhammad. “Pak-Iran: Trade and Travel Suspended for Three Weeks.” Express 
Tribune, November 6, 2018. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1841347/1-pak-iran-
trade-travel-suspended-three-weeks/. 
———. “PPP Demands Reopening of Zero-Point Trade Gate.” Express Tribune, April 
15, 2018. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1685850/1-ppp-demands-reopening-zero-
point-trade-gate/. 
———. “Raahdari Comes Back to Life, Express Tribune, April 19, 2018. 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1689327/1-raahdari-comes-back-life/. 
254 
Zambelis, Chris. “A New Phase of Resistance and Insurgency in Iranian Baluchistan.” 
CTC Sentinel 2, no. 7 (July 2009): 15-18. https://ctc.usma.edu/a-new-phase-of-
resistance-and-insurgency-in-iranian-baluchistan/. 
———. “Back with a Vengeance: The Baloch Insurgency in Iran.” Terrorism Monitor 9, 
no.2 (January 14, 2011). https://jamestown.org/program/back-with-a-vengeance-
the-baloch-insurgency-in-iran/ 
———. “The Evolution of the Ethnic Baluch Insurgency in Iran.” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 3 
(March 2014): 17-20. https://ctc.usma.edu/the-evolution-of-the-ethnic-baluch-
insurgency-in-iran/. 
———. “Iran Confronts Intensifying Insurgent Offensive in Sistan-Balochistan 
Province.” The Jamestown Foundation. April 17, 2015. https://jamestown.org/
program/iran-confronts-intensifying-insurgent-offensive-in-sistan-balochistan-
province/. 
———. “Political Theater or Counterterrorism? Assessing Iran’s Capture of Jundallah 
Leader Abdelmalek Rigi.” Terrorism Monitor 8, no. 13 (April 2010). 
https://jamestown.org/program/political-theater-or-counterterrorism-assessing-
irans-capture-of-jundallah-leader-abdelmalek-rigi/. 
———. “Terror in Tehran: The Islamic State Goes to War with the Islamic Republic.” 
CTC Sentinel 10, no. 6. (June 2017): 16-21. https://ctc.usma.edu/terror-in-tehran-
the-islamic-state-goes-to-war-with-the-islamic-republic/. 
255 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
